SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah

Utah Law Digital Commons
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship

Utah Law Scholarship

2009

Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender
of Homophobia
Clifford Rosky

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship
Part of the Law and Gender Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons

DUKEMINIER_1.24.11.DOC

1/28/11 11:18
AM
257

Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood,
and the Gender of Homophobia
Clifford J. Rosky†

ABSTRACT: This Article argues that gender influences the expression of
homophobic and heterosexist stereotypes about gay and lesbian parents. By
conducting a comparative analysis of reported family law opinions, it shows
that gay and lesbian parents are subjected to gender-influenced stereotypes in
custody and visitation cases—stereotypes that are influenced by the parent’s
gender, the child’s gender, and the judge’s gender. First, gay fathers are
subjected to two stereotypes that are influenced by the parent’s gender. They
are stereotyped as HIV agents and child molesters—men who infect children
with HIV and sexually abuse children, especially boys. Lesbian mothers are not
stereotyped as HIV agents, and they are rarely stereotyped as child molesters.
Next, both gay fathers and lesbian mothers are subjected to two stereotypes that
are influenced by the child’s gender. They are stereotyped as recruiters and role
models—people who encourage children to become homosexual. Although
recruiting and role modeling stereotypes are applied to both gay and lesbian
parents, they are applied more often to the parents of sons than the parents of
daughters, and they are rarely applied to the fathers of daughters. This pattern
betrays patriarchal concerns about the importance of fathers in the production
of masculine, heterosexual boys. Finally, all of these stereotypes are influenced
by the judge’s gender. Male judges are more likely than female judges to accept
gender-influenced stereotypes about gay and lesbian parents. This pattern
reflects the observed tendencies of heterosexual men to accept homophobic and
heterosexist stereotypes more often than heterosexual women and apply such
stereotypes to gay men more often than to lesbians.
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In the legal academy’s responses to stereotypes about gay and lesbian
parents, scholars have been blind to the influence of gender. By ignoring the
influence of the parent’s gender, we have introduced unnecessary omissions
and weaknesses into our responses to HIV and child molestation stereotypes.
By ignoring the influence of the child’s gender, we have failed to notice the
reciprocal relationship between homophobia and gender, and we have imposed
arbitrary limits on our responses to recruiting and role modeling stereotypes.
By taking account of the relationship between homophobia and gender, we can
develop a more rigorous and inclusive case on behalf of gay and lesbian
families—a case that vindicates not only the parental interests of gay men and
lesbians but the developmental interests of children who may grow up to be gay
men and lesbians, too.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that gender influences the expression of homophobic
and heterosexist stereotypes about gay and lesbian parents.1 On a general level,
it challenges a paradigm that ignores the influence of gender or pretends that
gender has no influence at all. On a specific level, it focuses on the influence of
male gender—the maleness of fathers, sons, and judges—which has generally
been neglected by lesbian, feminist, and family law scholars. By conducting a
comparative analysis of reported family law opinions, it shows that gay and
lesbian parents are subjected to gender-influenced stereotypes in custody and
visitation cases—stereotypes that are influenced by the parent’s gender, the
child’s gender, and the judge’s gender. By taking account of the reciprocal
relationship between homophobia and gender—the gender of homophobia and
the homophobia of gender—this Article aims to develop a more nuanced model
of homophobia and a more compelling case for gay and lesbian parenthood.
In most disputes over gay and lesbian parenthood, you don’t hear much
talk about gender. Opponents claim that children should not be exposed to the
“homosexual lifestyle,” and they ask gay men and lesbians to choose between
homosexuality and parenthood.2 Advocates call such claims “homophobic” and
“heterosexist,” and they urge judges and politicians to reject them.3 On both
sides, the debate over gay and lesbian parenthood remains gender-blind: Gay
fathers are lumped together with lesbian mothers; sons are lumped together
with daughters.4
For the most part, the legal scholarship on gay and lesbian parenthood
reflects a similar framework. If gender has had any influence in disputes over
gay and lesbian parenthood, legal scholars have largely ignored it. In the past
several decades, lawyers and law professors have written dozens of articles
about homosexuality and parenthood, in which they have generally argued for
pro-gay reforms to family law. In most of these articles, lesbian mothers and
gay fathers have been considered together and the legal problems that they face
have not been distinguished.5 While several scholars have written articles

1. For an explanation of how and why I use the term “gender” in this Article, see discussion infra
Part I.D.5.
2. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “[t]he
state has a substantial interest . . . in endeavoring to protect minors from being influenced by those who
advocate homosexual lifestyles”).
3. See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Insider and Outsider: What the American Legal Institute Has Done for
Gay and Lesbian Families, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 87, 93-94 (2001) (arguing that
“homophobic” family courts frequently allow a parent’s homosexuality to be “counted against that
parent in determining custody or visitation rights”); Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the
Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 32 n.128 (2004) (arguing that opponents of
gay and lesbian parenthood rely on “sexist and heterosexist assumptions . . . to justify denying child
custody to gay parents”).
4. See infra Part I.D.
5. See infra Part V.
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specifically about lesbian mothers,6 only a few have written specifically about
gay fathers.7 In this body of scholarship, no one has considered the influence of
the child’s gender on disputes over gay and lesbian parenthood at all.
In today’s legal academy, this framework is a little surprising. Among
sexuality and family law scholars, it is now axiomatic that gender plays a
powerful role in shaping how law governs homosexuality and parenthood.8
These days, we often speak of “heterosexism” rather than “homophobia,” to
underscore the structural similarity between discrimination against women and
discrimination against gay men and lesbians.9 In the debates over same-sex
6. Nancy Polikoff was one of the earliest legal scholars to focus specifically on lesbian mothers.
See, e.g., Nan Hunter & Nancy Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and
Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691 (1976); Nancy Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of
Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbians and Homosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 375 (1996); Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal
Challenges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 907 (1986); Nancy Polikoff, The Social Construction of
Parenthood in One Planned Lesbian Family, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 203 (1996); Nancy
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet the Needs of Children in
Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
Since the 1980s, Polikoff has been joined by a number of other scholars. See, e.g., Susan E.
Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination and the Legal Construction of
Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261 (2003); Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption:
Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian Family Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 175 (1995); Amy D. Ronner,
Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and the Judicial Perpetuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 341 (1995); Carmel B. Sella, When a Mother is a Legal Stranger to Her Child:
The Law’s Challenge to the Lesbian Nonbiological Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 135 (1991); Kyle C.
Velte, Towards Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented Family, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 245 (2001). Ruthann Robson has been especially prolific. See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation,
Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709 (2002); Ruthann Robson, Making Mothers:
Lesbian Legal Theory and the Judicial Construction of Lesbian Mothers, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 15
(2000); Ruthann Robson, Mostly Monogamous Moms? An Essay on the Future of Lesbian Legal
Theories and Reforms, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 703 (2000); Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the
Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377 (1994). In addition, many
law students have written notes and comments about cases involving lesbian mothers.
7. My research has revealed only four legal publications about gay fathers in the last thirty years:
one book chapter written by a law professor, one symposium essay, one law review article, and one
student comment. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Breaking with Tradition: Surrogacy and Gay Fathers, in
KINDRED MATTERS: RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAMILY 102 (Diana Tietjens Meyers et al.
eds., 1993); Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-Gay Arrangements: A
Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183 (1995); E. Gary Spitko,
From Queer to Paternity: How Primary Gay Fathers Are Changing Fatherhood and Gay Identity, 24
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 195 (2005); Darryl Robin Wishard, Comment, Out of the Closet and into the
Courts: Homosexual Fathers and Child Custody, 93 DICK. L. REV. 401 (1989).
8. See infra Parts I.A-B.
9. See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek, The Psychology of Sexual Prejudice, in 9 CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 19 (2000) (describing the use of “heterosexism . . . as a
term analogous to sexism . . . . [that refers to] societal-level ideologies and patterns of institutionalized
oppression of non-heterosexual people”). In this Article, I generally follow the convention of using the
term “homophobic” to describe “irrational fears” about gay men and lesbians and the term
“heterosexist” to describe the structural, institutional subordination of people who are not heterosexual.
See id. at 20. For the sake of simplicity, however, I use the term “homophobia” as a shorthand noun that
incorporates the meaning of both concepts. Scholars have criticized the generic use of the term
“homophobia” for falsely implying that “antigay attitudes are best understood as an irrational fear and
represent a form of individual psychopathology rather than a social reinforced prejudice.” Id. In this
Article, however, I argue that “homophobia” is influenced by broader social and historical forces—viz.,
traditional gender norms. Given the nature of my argument, there seems to be relatively little danger of
implying that “homophobia” is no more than a set of individual psychopathologies.

DUKEMINIER_1.24.11.DOC

262

Yale Journal of Law and Feminism

1/28/11 11:18 AM

[Vol. 20:257

marriage, we often claim that traditional marriage laws discriminate not only on
the basis of sexual orientation but also on the basis of sex and gender.10
Meanwhile, in the debates over gay and lesbian parenthood, we have left the
relationships between homophobia, heterosexism, and gender unexplored.
This Article examines how these relationships play out in legal disputes
over gay and lesbian parenthood. The argument is based on my analysis of a
collection of almost 200 family law opinions, which represents every custody
and visitation case involving a gay, lesbian, or bisexual11 parent and a
heterosexual parent reported in the United States since the 1950s.12
Part I provides background material on laws governing homosexuality and
parenthood, a description of the collection of cases, and an explanation of my
analytical framework. Applying this framework, Parts II and III argue that gay
and lesbian parents have been subjected to gender-influenced stereotypes in
custody and visitation cases.
Part II argues that gay fathers have been subjected to two stereotypes that
are influenced by the parent’s gender. First, they have been stereotyped as HIV
agents—men who carry HIV and infect children with HIV. Second, they have
been stereotyped as child molesters—men who sexually abuse children,
especially boys. Unlike gay fathers, lesbian mothers have not been stereotyped
as HIV agents. Both gay fathers and lesbian mothers have been accused of
sexual abuse, but gay fathers have been stereotyped as child molesters more
often and more explicitly than lesbian mothers.
Part III argues that both gay fathers and lesbian mothers have been
subjected to two stereotypes that are influenced by the child’s gender. They
have been stereotyped as recruiters and role models—people who encourage
children to become homosexual. Although recruiting and role modeling
stereotypes have been applied to both fathers and mothers, they have been
applied more often to the parents of sons, and they have rarely been applied to
the fathers of daughters. I argue that these patterns reflect the influence of two

10. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas
NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 461 (2007).
11. Although this Article is about gay fathers, I have included cases involving bisexual fathers in
my analysis. In custody and visitation cases, courts generally have not acknowledged the existence of
male “bisexuality,” so they have not generally recognized the distinction between fathers who identify
as gay or bisexual. When fathers identified themselves as “bisexual,” courts generally re-classified them
as “homosexual,” even if they had not described themselves as “gay” or “homosexual.” See, e.g., Conkel
v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 984-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (where the parties stipulate that the father is
“bisexual” but the trial and appellate court describe the father as “homosexual”). See generally Kenji
Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000) (describing the
“erasure” of bisexual identity by heterosexuals and gay men and lesbians). My analysis suggests that
courts may be more willing to recognize mothers as “bisexual,” but that question is beyond the scope of
this Article. For these purposes, I have included cases involving bisexual mothers in my analysis so that
my comparisons of cases involving fathers and mothers are sound.
12. See infra Appendix (listing opinions); infra Part I.C (describing opinions).
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psychological theories about childhood sexual development—one theory
suggesting that children identify with parents of the same gender and another
theory suggesting that “domineering” mothers raise “effeminate” boys. Taken
together, these two theories produce disparities in the expression of recruiting
and role modeling stereotypes that betray patriarchal concerns about the role of
fathers in the production of masculine, heterosexual boys.
Part IV briefly explores the influence of the judge’s gender on the
stereotypes identified in Parts II and III. Part IV argues that male judges have
been more likely than female judges to accept stereotypes about gay and
lesbian parents that are influenced by the parent’s gender and the child’s
gender. This pattern reflects the observed tendencies of heterosexual men to
accept homophobic and heterosexist stereotypes more often than heterosexual
women and apply such stereotypes to gay men more often than to lesbians.
Part V examines what happens when the legal academy adopts a genderblind framework for responding to stereotypes that are influenced by gender. It
argues that our gender-blind framework has weakened and warped our
advocacy on behalf of gay and lesbian families. By reviewing the scholarship
on each of the stereotypes identified in Parts II and III, Part V offers concrete
ways to strengthen and broaden the case for gay and lesbian parenthood.
First, in our responses to HIV stereotypes, we have ignored the influence
of the parent’s gender. Because of this oversight, we have overlooked one
group type of stereotypes altogether. We have not noticed that gay fathers have
been stereotyped as HIV carriers, so we have not yet articulated a response to
this stereotype at all. Similarly, in our responses to sexual abuse stereotypes,
we have ignored the influence of the parent’s gender as well. Because of this
oversight, we have allowed ourselves to rely on stock arguments that “most
child molesters are heterosexual men,” “most child molestation is
heterosexual,” and “children are more likely to be sexually abused by
heterosexuals than homosexuals,” rather than developing a rigorous response to
the stereotype, which is based on the available empirical data about
homosexuality and child sexual abuse. Finally, in our responses to recruiting
and role modeling stereotypes, we have ignored the homophobia of gender as
well as the gender of homophobia. By failing to appreciate that gender
development stereotypes are often conflated with sexual development
stereotypes, we have imposed an arbitrary limit on the scope of our argument:
Even as we defend the possibility that the children of gay and lesbian parents
may grow up to be “different,” we refuse to consider the possibility that they
may grow up to be gay men or lesbians.
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I. HOMOSEXUALITY, PARENTHOOD, AND FAMILY LAW:
IDENTIFYING THE GENDER OF HOMOPHOBIA
This Part provides background for the analysis in Parts II and III. It
includes an overview of how gender has historically shaped laws governing
homosexuality and parenthood, a primer on how custody and visitation law
applies to cases involving gay and lesbian parents, and an explanation of my
analytical method. Once we place modern custody and visitation law in social
and historical context, we can appreciate the influence of gender in disputes
over gay and lesbian parenthood.
A. The Law of Parenthood
Until the 1800s, the legal status of parents was determined by the parent’s
gender. Under the common law, “fathers had an absolute right to ownership
and control over children—as if they had title—and a corresponding duty to
support them.”13 In this era, mothers were owed “reverence and respect,” but
they were granted “no power.”14
As the United States was industrialized, however, the balance of power
shifted in American families. Fathers left the home and began working for
wages, leaving children in the primary care of mothers.15 As fathers took on the
role of providers or “breadwinners,”16 mothers were assigned the role of
homemakers and caretakers.17 With fathers off to work, Americans discovered
the “joys of motherhood.”18 By the 1830s, motherhood was widely thought to
be “not only critical to a child’s welfare and America’s future, but also the
cornerstone of a woman’s happiness.”19
This transformation brought about significant changes in the legal status of
fathers and mothers. By the late 1800s, the property rights of fathers were
increasingly rejected, and judges generally awarded custody to mothers in cases
13. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 76 (1995).
14. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452-53.
15. See, e.g., NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 34 (2000); RALPH LAROSSA, THE
MODERNIZATION OF FATHERHOOD: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY 27 (1997); John Demos, The
Changing Faces of Fatherhood: A New Exploration in Family History, in FATHER AND CHILD:
DEVELOPMENTAL AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 425, 433-34 (Stanley Cath, Alan Gurwitt & John M.
Ross eds., 1982); Michael E. Lamb, The History of Research on Father Involvement: An Overview, in
FATHERHOOD: RESEARCH, INTERVENTIONS, AND POLICIES 23, 26-27 (H. Elizabeth Peters & Randal D.
Day eds., 2000); Joseph H. Pleck, Parental Involvement: Levels, Sources, and Consequences, in THE
ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 66, 66 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 3d ed. 1997).
16. DOWD, supra note 15, at 10, 29; see also LAROSSA, supra note 15, at 27 (describing father’s
role as “economic provider”).
17. See LAROSSA, supra note 15, at 28 (citing MAXINE L. MARGOLIS, MOTHERS AND SUCH: VIEWS
OF MOTHERHOOD AND WHY THEY CHANGED 9 (1982)).
18. LAROSSA, supra note 15, at 28.
19. Id.
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involving infants and toddlers, especially girls.20 This maternal preference
became known as the “tender years” doctrine, and it was adopted by a majority
of states.21
In the postwar era, women began working for wages in unprecedented
numbers, which brought about a second shift in the legal status of fathers and
mothers.22 During the 1970s, feminists proposed a new model of the family
headed by co-equal, genderless “parents” who shared household and childcare
duties with each other.23 In the 1980s, this new model was co-opted by fathers’
rights groups, which called for the adoption of gender-neutral custody
standards and a presumption in favor of joint legal custody awards.24 Today,
the tender years doctrine has been largely abolished and joint legal custody is
commonly awarded.25
This is not to suggest, however, that the feminist ideal of the family has
been achieved or that gender no longer influences the law of parenthood. Even
after the adoption of gender-neutral custody and visitation standards, the old
division of labor between mothers and fathers has survived and the traditional
models of parenthood are still reflected in the practice of family law.26 In
families with two parents, mothers are still far more likely to be the custodial
parent, and in families with one parent, mothers are far more likely to be the
only parent.27 In most divorces, mothers are awarded custody because fathers
do not pursue it.28 As divorce rates have increased, men have increasingly
functioned as stepfathers, but they have often lost touch with children from

20. See FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 77; ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 30 (1993).
21. See FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 77; Michael Grossberg, Who Gets the Child? Custody,
Guardianship, and the Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth-Century America, 9 FEMINIST STUD.
235, 247-48 (1983); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1072-74 (1979).
22. See Mary T. Coleman & John Pencavel, Trends in Market Work Behavior of Women Since
1940, 46 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 653, 660 (1993); Manuelita Ureta, Women, Work and Family:
Recent Economic Trends, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 57, 62 (1998).
23. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 175-76 (1989) (proposing
that “public policies and laws should generally assume no social differentiation of the sexes” and
“facilitat[e] and encourag[e] . . . equally shared parenting”).
24. See FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 82-83. “Legal custody” is the right to make decisions regarding
the child’s basic welfare. When courts award joint legal custody, both parents have the right to
participate in decisions that affect the child’s welfare. Id.
25. See Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers To
Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 985-86 (2005).
26. See generally DOWD, supra note 15, at 4 (“To a remarkable degree, legal notions of fatherhood
reflect fathering divorced from nurturing. The model of fatherhood embedded in the law is
predominantly biological and economic within the marital framework. It accords with historic concepts
of fathers as property holders with relation to their children.”); id. at 5-8 (citing “[e]xamples of this
marital-biological-economic model” from “adoption, paternity-legitimation, and divorce law”).
27. See DOWD, supra note 15, at 23; Maldonado, supra note 25, at 946-48.
28. See DOWD, supra note 15, at 59-60, 141; Maldonado, supra note 25, at 974.
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previous marriages.29 In the vast majority of cases, family court judges award
physical custody to mothers and require fathers to pay child support.30
B. The Law of Homosexuality
The law of homosexuality may be less familiar than the law of parenthood,
but it has not been any less influenced by traditional gender norms. Until the
twentieth century, prohibitions of homosexual activity were prevalent in
Western civilizations, and they often distinguished between male and female
homosexual acts.31 Such laws generally punished sexual activity between men
more harshly than sexual activity between women, and in some cases, they did
not refer to sexual activity between women at all.32 For example, the Old
Testament prohibited a man from “lying” with a man as he “lieth” with a
woman, but it did not prohibit two women from “lying” together.33 In early
England, the law against “buggery” prohibited anal intercourse between men or
between a man and a woman, but it did not prohibit any female homosexual
acts.34 In the United States, many courts adopted similar definitions of
“sodomy,” holding that “penetration” was an element of this offense.35
In spite of these distinctions, there is no question that both male and female
homosexual activity has been persecuted harshly for centuries.36 Until the last
century, however, gay men and lesbians were condemned as “sexual inverts”—
29. See DOWD, supra note 15, at 60, 64; Maldonado, supra note 25, at 946-48.
30. See DOWD, supra note 15, at 7, 132-54; Maldonado, supra note 25, at 946-48.
31. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA
1861-2003, at 19 (2008) (“All the original states, and almost all subsequent ones adopted laws
criminalizing sodomy and attempted sodomy.”).
32. See id. at 17.
33. Leviticus 20:13 (King James) (“If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both
of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon
them.”); see ANNIE LAURIE GAYLOR, WOE TO THE WOMEN—THE BIBLE TELLS ME SO: THE BIBLE,
FEMALE SEXUALITY AND THE LAW 94 (1981) (observing that “the Mosaic law does not even consider
the possibility of lesbianism”); RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE
OF LAW 35 (1992) (observing that “[t]here is apparently no mention of lesbianism in the Old
Testament”).
34. See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION 133 (Stein & Day 1963) (1957).
35. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 176 So. 719 (Miss. 1937) (holding that the act of cunnilingus was not
prohibited by the state’s sodomy statute because it failed to satisfy the “penetration” element of the
offense), overruled by Miller v. State, 636 So. 2d 391 (Miss. 1994); see also State v. Pond, 131 S.W.3d
792 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (holding that conviction for “deviate sexual intercourse” requires “proof of
penetration, however slight”).
36. See VERN L. BULLOUGH, HOMOSEXUALITY: A HISTORY 17-18 (1979). Although gay male sex
was treated more harshly than lesbian sex in most ancient civilizations, there is no question that early
Christian commentators interpreted the New Testament to prohibit lesbian sex. ROBSON, supra note 33,
at 34-42. In the Middle Ages, lesbian sexual activities were specifically identified and vigorously
punished as sins. Id. In many cases, the harshest punishments were reserved for latter-day “tribades”—
women who penetrated other women with an “enlarged clitoris” or a “material instrument.” Id. In 1656,
the New Haven colony prohibited “women” from “lying with women.” ESKRIDGE, supra note 31, at 18.
After 1890, the prosecution of women for sodomy became more common in the United States. Id. at 5356, 69.
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not “homosexuals”—and they were grouped together with others who
“reversed” or “inverted” conventional gender roles.37 In the early nineteenth
century, for example, the category of “sexual invert” included women who
wore pants, men who wore dresses, women who liked politics, and men who
liked cats.38 It was not until the late 1800s that men and women who engaged in
homosexual activity were grouped together as “homosexuals” and
“homosexuality” was identified as a mental disorder.39
By the postwar era, psychologists had transformed the paradigm of
homosexuality from “sin” to “sickness,”40 and the legal system’s response
began to shift from punishment to treatment.41 Between the 1960s and the
1980s, sodomy laws were repealed in about half of the United States, in
connection with the widespread adoption of the Model Penal Code.42 In the
1970s and 1980s, however, several states replaced the old laws with new ones
that expressly prohibited both male and female homosexual conduct.43 By the
turn of the century, thirteen states still had sodomy laws on the books, and none
of them distinguished between male and female homosexual conduct. In
Lawrence v. Texas,44 the United States Supreme Court declared the country’s
remaining sodomy laws unconstitutional, so homosexual conduct can no longer
be criminalized in the United States.45
These days, gay men and lesbians are often described in gender-neutral
terms—as “homosexuals,” “same-sex couples,” or “same-sex parents.” As a
practical matter, however, gay men and lesbians are not always viewed in the
same light. Recent surveys have revealed that heterosexuals in the United
States still hold more negative attitudes toward gay men than lesbians.46 In one
survey, for example, respondents were more likely to regard gay men as
mentally ill and less likely to support gay male adoption rights.47 In each of
37. See DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 15-16 (1990).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see 1 MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 43 (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 1990) (1976).
40. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 794-98 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412, 414 n.1 (Ct. App. 1960) (citing trial court’s order
that gay father “obtain psychiatric treatment” for his homosexual behavior).
42. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 147 (3d ed. 2007).
43. See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 538 (1992).
44. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
45. Id.
46. See Gregory M. Herek, Gender Gaps in Public Opinion About Lesbians and Gay Men, 66 PUB.
OPINION Q. 40, 42, 53 (2002) [hereinafter Herek, Gender Gaps] (reporting survey findings that
“[o]verall, gay men were rated significantly more negatively than lesbians”); Gregory M. Herek, Sexual
Prejudice and Gender: Do Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men Differ?, 56 J. SOC.
ISSUES 251, 262 (2000) [hereinafter Herek, Sexual Prejudice and Gender] (reporting survey findings
that “ratings of gay men were significantly lower overall than ratings of lesbians” ); Gregory M. Herek
& John P. Capitanio, Sex Differences in How Heterosexuals Think About Lesbians and Gay Men:
Evidence From Survey Context Effects, 36 J. SEX RES. 348, 357 (1999) (reporting survey findings that
heterosexual men and women have more negative attitudes toward gay men than lesbians).
47. See Herek, Gender Gaps, supra note 46, at 49-53.
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these surveys, it has been heterosexual men who account for the disparity in
attitudes about gay men and lesbians.48
C. Homosexuality and Parenthood in Family Law
This Article analyzes a collection of 191 opinions from 171 cases reported
between 1951 and 2007.49 About 93% of the opinions were written by appellate
courts and 7% were written by trial courts. With respect to the parent’s gender,
about 71% of the cases involve lesbian mothers and 29% involve gay fathers.
Finally, with respect to the child’s gender, about 30% of the cases involve sons,
36% involve daughters, 21% involve both sons and daughters, and 16% involve
children whose gender was not disclosed.
To the best of my knowledge and effort, the collection includes every
custody and visitation case involving a gay, lesbian, or bisexual parent and a
heterosexual parent reported in the United States since the 1950s.50 Because the
collection spans a wide range of issues, jurisdictions, and years, this Section
provides a brief overview of how custody and visitation laws have been applied
to disputes between homosexual and heterosexual parents.
If the parents contest custody at the time of divorce, custody is awarded
based on the “best interests” of the child.51 Once custody is awarded, there is a
strong presumption against changing it. After the divorce, if one parent seeks a
change of custody, that parent must generally show a “change in

48. See Herek, Gender Gaps, supra note 46, at 41-42, 54 (reporting that heterosexual men’s
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians were more negative than heterosexual women’s attitudes);
Gregory Herek, Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men: Correlates and Gender
Differences, 25 J. SEX RES. 451, 452, 464, 469 (1988) (finding that heterosexual men’s attitudes toward
gay men were consistently more negative than heterosexual women’s); Herek, Sexual Prejudice and
Gender, supra note 46, at 255, 259, 262 (finding that heterosexual men’s attitudes toward gay men were
significantly “more hostile than their attitudes toward lesbians or heterosexual women’s attitudes toward
homosexuals of either gender”); Herek & Capitanio, supra note 46, at 348 (finding that “heterosexual
men generally manifest higher levels of sexual prejudice than do heterosexual women”)..
49. See infra Appendix (listing opinions). Throughout this Article, I use the term “reported” to refer
to any opinion that is publicly available on Westlaw or Lexis, regardless of whether it was classified as a
“published” or “unpublished” opinion under local court rules.
50. When I first gathered the collection of cases, I compiled all of the custody and visitation cases
involving gay and lesbian parents from heterosexual relationships—not only the cases involving both of
the child’s parents but also neglect proceedings brought by child protective agencies, and custody,
visitation, and adoption proceedings brought by non-parents, such as grandparents and stepparents. I
have excluded the neglect and non-parent cases from my quantitative analysis for several reasons. First,
most of the neglect and non-parent cases involved lesbian mothers—because, as a general matter,
mothers are more often custodial parents than fathers. Second, courts apply different legal standards in
neglect and non-parent cases, which are significantly more favorable to the child’s parent. Finally,
neglect and non-parent cases included an unusually high number of sexual abuse allegations, which
would have skewed my analysis of sexual abuse stereotypes. Taken together, these differences would
have undermined my ability to make sound comparisons based on the parents’ gender. Throughout the
Article, I have noted when similar stereotypes have appeared in neglect and non-parent cases.
51. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 803 (3d ed. 2006).

DUKEMINIER_1.24.11.DOC

2009]

1/28/11 11:18 AM

Like Father, Like Son

269

circumstances” to warrant the transfer.52 In many cases involving gay and
lesbian parents, courts have held that a parent’s homosexuality is a “change in
circumstances” that justifies a transfer of custody to the other parent.53
There is a strong presumption against denying a parent all visitation rights,
which is considered tantamount to the termination of parental rights.54 There is
a much weaker presumption, however, against restricting a parent’s visitation
rights. If a court finds that a parent’s behavior may have an “adverse effect” on
the child, then the court may impose broad restrictions on that parent’s
visitation rights.55 In cases involving gay and lesbian parents, typical visitation
restrictions include prohibitions against overnight visits, unsupervised visits, or
visits in the company of a parent’s same-sex partner.56
Over the last half-century, courts have gradually adopted a more liberal
approach toward a parent’s homosexuality in custody and visitation cases.57 In
some early cases, courts articulated a “per se” rule against custody and
visitation claims made by gay and lesbian parents, holding that homosexuality
was inherently inconsistent with parenthood as a matter of law. In 1960, for
example, a California court ordered a gay father to move out of his partner’s
apartment, “take up residence in the home of his parents,” and “obtain
psychiatric treatment” for his homosexual behavior; in the meantime, the court
required the father’s mother to be present “at all times” when he visited his
child.58 Similarly, in 1985, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the father’s
“exposure” of his homosexual relationship to his child rendered him “an unfit
and improper custodian as a matter of law.”59
In the last twenty-five years, the majority of jurisdictions have abandoned
the per se rule in favor of a “nexus” test.60 Under the nexus test, a parent’s
homosexuality is not a sufficient ground to revoke or limit the parent’s custody
or visitation rights, unless one parent proves that the other parent’s
homosexuality has an “adverse effect” on the child.61

52. Id. at 899.
53. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898, 899 (N.C. 1998).
54. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 51, at 860.
55. Id. at 854.
56. See RUBENSTEIN, BALL & SCHACTER, supra note 42, at 756-57.
57. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 116566 (2d ed. 2004); WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW 810-11 (2d. ed. 1997).
58. Evans v. Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412, 414 n.1 (Ct. App. 1960).
59. Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985). In some jurisdictions, courts adopted a per se
presumption (as opposed to a per se rule) that a parent’s homosexuality would adversely affect the child.
Although such a presumption was rebuttable, it was the burden of the gay or lesbian parent to prove that
his or her behavior did not have any adverse effect on the child. See, e.g., Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512
A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
60. See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 57, at 1169.
61. See, e.g., M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 965 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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As many scholars have observed, the shift from a per se rule to a nexus test
represents a measure of progress for gay and lesbian parents.62 Today, the
concept of “homosexual parenthood” is no longer a contradiction in terms. In
most jurisdictions, gay and lesbian parents stand a chance in custody and
visitation disputes with heterosexual parents, whereas fifty years ago, they
generally did not.
Yet the nexus test has not eliminated homophobia from custody and
visitation cases. Because the “best interest” standard is notoriously vague, the
devil is often in the details. The standard authorizes courts to restrict a parent’s
rights based upon subjective judgments about what is “best” for a child. In
disputes between heterosexual and homosexual parents, the result often turns
on whether the court views the gay or lesbian parent as “discreet” or
“flamboyant.”63 Even under the nexus test, many courts still presume that when
a parent exposes a child to the “homosexual lifestyle”—for example, by
coming out, spending time with other gay men or lesbians, displaying same-sex
affections, or living with a same-sex partner—the parent’s homosexuality has
an adverse effect on the child.64
In such cases, gay and lesbian parents are often forced to choose between
living in the closet or losing parental rights. Only four years ago, a trial court
sentenced a gay father to two days in jail for coming out to his child.65 The
father’s conduct had violated the court’s restraining order, which had
prohibited the father “from taking the child around or otherwise exposing the
child to his gay lover(s) and/or his gay lifestyle.”66
D. Identifying the Gender of Homophobia
Has gender had any influence on the behavior of litigants, experts, and
judges in these cases? If so, the influence of gender would not be easy to
discover, because it could not be explicitly acknowledged in the opinions
themselves. During the 1980s, most jurisdictions shifted toward gender-neutral
62. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 57, at 810-11 (describing the shift from the per se test rule to the
nexus test as “an improvement”); Yoshino, supra note 40, at 851 (describing the shift from the per se
test rule to the nexus test as “progress”).
63. See, e.g., M.A.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 963 (granting custody to a gay father on the ground that the
“[f]ather’s behavior has been discreet, not flamboyant”).
64. See, e.g., N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). Kenji Yoshino has argued
that the nexus test represents a “covering regime,” which demands that gay and lesbian parents “cover”
or downplay gay identity. Yoshino, supra note 40, at 851. Michael Wald has suggested that the nexus
test unduly focuses the best interests inquiry on the parent’s sexual orientation, which should generally
be irrelevant in custody and visitation cases. See Michael S. Wald, Adults’ Sexual Orientation and State
Determinations Regarding Placement of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 381, 427 (2006).
65. See Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). The trial court’s order was
struck down as “vague” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellate
court did not reach the question of whether the order violated the father’s freedom of speech under the
First Amendment. Id.
66. Id. at 247.

DUKEMINIER_1.24.11.DOC

2009]

1/28/11 11:18 AM

Like Father, Like Son

271

custody and visitation laws, so opinions and briefs have been written in genderneutral terms since this era. Judges and litigants cite cases involving gay fathers
and lesbian mothers interchangeably as precedent, and they casually presume
that gay fathers and lesbian mothers are treated alike by courts. When they
disagree, they normally argue over the relationship between homosexuality and
parenthood rather than factors explicitly based on the parent’s gender or the
child’s gender.67
If we proceed carefully, however, we may still observe the gender of
homophobia in custody and visitation cases. After much trial and error, I have
developed the following method for analyzing the influence of gender in this
collection of cases: By comparing the distribution of homophobic and
heterosexist stereotypes in cases involving gay fathers and lesbians mothers
(Part II), and in cases involving sons and daughters (Part III), I argue that gay
and lesbian parents have been subjected to a series of stereotypes that have
been influenced by the parent’s gender and the child’s gender. By counting
cases and reading rhetoric, I have documented the influence of gender in
disputes over gay and lesbian parenthood. Before proceeding with this analysis,
I will anticipate a handful of methodological questions.
1. Reading Opinions
First, there is the question of what I am looking at—reported opinions,
mostly appellate opinions. I acknowledge that reported opinions are not
representative of unreported opinions, appeals are not representative of trials,
and neither appeals nor trials are representative of mediations, arbitrations, or
settlements, which are far more numerous. Appellate opinions are always
exceptional, and they may be more exceptional in this area of law than in any
other.68 There are reasons to think that in studies of bias, appellate opinions
67. In some cases, this gender-neutral framework has been explicitly articulated and defended by
judges. See, e.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (“The notion that a
lesbian mother should enjoy a parental relationship with her daughter but a gay father should not is so
innately discriminatory as to be unworthy of comment.”); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL
30173, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (Tomlin, P.J., concurring) (“While we are dealing with
lesbianism, there is no ground for a gender-based distinction. Therefore, I shall speak to this issue solely
in terms of homosexuality. Homosexuality has been considered contrary to the morality of man for well
over two thousand years.”).
68. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS
ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 119 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that “reported appellate opinions . . .
are perhaps more exceptional in [family] law than in any other” field). See generally WALLACE D. LOH,
SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: CASES, READINGS, AND TEXT 98 (1984) (“It is important
to stress that ‘the facts’ recited in the appellate opinion do not represent a complete, coherent story of the
dispute.”); Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1017, 1024-25 (2000) (noting that “[a]ppellate opinions are not representative of trials”); Ahmed E.
Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2004)
(noting that “[r]esearchers have also found that published decisions are not representative of the larger
population of all case filings” and “published cases can create a misleading image of the overall work of
courts”).
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may show us only the tip of the iceberg.69 By applying my method, I will show
that even these exceptional texts reflect conventional assumptions about
homosexuality, parenthood, and childhood.
2. Defining Stereotypes
Second, there is the question of what I am looking for—explicit references
to anti-gay stereotypes about gay and lesbian parents that are influenced by the
parent’s gender or the child’s gender. For these purposes, I have defined a
“stereotype” as a generalization based on conventional assumptions about
homosexuality, parenthood, and childhood, as opposed to a specific allegation
based on evidence about an individual parent or child.70
By focusing on explicit references to anti-gay stereotypes, I have placed
three significant limitations on my analysis. First, this is a study of explicit
references—it considers only references to stereotypes that appear in the text of
opinions rather than those that may be inferred from ambiguous remarks or
factual circumstances.71 Second, this is a study of stereotypes—it considers
only the nature of judicial rhetoric rather than the legitimacy of litigation
results.72 Finally, this is a study of anti-gay stereotypes—it considers only
stereotypes about gay men and lesbians rather than broader stereotypes about
men, women, fathers, and mothers.73
69. In recent years, experimental psychologists have produced a growing body of evidence that
“implicit” or “unconscious” bias based on race, gender, sexuality, and other legally protected
characteristics remains a pervasive force in the contemporary United States. See, e.g., Ivan E.
Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and
Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83, 100 (2003) (reporting
psychological research showing that “[s]tereotypes, when they function as implicit prototypes or
schemas, operate beyond the reach of decisionmaker self-awareness and, therefore, cognitive bias may
well be both unintentional and unconscious” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
70. For a discussion of the distinction between stereotypes and specific allegations, see infra Part
III.B (analyzing sexual abuse stereotypes).
71. There are significant risks associated with limiting my analysis to explicit references to
stereotypes, and the limitation may not work well in other contexts. By focusing on explicit references,
one may “teach” litigants, experts, and judges to avoid making such references in future cases. To some
people, a world in which people no longer articulated anti-gay stereotypes may seem like an obvious
improvement, but it would not necessarily be a better world for gay and lesbian parents. The literature
on implicit bias warns that even when people no longer rely explicitly on stereotypes, they may continue
to rely implicitly on stereotypes. In comparison to explicit bias, implicit bias is considerably more
difficult to detect. See generally Bodensteiner, supra note 69, at 101-07 (describing the difficulty of
proving the existence of implicit bias in discrimination cases).
72. By focusing on judicial rhetoric, I have avoided making overall comparisons between how
often gay fathers and lesbian mothers have prevailed against heterosexual parents in custody and
visitation cases. In light of the limited number of reported cases, my attempts to make such comparisons
were confounded by the influence of other variables, such as the jurisidictions and years in which cases
were decided, the fact that mothers litigated custody more often than fathers, and the merits of
anomalous cases.
73. By focusing on stereotypes about gay men and lesbians, I have sidestepped the broader debate
about how fathers and mothers are treated in custody and visitation cases and the need to include a
“control group” of cases involving heterosexual fathers and mothers. Although I have not surveyed the
cases involving two heterosexual parents, it would be quite surprising if heterosexual parents were
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As a general matter, I have adopted a narrow definition of the concept of
“stereotype” in order to take a conservative approach to classifying and
counting cases. When opinions left any reasonable doubt about the meaning of
references, I excluded them from my tallies.74 In one respect, however, my
definition of “stereotype” remains broad. By counting all references to
stereotypes, I have included both affirmations and denials—not only statements
that a stereotype does apply to a parent but statements that a stereotype does not
apply to a parent. In some cases, one person’s denial may be responding to
another person’s affirmation, which may not have appeared in the opinion
itself, or even in the underlying proceedings.75 Even when a denial stands by
itself, however, it affirms that the stereotype exists as a general matter,
operating as a presumption that must be rebutted by gay and lesbian parents in
particular cases.76
3. Identifying Actors
Third, there is the question of whom I am looking for—which actors are
responsible for expressing stereotypes about gay fathers and lesbian mothers. In
my analysis, I include stereotypes expressed by three different types of actors—
litigants, experts, and judges. Whenever possible, I analyze the cases separately
to distinguish how often stereotypes were expressed by litigants and experts
and how often they were accepted by judges.77
stereotyped as HIV agents, child molesters, recruiters, and role models in traditional custody and
visitation cases. In any case, the legal scholarship on gay and lesbian parenthood strongly suggests that
lesbian and gay parents are subjected to these stereotypes more often than heterosexual parents.
74. For example, there were several cases in which courts referred to the possibility that gay and
lesbian parents would adversely affect the “moral” development of children, without specifically
referring to the “sexual” development of children. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987). I excluded these cases from my list of recruiting and role modeling cases, on the
ground that these courts may well have been referring to the child’s development of pro-gay attitudes
rather than homosexual desires.
75. In a few cases, I have analyzed the appellate records to test my assumptions about the
underlying proceedings. See, e.g., infra notes 349, 409 and accompanying text.
76. In this respect, the denial of a stereotype is analogous to a familiar form of backhanded
compliment, in which a white speaker describes an African-American as “articulate,” thereby suggesting
that as a general matter, African-Americans are inarticulate. See Lynette Clemetson, The Racial Politics
of Speaking Well, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, at 41 (analyzing Senator Biden’s description of Senator
Obama as “articulate” during presidential primaries). For my analysis of cases involving the denial of
stereotypes, see infra Part III.B (analyzing sexual abuse stereotypes) and Part V (analyzing the influence
of the judge’s gender).
77. Needless to say, stereotypes are most troubling when they are accepted by trial judges and
especially by appellate courts, because they gain the force of law in such cases. I have included
stereotypes expressed by litigants and experts in my analysis, however, because they have costs for gay
and lesbian parents as well. When litigants and experts express stereotypes about gay and lesbian parents
in custody and visitation cases, these parents are stigmatized and disadvantaged. In responding to such
stereotypes, gay and lesbian parents are often forced to incur additional attorney and expert witness fees;
in addition, they experience the humiliation of being subjected to degrading stereotypes and the risk of
attempting to disprove them.
Within each group of cases, there was no meaningful difference between how often stereotypes
were accepted by trial judges and how often they were accepted by appellate courts. In general, trial
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4. Specifying Jurisdictions and Years
Fourth, there are the questions of when and where—the times and places in
which stereotypes have appeared. Since the 1950s, social understandings of
homosexuality and parenthood have changed dramatically in most jurisdictions,
and to some extent, the laws of custody and visitation have changed with them.
In this changing environment, it would have been folly to analyze cases out of
historical and geographical context. When I refer to cases in this Article, I
make special efforts to incorporate this broader context. Throughout the text, I
present each line of cases in chronological order, and alongside the case names,
I include the state and the year in which the case was decided.78 More
generally, as I examine each stereotype, I describe the social context from
which it emerged.79
5. Distinguishing “Gender” from “Sex”
Fifth, there is the question of gender—specifically, my use of the term
“gender” and the associated distinctions between “male” and “female,” “father”
and “mother,” and “son” and “daughter.” For the purposes of this Article, I
define the term “gender” to include any and all of the conventional distinctions
between “male” and “female,” whether they refer to social or biological
characteristics. My broad usage may be unfamiliar (and unsatisfying) to many
gender and sexuality scholars, because I do not generally distinguish “gender”
from “sex.” (In Part III.C, I briefly distinguish the general concept of “gender”
from the specific concepts of “gender identity” and “gender roles” to reflect
terms used by litigants, experts, and judges in the opinions themselves.) I admit
that this usage of “gender” produces some vague formulations, but I believe
that it most accurately reflects what is going on in the cases.
On the surface, it may appear that litigants, experts, and judges were
specifically influenced by “sex” rather than “gender,” because they expressed
judges accepted each stereotype in one or two more cases than appellate courts; the difference was no
greater than two cases for any individual stereotype. In light of these patterns, I have reported the rate of
acceptance by all “judges” together rather than breaking down the acceptance rate for trial judges and
appellate courts.
78. For similar reasons, I have cited cases in reverse chronological order in the footnotes without
distinguishing by jurisdiction rather than the order suggested by the Bluebook. See THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, R. 1.4(d)(8), at 50 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed.
2005). Throughout this Article, I have attempted to present my data in the most accessible and digestible
formats.
79. In general, I found that stereotypes of gay fathers and lesbian mothers appeared most often in
southern and midwestern states, such as Alabama, Tennessee, Ohio, and Missouri, and especially during
the late 1980s and late 1990s, in the midst of two national backlashes against gay and lesbian rights.
About half of the stereotypes appeared in the remaining twenty-four states and about half appeared
during other time periods. My research did not reveal any custody, visitation, or neglect cases involving
a gay, lesbian, or bisexual parent reported during the relevant period in any of the following twelve
states: Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix (listing opinions).
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some stereotypes more often about fathers than mothers, and they expressed
other stereotypes more often about the parents of sons than the parents of
daughters. This reading is too casual, however, because there is no sense in
which litigants, experts, and judges actually distinguished gender from sex.
When litigants, experts, and judges stereotyped a gay or lesbian parent, for
example, they did not distinguish between the parent’s “gender” and the
parent’s “sex.” On the contrary, they assumed that the parent’s gender identity
and gender role were determined by the parent’s biological sex.80 Although
they held a belief about that parent’s sex, they did not make any attempt to
verify that belief by independently determining the parent’s sex as
distinguished from the parent’s gender. On the contrary, they made
conventional assumptions about that parent’s sex based on the parent’s
declaration of gender identity and performance of gender roles. When the
parent was identified as a “father,” or by a masculine name, they assumed that
the parent was male; when the parent was identified as a “mother,” or by a
feminine name, they assumed that the parent was female.81 Even when they
applied stereotypes, they conflated gender with sex. Based on assumptions
about the parent’s sex, they made further assumptions about the parent’s
behavior based on what they regarded as normal or expected behavior for gay
men or lesbians.82
6. Counting Cases
Sixth, there are questions about numbers—specifically, how many times
each stereotype has appeared in the collection of cases. To measure the
influence of gender, I have counted the number of times that stereotypes appear
in cases involving fathers and mothers, and sons and daughters, and in opinions
written by male and female judges. Because my analysis reports quantitative
differences, some readers may wonder whether my findings are “statistically
80. The tendency of courts to conflate “sex” and “gender” has been observed by many feminist and
queer legal scholars. See, e.g., Mary Ann Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex from Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995)
(arguing that courts generally conflate sex and gender); David Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90
CAL. L. REV. 997 (2002) (arguing that the Constitution generally conflates sex and gender); Francisco
Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and
“Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3 (1995) (arguing that courts
generally conflate sex, gender, and sexual orientation).
81. In order to analyze how stereotypes were applied in cases involving fathers and mothers, sons
and daughters, and male and female judges, I was forced to adopt a similar framework. To categorize
each group of cases, I applied conventional assumptions about the “maleness” and “femaleness” of
parents who were identified as “fathers” and “mothers,” children who were identified as “sons” and
“daughters,” and judges who were identified by “masculine” and “feminine” names. See infra note 320
(explaining method of categorizing opinions by judge’s gender).
82. In any event, I do not believe that any aspect of my argument turns on the distinction of gender
and sex in this Article. If you disagree with my usage of “gender,” please feel free to substitute
“presumed sex” or “sex/gender” in lieu of the term “gender.” I considered both of these formulations but
rejected them as too awkward.
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significant”—that is, whether they can be used to support generalizations about
other cases.
Because of the nature of my data, this question has no meaningful answer.
My method is both empirical and quantitative, but it is not “statistical” in the
technical sense of that word. Instead of randomly collecting a representative
sample of cases,83 I have systematically gathered all of the available cases from
Westlaw, Lexis, casebooks, and law reviews. I do not offer my observations to
support generalizations about other cases, let alone other kinds of disputes,
such as the many divorces that do not involve lawyers, experts, or judges. It
would be equally futile to make generalizations about future cases, given the
social and legal changes of recent years.
I am left with my own observations of judicial opinions, which may be
evaluated based on any number of criteria. In quantitative terms, the question is
not whether the differences that I observe are “significant” but whether they are
“meaningful”—that is, whether they are large enough to be regarded as a
pattern or trend rather than the random influence of “outliers” or anomalous
cases.84 In this Article, I define a difference to be “presumptively meaningful”
when it is based on a disparity of at least three cases, and thus, it could not have
been produced by one or two anomalous cases.85 Once I determine that a
difference is presumptively meaningful, I test my finding by asking whether it
can be confirmed or explained by the social and historical context in which the
relevant cases were decided.86 If so, then I conclude that the difference is
meaningful. Rather than asking whether these differences are statistically
83. The concept of statistical significance applies only to representative samples—i.e., samples that
do not include a complete universe of the observed data. Moreover, the concept is most accurately
applied only to randomly collected data—i.e., samples that are gathered through the application of
techniques designed to minimize selection bias. See M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 139-64
(2d ed. 1979); DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 375-86 (4th ed. 2007).
84. This question is analogous to the statistical concept of “robustness.” Like the concept of
significance, the concept of robustness applies only to representative samples. For a detailed explanation
of the concept of robustness, see PETER ROUSSEEUW & ANNICK LEROY, ROBUST REGRESSION AND
OUTLIER DETECTION 8 (2003).
85. It is important to keep in mind that when we compare cases involving gay fathers and lesbian
mothers, the number of cases in each group is not equal, so disparities can only be expressed as a
minimum number of cases involving gay fathers, or a range of cases in both groups, rather than an
absolute number of cases. For example, if a stereotype appears in 3 of 50 cases involving gay fathers,
and it does not appear in any of the 121 cases involving lesbian mothers, then there are two ways to
describe this difference: On the one hand, it is produced by the existence of 3 cases involving gay
fathers; on the other hand, it is produced by the corresponding absence of 8 similar cases involving
lesbian mothers. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to this difference as a disparity of “at least three
cases.” Although the concept of statistical significance does not apply in this context, it is worth noting
that if one applied the traditional two-tailed test for statistical significance, this difference would be
statistically significant at the 5% level, with a P-value of .0066. See JOHN E. FREUND, MODERN
ELEMENTARY STATISTICS 289 (6th ed. 1984) (explaining traditional two-tailed test for statistical
significance).
86. This technique is analogous to the sociological concept of “triangulation” —the verification of
observed findings through the application of multiple research methods. See NORMAN K. DENZIN,
SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS 340 (1978) (identifying different methods of “triangulation” and observing
that “[t]he greater the triangulation, the greater the confidence in the observed findings”).
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significant, I ask whether they are legally, politically, or morally significant.
Even though my analysis does not allow us to predict future cases, it may still
shed new light on old problems, leading us toward new lines of advocacy and
thought.
7. Theorizing the Framework
Last but not least, there are theoretical questions—specifically, questions
about how my framework fits into scholarly debates about the relationships
among homosexuality, parenthood, and gender. These days, the boundaries of
“feminist” and “queer” theory are hotly contested, so any claims to these labels
will be controversial. Nonetheless, with a long list of caveats, I can generally
say that my perspective on parenthood is “feminist,” my perspective on
homosexuality is “queer,” and my perspective on gender is both “feminist” and
“queer.”87
87. In a recent book, Janet Halley has offered both a criticism of feminist theory and a pitch for
queer theory. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM 4-5, 112-114 (2006). The book has sparked controversy among feminists, queer theorists, and
others. In two recent reviews, scholars have claimed that Halley has drawn a false dichotomy between
the two disciplines—specifically, that she presents feminism as simplistic and narrow in her effort to
make feminism look bad and queer theory look good. See Mary Anne Franks, Book Review, Split
Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break From Feminism, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 257 (2007); Adam
P. Romero, Book Review, Methodological Descriptions: ‘Feminist’ and ‘Queer’ Legal Theories, 19
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227 (2007). Although Halley’s definition of feminism is controversial, it is both
well-known and clearly articulated, so it provides a good point of departure for describing my theoretical
framework. In this footnote, I will elaborate my perspectives on feminist and queer theory by making
two passes at Halley’s definitional framework.
To start, I will describe my relationship to feminism. Among other things, Halley claims that in the
United States, feminism “is persistently a subordination theory set by default to seek the social welfare
of women, femininity, and/or female or feminine gender by undoing some part or all of their
subordination to men, masculinity, and/or male or masculine gender.” HALLEY, supra, at 4. This
definition incorporates three elements: “[1] a distinction between something m and something f; [2] a
commitment to be a theory about, and a practice about, the subordination of f to m; and [3] a
commitment to work against that subordination on behalf of f.” Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 15-16. (Halley
makes other definitional claims about feminism, but they are more controversial, and they are neither
helpful nor relevant here.)
By Halley’s definition, my framework is only partially “feminist.” First, this Article assumes, for
the sake of clarity and argument, that there is “a distinction between something m and something f”—
more certainly, a distinction between “male” and “female” and less certainly, a distinction between
“masculine” and “feminine.” As a result, the Article speaks freely of differences between men and
women, fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, and gay men and lesbians. To some extent, my use of
these distinctions reifies the dichotomy between male and female—and regrettably, it tends to
marginalize parents and children who are transgendered. (In this respect, my analysis of gender could be
legitimately criticized as insufficiently “queer.”) This Article does not, however, assume that gay men
are “feminine” and lesbians are “masculine” or that heterosexual men are “masculine” and heterosexual
women are “feminine.” On the contrary, it criticizes judges, experts, and litigants for promoting such
stereotypes. See Part V.C.3.
Second, this Article often describes the subordination of women to men, but it describes the
subordination of gay men as well. In this respect, Parts I and III are classically feminist, but Part II
departs from this model. Part I traces the law of parenthood, which has been historically characterized
by the subordination of women, even in the law’s early celebration of mothers and motherhood. Part III
traces how sexual development stereotypes reflect patriarchal concerns about the role of fathers in the
production of masculine, heterosexual boys. Part II, however, traces how gay fathers have been
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This Article explores how homophobia and sexism “intersect” with each
other, placing special burdens on subordinated groups.88 Like others, I have
generally sought to show that homophobia and sexism support one another by
idealizing the identity of masculine, heterosexual men and devaluing other
identities.89 I have not, however, followed those who suggest that in the domain
of identity politics, subordination and resistance are zero-sum games.90 In
particular, I have resisted any sweeping comparisons of the burdens shouldered
by gay fathers and lesbian mothers. I have not claimed that gay fathers stand
alone at the intersection of homophobia and sexism—“doubly burdened” as gay
men and fathers91—nor have I claimed such a status for lesbian mothers.92 My

subjected to HIV and sexual abuse stereotypes. In doing so, this Part suggests that it is not always
lesbians who stand at the intersection of sexism and homophobia.
Third, this Article works against the subordination of women to men, but it squarely rejects the
notion that feminists have an obligation to work specifically on behalf of women or lesbians to the
exclusion of others. When feminist work is one-sided, it yields one-sided gains. In the United States, for
example, it is now generally acceptable for women to wear pants, but it still controversial for men to
wear dresses. Similarly, it is now common for women to perform wage work, but it is still relatively
unusual for men to assume primary child-care responsibilities. I believe that both of these disparities are
problems—for both men and women—and a good theory of feminism should be equipped to address
them.
Next, I will adapt Halley’s definitional framework—swapping “hetero” for “m” and “homo” for
“f”—to briefly elaborate my relationship to queer theory as well. First, this Article assumes—again, for
the purposes of clarity and argument—that there is a distinction between something “hetero” and
something “homo.” As a result, the Article speaks freely of differences between gay men and lesbians,
gay fathers and lesbian mothers, gay sons and lesbian daughters. To some extent, my use of this
distinction reifies the dichotomy between “hetero” and “homo”—and regrettably, it tends to marginalize
parents and children who are bisexual. (In this respect, my analysis of homosexuality could be
legitimately criticized as insufficiently “queer.”) Second, this Article describes the subordination of
“homo” to “hetero”; it does not consider the subordination of “hetero” to “homo” or describe any
instances in which this occurs. Third, this Article works against the subordination of “homo” to
“hetero,” but it squarely rejects the notion that queer theorists have an obligation to work on behalf of
gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, or transgendered people to the exclusion of heterosexuals. Following
Halley, I believe that homophobia and sexism imprison us all and that when we work against them, we
work for the equality and liberty of all.
88. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 289 (2002) (arguing that the intersection of
homophobia and sexism led to the exclusion of lesbians from the feminist movement “because of fear
that homophobia would jeopardize that movement’s goals”); cf. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241 (1991) (describing the “intersectionality” of racism and sexism in antidiscrimination law).
89. See Ehrenreich, supra note 88, at 294 (arguing that “compulsory heterosexuality and patriarchy
reinforce each other in the construction of masculinity,” resulting in the subordination of women and the
stigmatization of “all men who fail to conform to hypermasculine gender norms”).
90. Id. at 267-69.
91. See, e.g., Wishard, supra note 7, at 420 (claiming that gay fathers face a “double” challenge in
custody proceedings because “society shuns them because they are gay, and other gays shun them
because they are fathers”); see also Jerry J. Bigner & R. Brooke Jacobsen, The Value of Children to Gay
and Heterosexual Fathers, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 163, 164 (Frederick W. Bozett ed.
1989) (describing gay fathers as “a minority within a minority” that is “marginal to the cultural worlds
of both heterosexuals and gays”).
92. Cf. Ehrenreich, supra note 88, at 275 (“A . . . woman is oppressed because of her gender . . . . If
she is a lesbian, she is oppressed once again because of her sexual orientation.”); Ruthann Robson, The
Specter of a Lesbian Supreme Court Justice: Problems of Identity in Lesbian Legal Theorizing, 5 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 433, 457 (1993) (placing “lesbian identity” at the “intersection between sexuality and
gender”).
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analysis suggests that there is no one figure who stands at the intersection of
homophobia and sexism, and moreover, that there is no one intersection at
which such a figure could stand. Because homophobia and gender influence
each other, they assume different forms at different intersections. If we mean to
theorize these intersections, then we will have to observe them, rather than
relying on generalizations about which groups are “doubly burdened” by the
intersection of identity norms.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF THE PARENT’S GENDER:
GAY FATHERS AS HIV AGENTS AND CHILD MOLESTERS
This Part argues that in custody and visitation cases gay fathers have been
subjected to two stereotypes that have been influenced by the parent’s gender.
First, they have been stereotyped as HIV agents—men who are likely to
contract HIV and infect children with HIV. Second, they have been stereotyped
as child molesters—men who are likely to sexually abuse children, especially
boys.
With respect to HIV stereotypes,93 the influence of gender is fairly
straightforward. Unlike gay fathers, lesbian mothers have not been stereotyped
as HIV agents. With respect to sexual abuse stereotypes, the influence of
gender is somewhat subtler. Both gay fathers and lesbian mothers have been
accused of sexual abuse, but gay fathers have been stereotyped more often and
more explicitly as child molesters.
A. HIV Stereotypes: Gay Fathers as HIV Agents
The first stereotype portrays gay fathers as HIV agents—men who are
likely to contract HIV and infect children with HIV. When we compare the
cases involving gay fathers and lesbian mothers, we see that HIV stereotypes
were raised exclusively in cases involving gay fathers. Specifically, concerns
that parents would contract HIV or infect children with HIV were raised in
12% (6 of 50) of the cases involving gay fathers and none (0 of 121) of the
cases involving lesbian mothers.94 In 67% (4 of 6) of these cases, HIV
93. The distinction between HIV and AIDS is often collapsed and conflated by litigants, experts,
and judges in custody and visitation cases. For the sake of simplicity, I generally refer to “HIV” when
discussing the stereotypes that appear in the opinions.
94. This section is based upon my analysis of the following cases involving gay fathers: North v.
North, 648 A.2d 1025, 1027-29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); H.J.B. v. P.W., 628 So. 2d 753, 754-55
(Ala. Civ. App. 1993); J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 786-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Stewart v. Stewart,
521 N.E.2d 956, 959, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (Sup. Ct.
1987); and Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
For other cases expressing similar themes, see Soteriou v. Soteriou, No. FA030733243S, 2005 WL
3471472, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2005); Inscoe v. Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70, 76 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997); In re J.L.O., 398 S.E.2d 853, 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); and Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 718
(Sup. Ct. 1988).
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stereotypes were accepted by judges.95 All of the HIV stereotypes appeared in
cases reported during the late 1980s and early 1990s.96
1. Opposing Litigants and HIV
In the HIV cases, it was most often opposing litigants—heterosexual
mothers—who stereotyped gay fathers as HIV agents.97 When there was no
evidence that the father had actually contracted HIV, litigants argued that gay
fathers were more likely than the general public to contract HIV because they
were homosexual.
In J.P. v. P.W. (Missouri 1989),98 the father and his partner had both tested
negative for HIV, but the mother expressed her “concern[] with the exposure of
the child to AIDS.”99 Based on evidence that “the incidence of AIDS is higher
in homosexuals than in the general population,” and “it is possible [for] a
person infected with the AIDS virus to test negative,” the mother asked the
court to allow her to supervise the father’s visits.100 In Conkel v. Conkel (Ohio
1987),101 there was “no evidence that the father . . . [was] seropositive with
HIV or ha[d] AIDS,” but the mother testified that she was “‘petrified’ that the
children will contract AIDS,” and she asked the court to deny the father
overnight visits.102
In these arguments, litigants often couched concerns about HIV infection
in medical and scientific terms, such as “exposure,” “incidence,” and “risk.”
Rather than assessing the individual risk posed by each father, however, they
assessed the collective risk posed by the gay male population itself. From this
epidemiological standpoint, if a gay father had not already contracted HIV,
then he was in imminent danger of doing so. By generalizing from groups to
individuals, litigants stereotyped all gay fathers as promiscuous and reckless,
including those who were monogamous and safe.103
When gay fathers acknowledged that they were HIV-positive, litigants
articulated concerns about HIV infection in more concrete terms. In North v.
North (Maryland 1994),104 the father was living with his gay partner, and he
95. See North, 648 A.2d at 1027-29; H.J.B., 628 So. 2d at 754-55; J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 786-89;
Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 959, 964.
96. All seven cases were reported between 1987 and 1994. See supra note 94.
97. But see J.L.O., 398 S.E.2d at 853 (involving gay father and maternal grandmother); Doe, 526
N.Y.S.2d at 718 (involving gay father and maternal grandparents).
98. 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
99. Id. at 789.
100. Id. at 788-89.
101. 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
102. Id. at 987.
103. See, e.g., J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 786-89 (restricting the father’s visitation rights based
on, inter alia, the mother’s concerns about the child’s exposure to AIDS, in spite of evidence that the
father had tested “negative” for HIV, he had only one “monogamous” male partner, and the couple’s
relationship was limited to “oral sex”); see infra Part V.A (analyzing HIV stereotypes in J.P. v. P.W.).
104. 649 A. 2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (internal quotations omitted).
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acknowledged that they had both contracted HIV. At the mother’s request, the
court ordered the Department of Social Services to investigate the father’s
home. The DSS reported that during overnight visits, the father and his partner
slept in separate bedrooms, “they had agreed not to discuss or display their
sexuality . . . during visits during day or evening hours, and [they] were taking
every precaution to avoid any risk of the children acquiring HIV.”105
The mother was not satisfied with the father’s precautions. “[S]he did not
trust [the father] to shield the children” from his “homosexual lifestyle” or the
risk presented by his HIV-positive status, because the father had exposed her to
HIV during the marriage.106 She argued that by living and sleeping together, the
father and his partner were exposing the children to “harmful psychological
effects” and “serious health risks”:
I was concerned that the longer the children stayed with the two of
them, that somehow the children would be damaged by their sleeping
together. The children love to jump in bed with me, and when we were
together, when we were married they loved to jump in bed with the
two of us, and when—the fear was that they would wake up at night,
and they would see that he’s not in the room, and they would wonder
where is my father. Then the next thing you know you see that they go
into the other man’s room, and they are both on top of each other
making love. The contraction of the body fluids, after they finished
making love, that there is residue left on the sheets that the children
may get. He’s not a very clean person at all.107
To protect the children from these “health risks,” the mother asked the court
that “all visitation be denied and that [the father] be enjoined from taking the
children from her home.”108 The trial court restricted the father’s visitation to
“daylight hours,” but the order was reversed on appeal.109
2. Experts, Judges, and HIV
Gay fathers did not challenge the notion that gay men were likely to be
HIV carriers, but they challenged the notion that they would infect their
children with HIV.110 To support this argument, they often introduced expert
evidence showing that HIV could only be transmitted through the “direct
mixing of bodily fluids”—“sexual contact, the sharing of needles among
105. Id. at 1028.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1027.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., North v. North, 648 A.2d 1025, 1029 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); J.P. v. P.W., 772
S.W.2d 786, 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988);
Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603,
604 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 725 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (involving gay father and
maternal grandparents).
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intravenous drug abusers and the transfusion of blood”—and not through
everyday contact between parent and child.111 This evidence was rarely
contested by litigants and was generally accepted by judges.112
This is not to say, however, that judges never stereotyped gay fathers as
HIV carriers, or that they always rejected the fear that fathers could infect
children with HIV. In Stewart v. Stewart (Indiana 1988),113 the father sought a
change of custody on the grounds that the mother was not giving the child
“adequate nourishment” and was supplying the child with “alcohol and
narcotics.”114 The mother denied the father’s allegations, and she claimed that
the father “led a homosexual lifestyle, [and] was infected with the AIDS
virus.”115 The trial court not only denied the father’s custody claim but also
terminated his visitation rights, even though the mother had not requested it. To
justify this sua sponte order, the court reasoned: “[E]ven if there was a one
percent chance that this child is going to contract it from him, I’m not going to
expose her to it.”116
The trial court’s order was reversed by a divided appellate court. The
majority found that “[a]n examination of the evidence leads to but one
conclusion: the medical evidence and studies available . . . showed that AIDS is
not transmitted through everyday household contact.”117 “In light of the
medical evidence presented,” the majority held that the trial court’s “complete
termination of visitation was an extreme and unwarranted action” and restored
the father’s visitation rights.118
One dissenting judge, however, was troubled by the medical evidence.
Under cross-examination, the father’s expert had acknowledged that it was
“theoretically possible for a parent to infect a child with the AIDS virus while
extracting a child’s tooth.”119 Although the judge acknowledged that pulling a
child’s tooth was “a poor example upon which to base a hypothesis,” he would
have concluded that “under such circumstances, a parent ‘might’ infect his
child with AIDS.”120 To eliminate any risk of the father infecting the child, the
judge would have upheld the trial court’s termination of the father’s visitation
rights.
107. Jane W., 519 N.Y.S.2d at 604; see also North, 648 A.2d at 1029; J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 789;
Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 964; Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 987; cf. Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (involving gay
father and maternal grandparents).
112. See North, 648 A.2d at 1029; Stewart, 521 N.E.2d at 963; Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 987; Jane W.,
519 N.Y.S.2d at 604; see also Doe, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (involving gay father and maternal
grandparents). But see J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 789 (upholding restrictions on father’s visitation rights based
on mother’s concerns about child’s exposure to AIDS).
113. 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App.1988).
114. Id. at 958.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 959 (quoting trial court).
117. Id. at 964.
118. Id. at 965.
119. Id. at 967 (Conover, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
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In J.P. v. P.W. (Missouri 1989),121 the stereotype of the gay father as HIV
agent was unanimously endorsed on appeal. As previously noted, the father and
his partner had tested negative for the HIV virus, yet the mother sought to
supervise the father’s visits to prevent “the exposure of the child to AIDS.”122
In a hearing on the mother’s request, the father acknowledged that he had met
his partner while he was still married to the mother, and the two men had
developed “a sexual relationship” in which “they were engaging in oral sex on
a regular basis . . . approximately once or twice each week.”123 The court
found, however, that the father’s relationship with his partner was
“monogamous” and “permanent” and that “[h]e probably would marry [his
partner] if he were permitted to do so.”124 In response to the mother’s concerns
about the child’s exposure to AIDS, the father called an expert witness who
“doubted that AIDS could be spread through casual contact.”125 Under cross
examination, the expert acknowledged that “the incidence of AIDS is higher in
homosexuals than in the general population” and that “it is possible that a
person infected with the AIDS virus [could] test negative.”126
The trial court was sympathetic to the mother’s concerns about HIV,
finding that “AIDS has a higher incidence of occurrence among homosexuals
than the general public” and noting that “[a]fter his homosexual encounter with
[his partner], the father continued to have normal sexual intercourse with the
mother.”127 After making these findings, the court prohibited the father’s
partner or “any other male” from participating in the father’s visits.128 When
both parents appealed, the appellate court relied on the lower court’s findings
about HIV to justify restricting the father’s visitation rights.129 In addition, at
the mother’s request, the appellate court required that the father’s visitation be
“supervised” by “a responsible adult.”130
Finally, in H.J.B. v. P.W. (Alabama 1993),131 the father gained custody of
his daughter from foster care after the child had been sexually abused by her
stepfather. Once the mother and stepfather were divorced, the mother sought a
transfer of custody from the father. Prior to the custody trial, the mother sought
to prove that the father was gay and HIV-positive. The father did not disclose
his sexual orientation or his health status until the day of trial. The trial court
found that the father’s failure to “disclose his personal health and affairs . . .
[was] tantamount to an attempt to secrete his true health status from the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 789.
Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 789.
Id.
Id. at 787, 789.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 794.
628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).
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Court.”132 Based on this finding, the trial court disregarded the father’s
testimony and transferred custody to the mother. Relying on “the father’s
present health and lifestyle,” the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
transfer.133
3. Gay Men and HIV
It is no mystery why gay fathers have been specifically stereotyped as HIV
agents in custody and visitation cases. In Western societies, male
homosexuality has been portrayed through infection metaphors, such as
“plague, infestation, and disease,” for thousands of years.134 In the
contemporary United States, the spread of HIV has been linked to the
demographic of gay men—specifically, to the practice of gay anal sex—since
the earliest signs of the outbreak.135
In 1981, the first AIDS cases were diagnosed as Gay-Related Immune
Deficiency (GRID), because the syndrome was thought to afflict only gay men
and to be caused by a combination of illegal drug use and promiscuous anal
sex.136 As the scope of the epidemic became broader and the causes of the
illness became clearer, the syndrome was renamed Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), but the links between gay men and AIDS have
lasted much longer.137 Since the early 1990s, HIV has spread most quickly
among sexually active gay men and intravenous drug users in the United
States.138 By comparison, the virus has spread more slowly among women and
hardly at all among lesbians.139
Likewise, it is no mystery why HIV stereotypes appeared most often in
cases reported during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the early 1980s, more
than 12,000 people died of AIDS in the United States, but the syndrome was

128. Id. at 755.
133. Id. at 756.
134. See BYRNE FONE, HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY 186-87 (2001) (observing that “[s]ince Old
Testament days, sodomy had been implicated as a cause of natural calamity, and antisodomitical rhetoric
had also consistently described sodomy as pestilential and sodomites as sources of infection” and that
during the Middle Ages, “[i]mages of plague, infestation, and disease became the primary metaphors for
sodomy and its effects”).
135. RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 53112, 121, 171 (2007).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See generally JONATHAN ENGEL, THE EPIDEMIC: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF AIDS 5-10 (2006)
(describing the spread of AIDS among gay men and IV drug users).
139. Id. at 113-14. Of course, some lesbians were infected with HIV and some developed AIDS as
early as the late 1980s. Id. Some lesbians became targets of AIDS phobia in this period, because
homosexuality and AIDS were so thoroughly conflated. See, e.g., TERRY CASTLE, THE APPARITIONAL
LESBIAN: FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY AND MODERN CULTURE 12 & n.15 (1993); EVE KOSOFSKY
SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 38 & n.39 (1990). For the most part, however, it was gay
men who were victimized by the AIDS epidemic and gay men who were targeted by AIDS phobia. See
ENGEL, supra note 138, at 113-14.
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widely dismissed as a “homosexual” disease by politicians, epidemiologists,
physicians, and journalists.140 It was not until 1985, when the media reported
that the actor Rock Hudson had developed AIDS, that the American public
became generally aware of the risk of HIV infection and the scope of the AIDS
epidemic.141 In the late 1980s, the nation was swept up in a panic over the
spread of AIDS, which fueled a backlash against the “homosexual lifestyle”
and the gay rights movement.142 In 1987 and 1988, family courts openly
acknowledged the “stigma” and “hysteria” associated with AIDS in custody
cases involving gay fathers.143
Since the early 1990s, however, there has been only one custody or
visitation case in which a gay father was explicitly portrayed as an HIV carrier,
and it was an exceptional case in several respects. In Inscoe v. Inscoe (Ohio
1997),144 the mother testified that four years earlier, shortly after the father had
come out to her, he had told her that “he was sick, was going to die of AIDS,
and that he was going to go down the road to commit suicide.”145 In this private
moment, the father portrayed himself as an HIV carrier.146 When he took the
stand in court, however, he clarified that he had not actually contracted HIV or
developed AIDS.147
Several aspects of Inscoe suggest how attitudes towards HIV have changed
since the early 1990s, insofar as they are reflected in reported custody and
visitation cases. First, unlike in previous cases, the mother did not seek to
contradict the father’s testimony or argue that his homosexuality made him
more likely to contract HIV than the general public. Second, neither the trial
judge nor the appellate court bothered to mention the possibility of the father
infecting the child. Finally, although Inscoe was reported in 1997, the father’s
statement was made four years earlier, when the rate of AIDS fatalities was still
increasing rapidly in the United States and AIDS phobia was still prevalent. In
1991, for example, a survey of Americans revealed that about one-fifth of
respondents believed that AIDS victims “deserved” the illness, one-fourth were

140. See SHILTS, supra note 135, at xxi-xxiii.
141. Id. at xxi.
142. ENGEL, supra note 138, at 69-102.
143. Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721, 726 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (involving gay father and maternal
grandparents); Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
144. 700 N.E.2d 70, 76 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
145. Id. at 76.
146. I have not counted this reference to AIDS as an HIV stereotype because it is not clear why the
father initially told the mother that he had AIDS. On the one hand, his statement may have been based
on his own internalized assumptions about male homosexuality and HIV; on the other hand, it may have
been based on his own knowledge of his sexual behavior along with an accurate assessment of the
associated HIV risks. In any case, it is clear that the father’s initial portrayal of himself as an HIV carrier
was not factually accurate. Aside from the father’s statement, which he disavowed under oath at trial,
the record does not include any evidence that the father had contracted HIV or developed AIDS. See
supra Part I.D.2 (explaining method for identifying stereotypes).
147. 700 N.E.2d at 78.
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“disgusted” or “angry” with AIDS victims, and one-third were “afraid” of
AIDS victims and believed that they should be quarantined.148
We should be wary of drawing too many conclusions from a single case,
however, or even from the lack of references to HIV and AIDS in more recent
cases. Although AIDS phobia no longer explicitly appears in reported opinions,
it clearly persists among a minority of Americans. In 1999 and 2000, surveys
revealed that although very few Americans still supported quarantines for
AIDS victims, one-fifth of respondents were still “afraid” of AIDS victims,
one-fourth believed that AIDS victims “deserved” the illness, and almost onehalf believed that HIV could be transmitted by coughing, sneezing, or sharing a
drinking glass.149 More recently, a 2006 survey found that “[s]ince 1990, there
has been no change in the share [of Americans] who incorrectly think HIV
might be transmitted through kissing, sharing a drinking glass, or touching a
toilet seat.”150 In one recent custody case, Soteriou v. Soteriou (Connecticut
2005),151 a mother played upon the general association of male homosexuality
and disease by claiming that the father had “engaged in extramarital
homosexual activities” and was “spreading disease.”152
B. Sexual Abuse Stereotypes: Gay Fathers as Child Molesters
The second stereotype portrays gay fathers as child molesters—men who
sexually abuse children, especially boys. When we compare the cases involving
gay fathers and lesbian mothers, we see that the subject of sexual abuse was
raised more than twice as often in cases involving gay fathers—specifically, in
22% (11 of 50) of the cases involving gay fathers and about 9% (11 of 121) of
the cases involving lesbian mothers.153 In about 59% (13 of 22) of these cases,
148. See Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, Public Reactions to AIDS in the United States: A
Second Decade of Stigma, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 574, 575 (1993).
149. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV-Related Knowledge and Stigma—United
States, 2000, in 49 MORBIDITY & MORALITY WKLY REP. 1062, 1063 (2000) (reporting 1999 survey
results); Gregory M. Herek, John P. Capitanio & Keith F. Widaman, HIV-Related Stigma and
Knowledge in the United States: Prevalence and Trends, 1991-1999, 92 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 371,
372 (2002) (reporting 2000 survey results).
150. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, SURVEY OF AMERICANS ON HIV/AIDS (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/pomr050806pkg.cfm.
151. No. FA030733243S, 2005 WL 3471472, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2005). I have not
counted Soteriou as an HIV case because the litigant did not make an explicit reference to “HIV” or
“AIDS.” See supra Part I.D.2 (explaining method for identifying stereotypes).
152. Soteriou, 2005 WL 3471472, at *3.
153. This section is based upon my analysis of the following cases involving gay fathers, Soteriou
v. Soteriou, No. FA030733243S, 2005 WL 3471472, at *4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 23. 2005); Pamela
J. v. Santiago J., No. CN98-06021, 2000 WL 1279443, at *1-2 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 4, 2000); Boswell v.
Boswell, 701 A.2d 1153, 1160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Inscoe v. Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70, 76 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1997); Glover v. Glover, 586 N.E.2d 159, 164 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d
786, 793 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); M.A.B. v.
R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964-65 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Wolff v. Wolff, 349 N.W.2d 656, 658 (S.D. 1984);
J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); and In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 96
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), and the following cases involving lesbian mothers, Gould v. Dickens,
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concerns about sexual abuse were accepted by judges.154 Sexual abuse concerns
appeared in cases reported during every decade since the 1970s, and 50% (11
of 22) appeared in the late 1990s and early 2000s.155
If we look closer at the language of the sexual abuse cases, we can discover
why these concerns were raised twice as often in cases involving gay fathers.
Both gay fathers and lesbian mothers were accused of sexual abuse, but gay
fathers were stereotyped as child molesters more often and more explicitly than
lesbian mothers.
1. Sexual Abuse Accusations: Specific Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse
Against Gay and Lesbian Parents
In most of the sexual abuse cases, the heterosexual parent specifically
accused the gay or lesbian parent, or that parent’s same-sex partner, of sexually
abusing a child.156 In almost all of these cases, there was a direct relationship
between the parent’s gender and the child’s gender—gay men were accused of
molesting boys and lesbians were accused of molesting girls.157 In most of

143 S.W.3d 639, 641-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); In re Marriage of Faulhaber, No. 2001-P-0110, 2002 WL
1401066, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 2002); Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (Ala. 1998); In
re Marriage of McKay, No. C6-95-1626, 1996 WL 12658, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 1996); Phillips
v. Phillips, No. CA94-03-005, 1995 WL 115426, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 1995); Hertzler v.
Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 1995); D.B. v. R.B., 652 A.2d 1254, 1256 & n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995); In re Marriage of Williams, 563 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Miller v.
Hawkins, 549 So. 2d 102, 103 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 643 (Utah 1980);
and In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
For neglect cases involving child sexual abuse allegations, see In re T.B. & J.B., No. 04JC998999, 2007 WL 2781274, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2007); In re B.P. & A.P., 995 P.2d 982, 988
(Mont. 2000); In re Jason L., 272 Cal. Rptr. 316, 323 (Ct. App. 1990); In re C.M.M., 757 S.W.2d 601,
602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); McKinney v. Ala. Dept. of Pensions & Sec., 475 So. 2d 568, 570 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1985); In re T.L.H., 630 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. App. 1982); and In re Jane Doe, 542 P.2d 1195,
1200 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).
154. See Soteriou, 2005 WL 3471472, at *4-5; Glover, 586 N.E.2d at 164; J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793;
Wolff, 349 N.W.2d at 658; J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 869; J.S. & C., 324 A.2d at 96; Faulhaber, 2002
WL 1401066, at *2; J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1193; Phillips, 1995 WL 115426, at *2; Hertzler, 908 P.2d at
951; Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 1199; Hawkins, 549 So. 2d at 103; Kallas, 614 P.2d at 643.
155. See supra note 153.
156. In about 64% (14 of 22) of the sexual abuse cases, the heterosexual parent made specific
accusations of sexual abuse against the gay or lesbian parent or the parent’s same-sex partner. For cases
involving gay fathers, see Soteriou, 2005 WL 3471472, at *4-5; Boswell, 701 A.2d at 1160; Glover, 586
N.E.2d at 164; J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793; and Wolff, 349 N.W.2d at 658. For cases involving lesbian
mothers, see Gould, 143 S.W.3d at 641-42; Faulhaber, 2002 WL 1401066, at *2; J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at
1193; Phillips, 1995 WL 115426, at *2; Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 951; D.B. 652 A.2d at 1256 & n.3;
Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 1199; Hawkins, 549 So. 2d at 103; and Kallas, 614 P.2d at 643.
In general, the neglect cases were similar to the sexual abuse cases—courts generally rejected
sexual abuse accusations against gay and lesbian parents. See, e.g., T.B. & J.B., 2007 WL 2781274, at
*9; B.P. & A.P., 995 P.2d at 988; T.L.H., 630 S.W.2d at 444; Jane Doe, 542 P.2d at 1200. In two neglect
cases, courts expressly found that gay fathers had molested girls. See In re Jason L., 272 Cal. Rptr. at
323; C.M.M., 757 S.W.2d at 602. In one neglect case, the court suggested that the father “may have
attempted” to molest one of his sons. McKinney, 475 So. 2d at 570.
157. Only about 14% (3 of 22) of the sexual abuse cases involved accusations that a gay man or
lesbian parent had sexually abused a child of the other sex. See Gould, 143 S.W.3d at 641; Miller, 549
So. 2d at 103; J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793.
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these cases, the alleged victim was the parent’s own child,158 but in some cases,
the alleged victim was another minor.159
When the alleged victim was the parent’s own child, the litigant’s
accusation was generally rejected, even when it was supported by the testimony
of experts and witnesses.160 In the majority of these cases, courts reviewed the
evidence and expressly rejected the accusation as unfounded.161 In only a few
of these cases, courts suggested that a child “may” have been abused, citing
evidence of sexual abuse to support a ruling against a gay or lesbian parent.162
There was not a single custody or visitation case in which a court expressly
found that a gay or lesbian parent had sexually abused his or her child.
When the alleged victim was another minor, by contrast, the litigant’s
accusation was generally accepted. In most of these cases, courts found that a
gay or lesbian parent had engaged in sexual activity with another minor, and
based on this conduct, the court restricted the parent’s custody or visitation
rights.163
In all of these cases, when litigants made specific accusations against gay
fathers and lesbian mothers, neither the accusations nor the results seemed to be
influenced by the parent’s gender. There was no meaningful difference in how
often gay fathers and lesbian mothers were accused of sexual abuse164 or how
often they were cleared of such accusations.165

158. See Gould, 143 S.W.3d at 641-42; J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1193; Boswell, 701 A.2d at 1160;
Glover, 586 N.E.2d at 164; Phillips, 1995 WL 115426, at *2; Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 951; D.B., 652 A.2d
at 1256 & n.3; Hawkins, 549 So. 2d at 103; J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793.
159. See Williams, 563 N.E.2d at 1199 (finding that mother enticed “minor” into sexual
relationship); Wolff, 349 N.W.2d at 658 (finding that father had relationship with “juvenile”); Kallas,
614 P.2d at 643 (discussing evidence that mother made sexual advances on neighbor’s thirteen-year-old
daughter).
160. See Gould, 143 S.W.3d at 641-42; Boswell, 701 A.2d at 1160; Glover, 586 N.E.2d at 164;
Phillips, 1995 WL 115426, at *2; Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 951; D.B., 652 A.2d at 1256 & n.3.
161. See Gould, 143 S.W.3d at 641-42; Boswell, 701 A.2d at 1160; Glover, 586 N.E.2d at 164;
Phillips, 1995 WL 115426, at *2; Hertzler, 908 P.2d at 951; D.B., 652 A.2d at 1256 & n.3.
162. See J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1193; J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793; Miller v. Hawkins, 549 So. 2d 102, 103
(Ala. Civ. App. 1989).
163. See Wolff, 349 N.W.2d at 658 (stating that father had relationship with “juvenile”); Williams,
563 N.E.2d at 1199 (suggesting that mother enticed “minor” into sexual relationship); Kallas, 614 P.2d
at 643 (claiming that mother made sexual advances on neighbor’s thirteen-year-old daughter); see also
Soteriou v. Soteriou, No. FA030733243S, 2005 WL 3471472, at *4-*5 (Conn. Super Ct. Nov. 23, 2005)
(noting that father’s partner sexually assaulted nineteen-year-old employee); In re Marriage of
Faulhaber, No. 2001-P-0110, 2002 WL 1401066, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 2002) (finding that the
mother’s partner sexually assaulted co-habitant).
164. Sexual abuse accusations were made in 10% (5 of 50) of the cases involving gay fathers and
about 7% (9 of 121) of the cases involving lesbian mothers. This amounts to a difference of only two
cases, which is too small to be regarded as meaningful.
165. These patterns were too small to be regarded as meaningful, but they were remarkably
consistent. Overall, both gay fathers (2 of 4) and lesbian mothers (4 of 8) prevailed against half of the
sexual abuse accusations to which they were subjected. When the alleged victim was the parent’s own
child, both gay fathers (2 of 3) and lesbian mothers (4 of 6) prevailed against two-thirds of the sexual
abuse accusations to which they were subjected. Finally, when the alleged victim was another minor,
neither gay fathers (0 of 1) nor lesbian mothers (0 of 2) ever prevailed.
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2. Sexual Abuse Stereotypes: The Gay Child Molester
There was, however, one meaningful difference between the sexual abuse
cases involving gay fathers and lesbian mothers: In 10% (5 of 50) of the cases
involving gay fathers, there were references to a stereotype that portrayed gay
men as child molesters, even though there were no specific accusations of
sexual abuse against the father, his partner, or his friends.166 In the most
notorious of these cases, the stereotype was explicitly based on the parent’s
gender and the child’s gender—it referred specifically to “the molestation of
minor boys by adult males.”167 In the 121 cases involving lesbian mothers,
there was only one reference to a stereotype that portrayed lesbians as child
molesters, and it took the form of a denial about the mother’s partner, rather
than an affirmative stereotype about the mother herself.168
In In re J.S. & C. (New Jersey 1974),169 the mother was granted custody of
three children, two boys and one girl, when the parents separated. In the
divorce hearing, the mother sought a restriction prohibiting overnight visits
with the father. In reviewing her request, the court noted that the father had
brought the children to “‘The Firehouse,’ a meeting hall for homosexuals,
where one witness has testified [that] he observed men ‘fondling each other,
necking and petting.’”170 In restricting the father’s visitation rights, the court
cited one expert’s testimony that in light of “‘the father’s milieu . . . it is
possible that these children upon reaching puberty would be subject to either
overt or covert homosexual seduction which would detrimentally influence
their sexual development.’”171 The court’s order restricted the father’s weekly
and holiday visits to daylight hours and generally prohibited the father from
exposing the children to “his lover” or taking them to “the Firehouse” during
visits.172 On appeal, the lower court’s order was affirmed in a per curiam order
on “substantially” similar grounds.173
In J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P. (Missouri 1982),174 the stereotype of the gay child
molester was articulated in more specific terms, and it was proffered by a
166. See Inscoe v. Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70, 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d
983, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964-65 (Sup. Ct. 1986); J.L.P.(H.) v.
D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1974).
167. J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 869 (emphasis added).
168. In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (Sup. Ct. 1976). This ratio (1 in 121) amounts to less
than 1% of the cases involving lesbian mothers. The difference between the cases involving gay fathers
(5 of 50) and lesbian mothers (1 of 121) amounts to a difference of at least four cases, which is large
enough to be regarded as meaningful. See supra Part I.D.6 (defining minimum threshold for identifying
differences that are “presumptively meaningful”).
169. 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
170. Id. at 95.
171. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 97.
173. In re J.S. & C., 364 A.2d 54, 55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
174. 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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unanimous appellate court. During the trial, the father acknowledged discussing
his homosexuality with his child, introducing the child to “three or four” of his
homosexual partners, and taking the child to a church in which “over half” of
the congregants were “homosexual persons.”175 In addition, the mother testified
that “the father took the child out of the state for a period of several days . . . in
the company of another homosexual and his juvenile nephews.”176 The mother
did not, however, make any allegations of sexual abuse against the father or
any of his partners or friends.
The father presented the testimony of two psychologists at trial. Both
experts testified that “the child suffered . . . no psychological damage arising
from his association with his father.”177 Although the mother had not accused
the father of sexual abuse, both experts testified that “most child molestation
occurs between adult heterosexual males and female children.”178 In addition,
one expert testified that “child molestation was approximately 95%
heterosexual and . . . homosexual molestation is rare.”179 The father’s expert
testimony was not challenged by the mother.
The trial court found that the father’s behavior was “seductive in nature,”180
even though the mother had not accused him of seducing or molesting the
child. Based on this finding, the court issued an order denying the father
overnight visitation and prohibiting him from taking the child to his church or
any “gay activist social gatherings.”181
In his appeal, the father argued that the expert testimony “refuted” the trial
court’s characterization of his behavior as “seductive.”182 The appellate court
rejected this argument by invoking conventional assumptions about gay men
and child sexual abuse:
The trial court was simply not required to accept the opinions of the
experts. . . . The experts’ testimony with respect to molestation of
minors is . . . suspect. Every trial judge, or for that matter, every
appellate judge, knows that the molestation of minor boys by adult
males is not as uncommon as the psychologist experts’ testimony
indicated.183
To provide empirical support for this claim, the court observed that “[a] few
minutes research discloses the following appellate decisions involving such
molestation” and cited seven criminal cases reported between 1957 and 1978 in
which adult men were convicted of sexually abusing young boys.184 In rejecting
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 869.
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
Id. at 866.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 868-69.
Id. at 869. For a criticism of the court’s analysis, see infra Part V.B.5.
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the father’s appeal, the court suggested that the father’s “seductive” behavior
had not only supported the trial court’s order, but “would support an even
broader prohibition upon the father’s exercise of visitation in the presence of
known homosexuals.”185
Even among the sexual abuse cases, cases like J.S. & C. (New Jersey 1974)
and J.L.P.(H.) (Missouri 1982) stand out as unusual. In most of these cases,
courts did not affirmatively suggest that “homosexuals” are child molesters. In
the remaining cases, the stereotype of the gay child molester was expressed in
the form of a denial—a nonsequitur statement that a gay or lesbian parent, or
that parent’s partner, had not sexually abused the parent’s child.186 In these
cases, courts did not generally rule against gay or lesbian parents, but they
affirmed that the stereotype of the gay child molester exists, operating as a
presumption that must be rebutted in particular cases. Even in the absence of
any specific accusations of sexual abuse, these courts felt compelled to rebut
the conventional assumption that “homosexuals” are child molesters—as if a
gay or lesbian parent who was not a child molester was an exception to the
general rule.187
In In re Jane B. (New York 1976)188 —the only one of these cases
involving a lesbian mother—the judge emphasized that the mother’s partner
had “no physical relationship with the infant . . . or any other child,” and that
“any [of her] homosexual relationships have been with adult females,” even
though the father had not accused the mother or her partner of sexually abusing
the child.189 Similarly, in M.A.B. v. R.B. (New York 1986),190 one of the cases
involving a gay father, the judge rejected the notion that “if gay parents have
custody, they will molest the children,” even though the mother had not
articulated this position at trial.191 In Conkel v. Conkel (Ohio 1987),192 the court
mentioned that the father “had never made any sexual advances toward his

185. Id. at 872.
186. See Inscoe v. Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70, 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d
983, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 964-65 (Sup. Ct. 1986); In re Jane
B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
187. For an explanation of why I have included denials in my analysis, see supra Part I.D.2. By
dividing the cases into three categories—cases involving specific accusations, explicit stereotypes, and
implicit stereotypes—I do not mean to suggest that the categories are mutually exclusive. For example,
it seems likely that at least some of the specific accusations were based on implicit stereotypes rather
than any specific evidence of a parent sexually abusing a child. It would have been exceedingly difficult,
however, to identify which accusations were based on implicit stereotypes. Finally, my research
revealed only two cases suggesting that accusations were based on implicit stereotypes. See Ex parte
J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (Ala. 1998) (expert testifying that the father’s suspicion of sexual abuse
stemmed from the fact of the mother’s lesbianism); Grant v. Grant, No. WD-88-29, 1989 WL 80951
(Ohio App. Ct. July 21, 1989) (mother alleging that father is “a latent homosexual who has forced his
son to perform fellatio”).
188. 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
189. Id. at 854.
190. 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
191. Id. at 964-65.
192. 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).

DUKEMINIER_1.24.11.DOC

292

Yale Journal of Law and Feminism

1/28/11 11:18 AM

[Vol. 20:257

sons,” even though the mother had stipulated to this fact during trial and did not
contest the stipulation in her appeal.193
The strongest example of a denial appeared in Inscoe v. Inscoe (Ohio
1997),194 where a witness testified that people in the father’s neighborhood had
stereotyped the gay father and his partner as child molesters. Mr. Inscoe, a gay
father, had been awarded custody of his thirteen-year-old son at the time of his
divorce. When the father and son moved in with the father’s partner, the boy’s
mother challenged the original custody order. During the trial, the boy’s
paternal grandfather told the court what “people” had been saying about the
father and his partner: “Well, I’ve heard people say, you know, Herb and
Charlie is gay and all this, and they might do something to the kids and all this,
you know.”195 In his testimony, the grandfather dismissed the rumors as “a
bunch of malarkey.”196 “None of that thing happens,” he explained, “not even
one time. Not one incident that I’ve ever been around.”197 Although the father
initially lost custody to the mother, he prevailed in his appeal, on the ground
that “[a] parent’s sexual orientation, standing alone, has no relevance to a
decision concerning the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.”198
Taken together, these affirmations and denials explain why sexual abuse
was mentioned twice as often in cases involving gay fathers, and they
demonstrate the ways that the stereotype of the gay child molester was
influenced by the parent’s gender. On the whole, sexual abuse stereotypes
appeared in 10% (5 of 50) of the cases involving gay fathers and less than 1%
(1 of 121) of the cases involving lesbian mothers.199
3. Gay Men and Child Sexual Abuse
Like associations between male homosexuality and disease, associations
between male homosexuality and child sexual abuse—from “pederasty” to
“pedophilia”—can be traced back for many centuries in Western societies.200 In
a divorce case reported over 100 years ago, for example, the wife charged that
her husband “was guilty of what is known as ‘pederasty,’” which she defined as
“improper intimacy with the male sex.”201 In affirming her divorce, the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that the husband’s conduct was “cruel and

193. Id. at 984.
194. 700 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
195. Id. at 77.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 81.
199. See supra notes 166, 168.
200. See generally FONE, supra note 134, at 19, 47-48, 87-90, 193, 232 (tracing the development of
Western associations between homosexuality and “pederasty” from ancient Greece to Enlightenment
Europe).
201. Crutcher v. Crutcher, 38 So. 337, 337 (Miss. 1905).

DUKEMINIER_1.24.11.DOC

2009]

1/28/11 11:18 AM

Like Father, Like Son

293

inhuman treatment,” while reserving the question of whether his conduct was
properly described as “pederasty” or “sodomy.”202
In the 1950s and 1960s, American psychologists often portrayed gay men
as child molesters, based on the view that homosexuality was an “adolescent”
stage of sexual development.203 In the 1970s, Anita Bryant portrayed
“homosexuals” as child molesters when she launched her “Save Our Children”
campaign against the gay liberation movement.204
Because American attitudes about homosexuality have changed
considerably since the 1980s, the stereotype of the gay child molester is less
prevalent now than in recent years.205 In light of these changes, it is no wonder
that in J.L.P.(H.) v. D.L.P. (Missouri 1982), three appellate judges agreed that
“every judge knows” that gay men are child molesters,206 but fifteen years later,
in Inscoe v. Inscoe (Ohio 1997), such rumors were rejected as “a bunch of
malarkey” because “[n]one of that thing happens.”207 Once again, Inscoe seems
like a sign of how times have changed.
Yet old rumors die hard. In this context, too, we should be wary about
drawing too many conclusions from a single case, or from the lack of sexual
abuse stereotypes in more recent cases. For some Americans, the association
between gay men and child sexual abuse remains powerful. In 1999, a national
survey found that about one-fifth of heterosexual men still believed that most
gay men are child molesters, while only one-tenth believed the same to be true
about lesbians.208 More recently, stereotypes of gay men as “pedophiles” and
“child molesters” have been revived in the debates over the Boy Scouts’
exclusion of gay scoutmasters,209 the sexual abuse of boys by Catholic
priests,210 and the sexually charged communications between Representative
202. Id.
203. PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN
AMERICA 62 (1998) (observing that during the 1950s, “[p]revailing therapeutic orthodoxy viewed
homosexuality as a form of an arrested psychosexual development, one likely to be associated with an
un-natural attraction toward children”).
204. See id. at 124-25 (observing that Bryant’s campaign “stressed homosexuals’ alleged
predilection for child pornography and involvement in organized pedophile rings,” including one
allegation that “25,000 boys seventeen years old or younger in [Los Angeles] alone have been recruited
into a homosexual ring to provide sex for adult male customers”).
205. See Gregory Herek, Facts About Homosexuality and Child Molestation,
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/facts_molestation.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (citing
ALBERT D. KLASSEN & COLIN J. WILLIAMS, SEX AND MORALITY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
EMPIRICAL ENQUIRY UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE KINSEY INSTITUTE (Hubert J. O’Gorman ed.,
1989)).
206. 643 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
207. 700 N.E.2d 70, 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
208. Herek, Gender Gaps, supra note 46, at 51.
209. See, e.g., HANS ZEIGER, GET OFF MY HONOR: THE ASSAULT ON THE BOY SCOUTS OF
AMERICA (2005) (“The BSA’s position against homosexuality is not just an issue of moral principle in
an effort to affirm the Scout Oath and Law, it is a serious safety effort to prevent cases of sexual abuse
and harassment.”).
210. Sean Cahill & Kenneth T. Jones, Child Sexual Abuse and Homosexuality: The Long History
of the “Gays as Pedophiles” Fallacy (National Gay and Lesbian Task Force), at 1, available at
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Mark Foley and his congressional pages.211 Even today, most dictionaries still
define “pederasty” in ambiguous terms, as “sexual relations between two
males, esp. when one of them is a minor.”212
III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHILD’S GENDER: GAY FATHERS, LESBIAN
MOTHERS, AND THE SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT OF SONS
The last Part showed that disputes over gay and lesbian parenthood are
influenced by the parent’s gender. This Part shows that they are influenced by
the child’s gender as well. By analyzing the same group of custody and
visitation cases from another angle, this Part demonstrates that gay and lesbian
parents have been subjected to two stereotypes that have been influenced by the
child’s gender.
In some cases, gay and lesbian parents have been stereotyped as
“recruiters”—people who overtly encourage children to become homosexual by
taking them to pro-gay events and exposing them to pro-gay media. In other
cases, gay and lesbian parents have been stereotyped as “role models”—people
who subtly encourage children to become homosexual by providing influential
models of same-sex relationships. In recruiting cases, parents were criticized
for exposing children to gay and lesbian parades and rallies,213 weddings and
churches,214 magazines and books,215 conferences and lectures,216 and radio and

www.rainbowfamilynm.org/pubs/childsexualabuse.pdf (“[S]ome in the Catholic Church hierarchy have
blamed homosexuality for the widespread pattern of sexual abuse of children, teens and young
seminarians by priests.”); Herek, supra note 205 (“[T]he Vatican’s early response to the 2002
revelations of widespread Church cover-ups of sexual abuse by priests was to declare that gay men
should not be ordained.”).
211. See Kate Zernike & Abby Goodnough, Lawmaker Quits Over E-Mail Sent to Teenage Pages,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A1.
212. Dictionary.com Unabridged, http://dictionary.reference.com (defining “pederasty” as “sexual
relations between two males, esp. when one of them is a minor”) (citing RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY (2006)); see also AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 914 (2d ed. 1982) (defining
“pederast” as “one who engages in anal intercourse, esp. with a boy”); 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
372 (2d ed. 1961) (defining “pederasty” as “sodomy” or “[u]nnatural connection with a boy” and
defining “pederast” as “sodomite”); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1428
(2d ed. 1987) (defining “pederasty” as “sexual relations between two males, esp. when one of them is a
minor”); STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1446 (28th ed. 2006) (defining “pederasty” as
“[h]omosexual anal intercourse, especially when practiced on boys”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1664 (3d ed. 1976) (defining “pederasty” as “anal intercourse esp. with a
boy as the passive partner”); Dictionary.com Unabridged, supra (defining “pederasty” as “[t]he crime
against nature; sodomy”) (citing WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1996)). But see
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1167 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “pederasty” as “[a]nal intercourse between a
man and a boy”).
213. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (describing trial
court’s criticism of lesbian mother for bringing her child to “a gay and lesbian pride parade”); In re J.S.
& C., 324 A.2d 90, 95-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (criticizing father for involving his children in
“gay rights movement” by bringing them to “protest marches” and “rallies”).
214. See, e.g., M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Okla. 1982) (criticizing lesbian mother for
exposing her child to “an acknowledged open homosexual relationship” and “invit[ing] forty friends to a
‘Gay-la Wedding’ at a church, performed by a minister”); J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 866
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television programs.217 In role modeling cases, parents were criticized for living
with same-sex partners, coming out to children, and displaying same-sex
affections.218 Recruiting stereotypes are concerned about gay and lesbian
parents “indoctrinating” children;219 role modeling stereotypes are concerned
about children “identifying” with gay and lesbian parents.220
Although these two stereotypes are phrased differently, they are based on
the same underlying concerns—that children raised by gay and lesbian parents
are more likely to develop homosexual desires, experiment with homosexual
conduct, and grow up to be gay and lesbian adults. Whether or not these
concerns have any factual basis, they draw support from conventional
assumptions about the process of sexual development—that before puberty,
children have both homosexual and heterosexual tendencies, and that during
puberty, they develop sexual relationships based on models provided by adults,
especially parents.221 By keeping children away from gay and lesbian parents,
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (prohibiting gay father from bringing his child to “a church at which a large
proportion of the congregation are homosexuals”).
215. See, e.g., T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 693 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (criticizing lesbian
mother for bringing her child to “a bookstore where there was literature on training for ‘the gay and
lesbian hotline . . . and for homosexual lovemaking’”).
216. See, e.g., Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d 733, 736-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (criticizing gay
father for exposing his children to “a ‘Liberty and Justice for All’ conference . . . addressing the
concerns of gay-lesbian people”); Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130, 134, 136 (Wash. 1978) (Rosellini,
J., dissenting) (criticizing lesbian mother for exposing her children exposure to “lectures” in which she
“publicly espoused . . . the superiority of the homosexual lifestyle”).
217. See, e.g., Schuster, 585 P.2d at 134, 136 (Rosellini, J., dissenting) (criticizing lesbian mother
for exposing her children exposure to “radio and television” appearances in which she “publicly
espoused . . . the superiority of the homosexual lifestyle”); J.S. & C., 324 A.2d at 95-96 (criticizing gay
father for allowing children to be filmed with him on “television show which discussed
homosexuality”).
218. See, e.g., L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (criticizing lesbian mother for
living with her same-sex partner, coming out to her children, and displaying same-sex affections);
Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 392, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (criticizing lesbian mother for living
with her same-sex partner and displaying same-sex affections).
219. See, e.g., Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949 (Wy. 1996) (finding that lesbian mother
engaged in “intensive and unrelenting efforts to immerse the children in her alternative lifestyle,
seemingly to the point of indoctrination”) (emphasis added); J.S. & C., 324 A.2d at 95 (finding that gay
father’s children would not be aware of gay rights movement “without prodding and indoctrination by
an adult”) (emphasis added).
220. See, e.g., Gottleib v. Gottleib, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (Kassal, J., concurring)
(arguing that gay father’s visitation should be restricted because “a child’s sexual maturation and sense
of sexual security must be safeguarded so that the child will have a proper identification as to what the
parents’ role model should be”) (emphasis added); Dailey, 635 S.W.2d at 394 (upholding transfer of
custody from lesbian mother to heterosexual father because “homosexuality is a learned trait and it
would be very difficult for [the child] to learn and approximate sex role identification from a
homosexual environment”) (emphasis added).
221. See, e.g., Schuster, 585 P.2d at 136 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). In one form or another, both of
these assumptions can be traced back to the model of child sexual development introduced by Sigmund
Freud. On “bisexual” tendencies, see Sigmund Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, in 23 THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 211, 243-44
(James Strachey trans., Hogarth Press 1973) (1937) [hereinafter WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD] (“We
have come to learn, however, that every human being is bisexual in this case and that his libido is
distributed either in a manifest or latent fashion, over objects of both sexes.”); Sigmund Freud,
Civilization and its Discontents, in 21 WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra, at 57, 105 (1930) (“Man is an
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courts have sought to establish “a proper atmosphere for young, pliable minds”
in which children are shielded from “any course of conduct that might
influence them to develop homosexual traits.”222
Since the 1950s, recruiting and role modeling stereotypes have been
expressed more often than HIV or sexual abuse stereotypes, and they have been
accepted more often by judges. Specifically, these “sexual development”
stereotypes were raised in about 28% (48 of 171) of all cases,223 and they were

animal organism . . . with an unmistakably bisexual disposition.”); Sigmund Freud, The Psychogenesis
of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman, in 18 WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra, at 145, 158 (1920)
(“In all of us, throughout life, the libido normally oscillates between male and female objects . . .”); id.
at 157 (noting “the universal bisexuality of human beings”). On parents as role models for sexual
development, see Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, in 7 WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD, supra, at 197-224 (1905) (introducing Oedipal theory of child sexual development).
222. Black v. Black, 1988 WL 22823, at *2-*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1988).
223. This Part is based upon my analysis of the following cases involving gay fathers, Price v.
Price, No. E1999-00102-COA-R10-CV, 2000 WL 704596, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2000);
Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 591-92 (Miss. 1999) (McRae, J., dissenting); Marlow v. Marlow,
702 N.E.2d 733, 736-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Glover v. Glover, 586 N.E.2d 159, 164 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990); J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); In re Marriage of Birdsall, 197
Cal.App.3d 1024, 1027, 1030 (Ct. App. 1988); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963 (Sup. Ct. 1986); Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067,
1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Gottleib v. Gottleib, 108 A.D.2d 120, 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (Kassal, J.,
concurring); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Wash. 1983); J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P.,
643 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d 775, 776 (N.C. Ct. App.
1979); and In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 95-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), and the following cases
involving lesbian mothers, Cook v. Cook, 965 So. 2d 630, 633-34 (La. Ct. App. 2007); In re Marriage of
Collins, 51 P.3d 691, 692 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 36 n.11 (Ala. 2002)
(Moore, C.J., concurring); S.B. v. L.W., 793 So. 2d 656, 657 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); Jacoby v. Jacoby,
763 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fl. Ct. App. 2000); Eldridge v. Eldridge, No. 03A01-9904-CH-00146, 1999 WL
994099, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1999); Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1195 (Ala. 1998);
Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 374-75 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997); Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So.
2d 538, 540-41 & n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995);
Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949 (Wyo. 1995); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637, 639 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 894, 896 (S.D. 1992); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d
31, 36 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
Barron v. Barron, 594 A.2d 682, 684 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1275
(La. Ct. App. 1990); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30,
1988); Black v. Black, 1988 WL 22823, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1988); G.A. v. D.A., 745
S.W.2d 726, 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 693 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Mo. 1985); S.N.E. v.
R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985);
Brownell v. Brownell, No. 1233, 1985 WL 17450, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1985); Bennett v.
O’Rourke, 1985 WL 3464, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 968-69
(Okla. 1982); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); S. v. S., 608
S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); M.P.
v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1259, 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d
130, 134, 136 (Wash. 1978) (Rosellini, J., dissenting); and In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (Sup.
Ct. 1976).
For neglect and non-parent cases involving recruiting and role modeling stereotypes, see Holmes
v. Holmes, 255 S.W.3d 482, 484 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007); In re Breisch, 434 A.2d 815, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981); Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981); Gerald D. v. Peggy R., No. C-9104, 79-12-143-CV,
1980 WL 20452 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 17, 1980); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980);
Towend v. Towend, No. 639, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 6193 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1976); and Chaffin
v. Frye, 45 Cal.App.3d 39 (Ct. App. 1975).
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accepted by judges in about 90% (43 of 48) of these cases.224
This Part explores the influence of gender in the expression of sexual
development stereotypes. The first section shows that gay fathers and lesbian
mothers were subjected to sexual development stereotypes equally often, but
the parents of sons were subjected to such stereotypes more often than the
parents of daughters. On a general level, this pattern shows that litigants,
experts, and judges expressed more concerns about the sexual development of
boys than the sexual development of girls.
After developing a more specific framework for identifying the influence
of gender, the remaining sections analyze how the expression of sexual
development stereotypes was influenced by both the parent’s gender and the
child’s gender. By comparing how sexual development stereotypes were
expressed in four group of cases—cases involving fathers and sons, mothers
and daughters, mothers and sons, and fathers and daughters—we can develop a
more specific account of why and how litigants, experts, and judges expressed
more concerns about the sexual development of boys than the sexual
development of girls.
A. Sexual Development Stereotypes: Recruiters, Role Models, and the Sexual
Development of Sons
When we first look at the sexual development cases, it seems that the
expression of stereotypes is not influenced by the parent’s gender at all. When
we compare the cases involving gay fathers and lesbian mothers, we see that
gay fathers and lesbian mothers were stereotyped as recruiters and role models
in the same percentage of cases—in exactly 28% (14 of 50) of the cases
involving gay fathers and about 28% (34 of 121) of the cases involving lesbian
mothers.225
In this context, the expression of stereotypes seems to depend more on the
child’s gender than the parent’s gender. When we compare the cases involving
sons and daughters, we see that the parents of sons were stereotyped as
recruiters and role models 49% more often than the parents of daughters.
Specifically, sexual development stereotypes appeared in about 38% (20 of 52)
of the cases involving sons and 26% (16 of 62) of the cases involving
daughters.226
224. Sexual development stereotypes were rejected by judges in the following cases: Weigand, 730
So. 2d at 591-92; Blew, 617 A.2d at 36 n.2; Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 986; S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 879; and
Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d at 776.
225. This amounts to a difference of only one case, which is too small to be regarded as
meaningful. See supra Part I.D.6 (defining minimum threshold for identifying differences that are
“presumptively meaningful”).
226. This amounts to a difference of at least six cases, which is large enough to be regarded as
meaningful. See supra Part I.D.6 (defining minimum threshold for identifying differences that are
“presumptively meaningful”).
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Based on this difference, we can see that litigants, experts, and judges
expressed more concerns about the sexual development of boys than the sexual
development of girls. Needless to say, this hierarchy of concerns was not
explicitly acknowledged by litigants, experts, and judges in the sexual
development cases. They did not claim, for example, that it was more important
or more difficult to raise heterosexual boys.
To gain a better understanding of this hierarchy of concerns, we must
develop a more specific framework for identifying the influence of gender in
the sexual development cases. By breaking down the cases by the parent’s
gender and the child’s gender, we can analyze the expression of sexual
development stereotypes in more detail. To this end, the following matrix
shows how often sexual development stereotypes appeared in four groups of
cases defined by the parent’s gender and the child’s gender: (1) cases involving
gay fathers and sons; (2) cases involving lesbian mothers and daughters; (3)
cases involving lesbian mothers and sons; and (4) cases involving gay fathers
and daughters.
Distribution of Sexual Development Stereotypes
by Parent’s Gender and Child’s Gender227

Sons
Daughters

Fathers
50% (9/18)
10% (2/20)

Mothers
32% (11/34)
33% (14/42)

By breaking down the sexual development cases in this manner, we can see
that the parent’s gender has a role to play after all. Although the expression of
sexual development stereotypes generally depends on the child’s gender, it
specifically depends on the relationship between the parent’s gender and the
child’s gender.
Based on these differences, we can identify the following hierarchy of
concerns expressed by litigants, experts, and judges in the sexual development
cases:
(1) They were most concerned about gay fathers raising gay sons. This
stereotype appeared in half (9 of 18) of all cases involving fathers and
sons.

227. These findings come with two caveats: First, this analysis excludes cases involving both sons
and daughters as well as cases in which the child’s gender was not disclosed. For these purposes, such
cases are inherently ambiguous. Second, this analysis reflects how often sexual development stereotypes
were expressed by litigants and experts, but it does not reflect how often they were accepted by judges.
Because of the small number of sexual development cases, I could not identify any meaningful
differences in how often judges endorsed stereotypes in cases involving fathers, mothers, sons, and
daughters.
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(2) They were less concerned—but only slightly less concerned—
about lesbian mothers raising lesbian daughters. This stereotype
appeared in one-third (14 of 42) of the cases involving mothers and
daughters.228
(3) They were equally concerned about lesbian mothers raising gay
sons and lesbian mothers raising lesbian daughters.229 Like the second
stereotype, this stereotype appeared in about one-third (11 of 34) of the
cases involving mothers and sons.230
(4) They were least concerned—indeed, they were hardly concerned at
all—about gay fathers raising lesbian daughters. This stereotype
appeared in only two cases—one-tenth (2 of 20) of the cases involving
fathers and daughters.
Above all, the differences between the father-daughter cases and the other cases
are most meaningful: Litigants, experts, and judges were three times more
concerned about lesbian mothers raising gay sons or lesbian daughters,231 and
they were five times more concerned about gay fathers raising gay sons.232
The following sections examine the evidence of this hierarchy of concerns
in each group of the sexual development cases.
B. Identification: Like Parent, Like Child
It is not difficult to understand why sexual development stereotypes were
so prevalent in cases where the parent’s gender and the child’s gender were the
same. In cases involving gay fathers and sons, the stereotypes reflect the
assumption that gay men are more likely to recruit boys, or conversely, that
boys are more likely to identify with male role models. In cases involving
lesbian mothers and daughters, the stereotypes reflect the assumption that
lesbians are more likely to recruit girls, or conversely, that girls are more likely
228. The difference between the first group of cases (father-son) and the second group of cases
(mother-daughter) amounts to three cases, which is barely large enough to be regarded as meaningful.
See supra Part I.D.6 (defining minimum threshold for identifying differences that are “presumptively
meaningful”).
229. The difference between the second group of cases (mother-daughter) and the third group of
cases (mother-son) is exceedingly small, less than 0.5%. It amounts to a difference of only one case,
which is too small to be regarded as meaningful. See supra Part I.D.6 (defining minimum threshold for
identifying differences that are “presumptively meaningful”).
230. Even if we included cases involving both sons and daughters, these differences would still
exist in all of the cases involving lesbian mothers: Sexual development stereotypes appeared in 30% (8
of 27) of the cases involving lesbian mothers who had both sons and daughters; overall, they appeared in
32% (33 of 103) of the cases involving lesbian mothers in which the child’s gender was disclosed.
231. The difference between the last group of cases (father-daughter) and the second and third
groups of cases (mother-daughter and mother-son) amounts to a difference of at least five cases, which
is large enough to be regarded as meaningful. See supra Part I.D.6 (defining minimum threshold for
identifying differences that are “presumptively meaningful”).
232. The difference between the last group of cases (father-daughter) and the first group of cases
(father-son) amounts to a difference of eight cases, which is large enough to be regarded as meaningful.
See supra Part I.D.6 (defining minimum threshold for identifying differences that are “presumptively
meaningful”).
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to identify with female role models. Whether or not these assumptions are
sound, they draw support from the wisdom of two common proverbs—“like
father, like son” and “like mother, like daughter”—which suggest that children
typically take after parents of the same gender. More specifically, they draw
support from many psychological theories of sexual development, which
generally suggest that children typically form a bond of “identification” with
parents of the same gender—that is, boys normally identify with fathers and
girls normally identify with mothers.233
In most of the sexual development cases, courts did not explicitly analyze
the relationship between the parent’s gender and the child’s gender, so the
significance of this bond was not often acknowledged. In a few cases, however,
courts explicitly suggested that children are more likely to imitate parents of the
same gender, in the course of denying custody to gay and lesbian parents. In
Bennett v. O’Rourke (Tennessee 1985),234 the court noted that “the homosexual
parent and the minor child are both female.”235 In denying the mother custody
of her daughter, the court explained, “we consider this factor particularly
important because of the increased chance of role-modeling.”236 In Constant A.
v. Paul C.A. (Pennsylvania 1985),237 the court expressed concern that awarding
custody to a lesbian mother would “proselytize” the children by indicating that
such a “role model” represented “a suitable lifestyle for the children”—
“particularly [for] Andrea,” the court added, referring specifically to the
family’s only daughter.238 In Cook v. Cook (Louisiana 2007),239 a courtappointed mental health counselor claimed that the mother’s “lesbian partner
would distort the children’s (especially the girls’) perception of female role
models,” and the father claimed that “kids raised by lesbian parents are more
likely to grow up lesbian.”240 In Glover v. Glover (Ohio 1990),241 when the
court rejected the testimony of the father’s expert witness, it expressed similar
concerns about sons raised by gay fathers: “Although studies showed that
233. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA G. KAPLAN & MARY ANNE SEDNEY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SEX ROLES
(1980).
There are three theories of how sex roles develop within the family: psychoanalytic, social
learning, and cognitive development theory. Although each theory has its problems, all three
are important because they have virtually ‘cornered the market’ of thinking in this area. A
central concept in the three traditional theories of sex-role development is identification.
Although some authors prefer to use the term ‘imitation’ most agree that the process is one
by which a person takes on some of the characteristics of another makes them a part of her or
his own personality. When talking about sex-role identification psychologists are usually
referring to the process by which a child comes to emulate certain behaviors of a parent,
especially the same-sex parent.
Id. at 180 (internal citation omitted).
234. 1985 WL 3464 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985).
235. Id. at *3.
236. Id.
237. 496 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
238. Id. at 8.
239. 965 So. 2d 630 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
240. Id. at 633-34.
241. 586 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
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children raised by lesbian mothers were not affected by the custodial parent’s
sexual preference, [the expert] admitted no such research was available for
male children raised by homosexual fathers.”242 In a similar vein, opponents of
gay and lesbian parenthood often claim that “[p]arents are important as role
models for their children of the same gender because children learn to be adults
by watching adults.”243
C. Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood: Lesbian Mothers, Effeminate Sons
The question remains, however, why lesbian mothers were so often
portrayed raising gay sons, while gay fathers were so rarely portrayed raising
lesbian daughters. If gay fathers were stereotyped along gender lines, why were
lesbian mothers stereotyped across gender lines? Put differently, why would
litigants, experts, and judges be more concerned that the sons of lesbians would
grow up to be gay men and less concerned that the daughters of gay men would
grow up to be lesbians?
Answers to these questions can be developed from a brilliant essay by Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay: The War on Effeminate
Boys.244 As Sedgwick explains, the modern war over the sexual development of
boys has been played out in the evolution of two theories of childhood sexual
development that have been adopted by mainstream psychologists during
different periods. The first is an old theory of why homosexuality develops in
boys, which was closely associated with the diagnosis of homosexuality as a
mental disorder. The second is a new theory of why effeminacy develops in
boys, which is closely associated with the diagnosis of gender identity disorder
of childhood—as well as the old theory of why homosexuality develops in
boys. By briefly reviewing the evolution of these theories, we can develop a
more specific understanding of why litigants, experts, and judges expressed
heightened concerns about lesbian mothers raising gay sons.

242. Id. at 164. In a handful of other cases, litigants and courts invoked gender-specific language to
express sexual development concerns about the influence of mothers over daughters and fathers over
sons. In Collins v. Collins, the court expressed “great concern” that the “mother” had exposed her
“young, female child” to her “lesbian relationships.” Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (emphasis added). In Conkel v. Conkel, the mother expressed a
“‘fear’ that contact with [the] father will trigger homosexual tendencies in the two boys.” Conkel v.
Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added); see N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606
S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (expressing concern about mother’s influence over daughter “as
her sexual awareness develops with the approach of young womanhood”) (emphasis added); accord
Bennett v. O’Rourke, 1985 WL 3464, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240,
244-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
243. Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 833, 860-61 (1997) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
244. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay: The War on Effeminate Boys, in
TENDENCIES 154 (Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick ed., 1993).
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1. The Psychology of Homosexuality: Domineering Mothers, Gay Sons
In Woodruff v. Woodruff (North Carolina 1979),245 a psychologist testified
that there was “a substantiated theory that a male child, raised by an extremely
domineering mother, may pursue a homosexual lifestyle.”246 In the postwar era,
this theory was popularized by conversion therapists, who diagnosed
homosexuality as a mental disorder—specifically, an arrested form of sexual
development. Citing clinical observations and psychological studies,
conversion therapists claimed that male homosexuality most often developed in
boys raised by mothers who were “domineering,” “harsh,” or “close-binding”
and fathers who were “weak,” “absent,” or “detached.”247 During this period,
most psychologists believed that this family dynamic caused boys to identify
across gender—to identify with mothers instead of fathers—and as a result,
such boys developed “effeminate” rather than masculine traits, including a
sexual attraction toward other males. This theory both informed and reflected
the conventional wisdom that boys raised by “smothering” mothers grow up to
be “sissies,” “fairies,” or “mama’s boys.”248 Although some psychologists
proposed similar theories about female homosexual development in this era,249
none gained widespread acceptance among mainstream psychologists.250
Based on this theory of homosexuality, therapists often sought to “convert”
male patients to heterosexuality by “curing” them of maternal influences and
effeminate traits. In the early 1970s, however, this theory of homosexuality
came under attack, as a growing number of psychologists and gay rights
activists began to view homosexuality as a normal and healthy form of sexual
development. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) voted to
remove the diagnosis of “homosexuality” from the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), indicating that psychologists should no

245. 260 S.E.2d 775 (N.C. 1979).
246. Id. at 776.
247. See IRVING BIEBER ET AL., HOMOSEXUALITY 79-81 (1972) (observing that mothers “promoted
homosexuality” by falling into a pattern described as “close-binding-intimate”); id. at 114 (observing
that “the pathologic seeking of need fulfillment from men has a clear point of origin in fathers who were
detached”); CHARLES W. SOCARIDES, HOMOSEXUALITY, 183-84 (1978) (observing that “[t]he absence
of the father or the presence of a weak father combined with a domineering, harsh, and phallic mother
favor the development of [male] homosexuality” (emphasis omitted)). These theories are aptly
summarized in Yoshino, supra note 40, at 795 (noting that “Bieber systematized the popular model that
male homosexuality arose from close-binding mothers and distant fathers”).
248. See, e.g., RICHARD GREEN, THE “SISSY BOY SYNDROME” AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
HOMOSEXUALITY (1987).
249. See, e.g., SOCARIDES, supra note 247, at 188 (claiming that lesbianism derives from a girl’s
“dread of . . . a malevolent mother” and her conviction that her father “rejects and hates her”).
250. See EDA G. GOLDSTEIN & LOIS C. HOROWITZ, LESBIAN IDENTITY AND CONTEMPORARY
PSYCHOTHERAPY: A FRAMEWORK FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 16-17 (2003) (criticizing Freudian theories
of lesbianism as “contradictory,” “negative,” and “phallocentric”); id. at 17-19 (noting that several early
psychoanalysts dissented from Freudian theories of lesbianism and female sexual development); id. at
23 (noting that lesbianism and female sexual development were not systematically explored by
psychotherapists until the 1970s).
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longer diagnose or treat homosexuality as a mental disorder.251 For the next
several years, the APA’s decision was met with “strong opposition” from a
substantial minority of APA members, including several prominent conversion
therapists.252 By the 1990s, however, the APA’s view had been embraced by
every major mental health association in the United States.253 Today, the
practice of conversion therapy has been thoroughly marginalized, and the
theory that blames domineering mothers for the development of gay sons has
been widely debunked.254
2. The Psychology of Gender Identity Disorder: Overbearing Mothers,
Effeminate Sons
This is not to say, however, that the underlying logic of the theory has been
abandoned, even by mainstream psychologists. In 1980, when the diagnosis of
“homosexuality” was officially removed from the DSM, a new diagnosis
known as “Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood” (GIDC) was added.255 As
several scholars have noted, the new theory of GIDC is similar to the old theory
of homosexuality in at least three ways: (1) it is specifically concerned with the
development of effeminacy in boys; (2) it blames mothers for fostering
effeminacy in boys; and (3) it links effeminacy in boys to homosexuality in gay
male adolescents and adults.256 Once we spell out the nature of these
similarities, it will be easier to see why litigants, experts, and judges have been
specifically concerned about lesbian mothers raising gay sons.
First, like the old diagnosis of homosexuality, the new diagnosis of GIDC
was specifically concerned with the gender development of boys. As Sedgwick
explains, although the DSM’s original diagnosis of GIDC was “nominally
gender-neutral,” it was “actually highly differentiated between boys and girls,”
insofar as it established a much lower threshold for diagnosing the disorder in
boys.257 Under the DSM’s guidelines, a girl could be treated for GIDC only in
the rare case in which she denied that she was anatomically female (for
251. See RUBENSTEIN, BALL & SCHACTER, supra note 42, at 78.
252. See In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 96-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (claiming that the
controversy among APA members over the diagnosis of homosexuality supported restrictions on gay
father’s visitation rights).
253. Yoshino, supra note 40, at 800 & n.147.
254. Even today, however, the theory persists among a handful of conservative psychological and
religious organizations that continue to advocate conversion therapies. Id. at 799-800.
255. See Kenneth J. Zucker & Robert L. Spitzer, Was the Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood
Diagnosis Introduced into DSM-III as a Backdoor Maneuver to Replace Homosexuality? A Historical
Note, 31 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 31, 32 (2005).
256. For helpful summaries of the similarities between these two theories, see Sedgwick, supra
note 244; Zucker & Spitzer, supra note 255, at 34-35; and Katherine K. Wilson, The Disparate
Classification of Gender and Sexual Orientation in American Psychiatry (Annual Meeting of the
American Psychiatric Association June 2, 1998), available at http://www.transgender.org/gidr/kwapa
98.html.
257. Sedgwick, supra note 244, at 156.
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example, “she is biologically unable to become pregnant,” “she will not
develop breasts,” or “she has no vagina”) or asserted that she was anatomically
male (for example, “she has, or will grow a penis”).258 A boy, by contrast,
could be treated for asserting merely that “it would be better not to have a
penis,” or that “his penis or testes are disgusting”—or alternatively, if he
displayed “a preference for either cross-dressing or simulating female attire,
or . . . a compelling desire to participate in the games and pastimes of girls.”259
Even today, under the DSM’s most recent version of the diagnosis, boys
may still be treated for “dressing in girl’s or women’s clothes,” using “[t]owels,
aprons, and scarves . . . to represent long hair or skirts,” adopting the “mother
roles” when “playing ‘house,’” and playing with “[s]tereotypical female-type
dolls, such as Barbie.”260 Alternatively, even if boys do not display
stereotypically feminine behavior, they may still be treated for displaying an
aversion toward “rough-and-tumble play” and rejection of “stereotypical boy’s
toys,” games, and activities, such as “cars,” “trucks,” and “competitive
sports.”261 The DSM’s focus on boys is only exacerbated by the secondary
literature, which is almost “exclusively” preoccupied with the diagnosis and
treatment of “effeminate boys.”262
Second, like the old theory of homosexuality, the new theory of GIDC
blames mothers for fostering effeminacy in boys. Although the DSM does not
specify the causes of GIDC, the secondary literature speculates that effeminacy
develops when mothers give boys too much attention and fathers fail to
“validate” boys “as masculine.”263 In this account, “[m]others . . . have nothing
to contribute to [the] process of masculine validation . . . any involvement is
overinvolvement; any protectiveness is overprotectiveness.”264 Much like
conversion therapists, GIDC theorists often reserve the harshest criticisms for
mothers who display “any tolerance” for effeminacy in sons.265
Finally, the DSM acknowledges that for most boys, a diagnosis of GIDC is
little more than a precursor to homosexuality in adulthood. “By late
adolescence or adulthood,” the DSM reports, “about three-quarters of boys who

258. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
265-66 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]; see also Sedgwick, supra note 244, at 156 (summarizing
DSM-III’s GIDC diagnostic criteria for girls).
259. DSM-III, supra note 258, at 265-66; see also Sedgwick, supra note 244, at 156 (summarizing
DSM-III’s GIDC diagnostic criteria for boys).
260. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
533, 537 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
261. Id.
262. Sedgwick, supra note 244, at 155; see also Susan Coates & Kenneth J. Zucker, Gender
Identity Disorders in Children, in 2 HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS 893, 893 (1988) (noting that “very little material has been published on girls with severe
gender identity disorder).
263. Sedgwick, supra note 244, at 160, 161.
264. Id. at 161.
265. Id. at 163.
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had a childhood history of Gender Identity Disorder report a homosexual or
bisexual orientation, but without concurrent Gender Identity Disorder.”266
In light of these similarities, some observers have claimed that the APA’s
introduction of the new diagnosis of GIDC was a “backdoor maneuver” to
reinstate the old diagnosis of homosexuality as a mental disorder.267 Whether or
not they are correct, the similarities between the theories can hardly be doubted.
Both theories are specifically concerned with the development of effeminacy
and homosexuality in boys, and both theories blame a surplus of mothering and
a deficit of fathering for inhibiting the development of masculine, heterosexual
boys.
3. The Law of Gender Identity Disorder: Lesbian Mothers, Effeminate
Sons
The theory of GIDC has played a significant role in the sexual
development cases involving lesbian mothers and sons.268 In 55% (6 of 11) of
the sexual development cases involving mothers and sons, concerns were
expressed about the development of “gender identity” or gender “masculine
roles” in boys,269 in addition to the development of homosexuality in boys.270 In
83% (5 of 6) of these cases, gender identity and gender role stereotypes were

266. DSM-IV, supra note 260, at 536. “The corresponding percentages for sexual orientation in
girls,” the manual admits, “are not known.” Id.
267. Zucker & Spitzer, supra note 255, at 32; see also 1 LAWRENCE D. MASS, DIALOGUES OF THE
SEXUAL REVOLUTION: HOMOSEXUALITY AND SEXUALITY 214 (1990) (suggesting that “American
psychiatry [is] simply engaged in a long, subtle process of reconceptualizing homosexuality as a mental
illness with another name—the gender identity disorder of childhood”); Zucker & Spitzer, supra note
255, at 34-35 (collecting criticisms of GIDC diagnosis). But see Zucker & Spitzer, supra note 255, at 36
(arguing that GIDC was introduced as a psychiatric diagnosis because it met the generally accepted
inclusion criteria of “clinical utility, acceptability to clinicians of various theoretical persuasions,
reliability, and validity”).
268. This section is based on my analysis of the following cases: Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760 (La.
Ct. App. 1995); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992); Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d
1273 (La. Ct. App. 1990); G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Brownell v. Brownell,
No. 1233, 1985 WL 17450 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1985); S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska
1985); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982); and
Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
269. In these cases, litigants, experts, and judges generally conflated the concepts of “gender
identity” and “gender roles.” See, e.g., Carlos Ball, Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity
and the Implications of Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691 (2003) (observing that judges often conflate
“gender identity” and “gender roles” in cases involving same-sex adoptions). This conflation is not
surprising, in light of the DSM’s tendency to interpret a child’s failure to conform with traditional
gender roles as symptomatic of gender identity disorder—especially when exhibited by boys. See supra
Part III.C.2 (describing GIDC diagnostic criteria for boys and girls).
270. See Scott, 665 So. 2d at 766; Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 637, 639; Blew 617 A.2d at 36 n.2;
Lundin, 563 So. 2d at 1275; M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 968-69; Dailey, 635 S.W.2d at 394. For an example of a
neglect case expressing similar themes, see In re Breisch, 434 A.2d 815, 817 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
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accepted by judges.271 By contrast, gender development stereotypes appeared in
only 7% (1 of 14) of the cases involving mothers and daughters,272 and none (0
of 50) of the cases involving gay fathers. The term “masculine” appeared three
times in the cases—all in cases involving lesbian mothers and sons—while the
term “feminine” did not appear at all.273 In other words, gender development
stereotypes were applied almost exclusively to lesbian mothers raising sons.
In Dailey v. Dailey (Tennessee 1981),274 the court cited a psychologist’s
view that it would be “preferable” to raise Rusty, a four-year-old boy, in “a
normal relationship wherein males and females adhere to their roles,” rather
than in “a homosexual relationship involving a mother in a submissive role,”
because “homosexuality is a learned trait and it would be very difficult for
Rusty to learn and approximate sex role identification from a homosexual
environment.”275 Based on this testimony, the court transferred custody to the
father and allowed the mother overnight visitation on alternating weekends.276
On appeal, the custody order was affirmed.277 Although neither the mother nor
the father had challenged the visitation order, it was reversed sua sponte by the
appellate court. After reciting the expert’s testimony, the court reasoned that
the mother’s behavior “could provide nothing but harmful effects in the [boy’s]
future life.”278 Based on this finding, the court prohibited overnight visits with
the mother as well as any visits in the presence of the mother’s live-in
partner.279
In Lundin v. Lundin (Louisiana 1990),280 the court cited a psychologist’s
concerns that if a two-year-old boy were raised by his lesbian mother, he may
not learn “masculine and female” roles, which the psychologist referred to as
“sex appropriate roles.”281 “I would be concerned,” the psychologist explained,
271. See Scott 665 So. 2d at 766; Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 637, 639; Lundin, 563 So. 2d at 1275;
M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 968-69; Dailey, 635 S.W.2d at 394. But see Blew, 617 A.2d at 36 n.2 (rejecting
gender development stereotypes).
272. See Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988 WL 30173, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988).
As previously noted, in Cook v. Cook, the court-appointed mental health counselor expressed his belief
that “a lesbian partner would distort the children’s (especially the girls’) perception of female role
models.” 965 So. 2d 630, 633-34 (La. Ct. App. 2007). Although the counselor was generally concerned
about the gender development of the family’s boys and girls, he was “especially” concerned about the
gender development of girls. Id.
273. See Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 637 (referring to ten-year-old boy’s exposure to men who are not
“masculine”); Lundin, 563 So. 2d at 1275 (describing two-year-old boy’s formation of “gender identity”
based on “appropriate roles for [his] own sex,” i.e., “masculine” roles); M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 968-69
(describing boy’s “sexual identity” as “masculine”). For a neglect case in which the court criticizes the
mother for being “masculine,” see Breisch, 434 A.2d at 817 (“The mother is a lesbian who effects a
masculine appearance, wears men’s clothing, and has a masculine oriented mental status.”).
274. 635 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
275. Id. at 394.
276. Id. at 395.
277. Id. at 394.
278. Id. at 396.
279. Id.
280. 563 So. 2d 1273 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
281. Id. at 1275.
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“if the role models were confused so that a child would not understand or know
that this was not typical or usual or to be expected.”282 The court awarded
primary custody to the father, based on a specific finding that “the child is of an
age where gender identity is being formed.”283
In Pleasant v. Pleasant (Illinois 1993),284 the trial court questioned the
mother “extensively” about a visit in which she took Jimmie, a ten-year-old
boy, to march with her friends in a “gay and lesbian pride parade”:
After asking whether the parade was an appropriate environment for
Jimmie and whether it had any effect on his sexual orientation, the
judge asked if there were men who were not masculine in the parade.
When the mother answered that there [were] no “unmasculine” men in
the parents group with which she walked, the judge argued with her
about the presence of so-called “unmasculine” men.285
In restricting the mother’s visitation rights, the trial court cited a psychiatrist’s
testimony that if Jimmie continued to spend extended, unsupervised visits with
his mother, he “might not develop a gender identity and may be confused about
what it is to be a male.”286 Based on this testimony, the court found that Jimmie
had a “gender identity problem” and that “having Jimmie in the presence of
gays and lesbians was endangering his gender identity and morals.”287 After
reviewing the expert’s testimony, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s
visitation restrictions, finding that “there is no evidence that Jimmie has a
gender identity problem.”288
In some cases, gender development stereotypes were raised more obliquely
than others. Litigants, experts, and judges expressed concerns that closely
tracked the DSM’s diagnosis of gender identity disorder in boys, without
explicitly referring to the boy’s “gender identity” or his understanding of
“masculine” roles.289 In Holmes v. Holmes (Arkansas 2007),290 for example, the
court observed that Zachary, a seven-year-old boy, would “not participate in
organized sports despite [his father’s] efforts to get him involved.”291 To
support a transfer of custody, the boy’s father testified that “he did not approve
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1277.
284. 628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
285. Id. at 637.
286. Id. at 639.
287. Id. at 638-39.
288. Id. at 641. The appellate court explained: “Although [the expert] testified that he was
concerned that Jimmie might ‘not develop a gender role identity and that he might be confused about
what it is like to be a male,’ he did not testify that Jimmie has a gender role identity problem. . . . In
fact,” the court noted, “[the expert] never even spoke with Jimmie.” Id. at 641-42.
289. See, e.g., Holmes v. Holmes, 255 S.W.3d 482, 484 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d
240, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Because my analysis is focused on explicit references to anti-gay
stereotypes, these cases were not included in my quantitative comparisons. I have included them as
background evidence that supports my claim that gender identity disorder plays a lead role in cases
involving lesbian mothers.
290. 255 S.W.3d. 482.
291. Id. at 484.
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of [the mother’s] lifestyle and believed that he had a right to raise Zachary in a
heterosexual environment.”292 In addition, the father expressed concerns “about
how much Zachary cried and about his lack of desire to play sports,”293 and the
father’s friend testified “that Zachary was whiney and did not like to be
rambunctious.”294 The mother acknowledged that “Zachary was afraid of
getting hurt,” but she insisted that he “was not a whiner”;295 moreover, she
argued, “the evidence that Zachary whines and does not like to play sports is of
no consequence.”296 The trial court transferred custody to the father, based on a
finding that Zachary’s “exposure to [his mother’s] sexual partners was
detrimental to [his] welfare.”297 The court’s order was affirmed on appeal.298
Finally, in In re Breisch (Pennsylvania 1981),299 the court suggested that
even if a lesbian mother was “masculine,” she could not raise her son to be
“masculine.”300 Based on testimony that “[t]he mother is a lesbian who effects
a masculine appearance, wears men’s clothing, and has a masculine oriented
mental status,”301 the court found that she had exposed “Joey,” a four-year-old
boy, “to a chaotic and harmful home life.”302 In this neglect proceeding, the
court transferred custody to the local child protection agency, and the court’s
order was affirmed on appeal.303
D. Fatherless Daughters: The Male Supremacy Principle
Sexual development stereotypes about boys raised by lesbian mothers
reflect not only the prevailing psychology of the times, but much older, much
broader concerns about boys raised by “fatherless” families, or families that
lack “strong” male role models.304 Although these concerns were originally a
product of the early industrial era, they continue to spawn controversies over
single motherhood in the contemporary United States.305
292. Id. at 486.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 485.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 487.
297. Id. at 488.
298. Id. Similarly, in L. v. D., the court noted the son’s complaints that “his father made him play
sports,” “he received but little praise and affection from his father,” and “he got a lot of hugs and kisses
from [his mother] and [her partner].” 630 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
299. 434 A.2d 815 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
300. Id. at 817.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 821.
304. See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents
Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 161 (2000) (noting that “opponents of homosexual parenthood . . .
rel[y] on a controversial literature that decries the putative risks of fatherlessness in general”).
305. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995); ELIZABETH HEROG & CECELIA E. SUDIA, BOYS IN FATHERLESS FAMILIES
(2004); LOUIS KREISBERG, MOTHERS IN POVERTY: A STUDY OF FATHERLESS FAMILIES (2006); LOST
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The analogy between lesbian mothers and single mothers may seem farfetched, but it is made frequently by opponents of gay and lesbian parenthood.
Lynn Wardle, for example, has criticized lesbian mothers by invoking studies
of children raised by single mothers. Defending the importance of fatherhood,
he has argued that “father love and mother love are different kinds of love,”
because only father love provides children with the following benefits: “First, it
provides them with a father’s physical protection. Second, it provides them
with a father’s money and other material resources. Third, and probably most
importantly, it provides them with what might be termed paternal cultural
transmission: a father’s distinctive capacity to contribute to [children’s]
identity, character, and competence.”306
Although critics of “fatherless” families often express generic concerns
about the impact on “children,” they generally focus on the impact on boys.307
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (Massachusetts 2003), three
justices objected to the recognition of same-sex marriage on the ground that
such unions “raise[] the prospect of children lacking any parent of their own
gender.”308 Although the justices initially stated this objection in gender-neutral
terms, they quickly slipped into the classic trope of fatherless boys: “For
example,” they explained, “a boy raised by two lesbians as his parents has no
male parent. . . . [T]he child himself might invoke gender as a justification for
the view that neither of his parents understands him, or that they ‘don’t know
what he is going through,’ particularly if his disagreement or dissatisfaction
involves some issue pertaining to sex.”309
As this analogy suggests, developmental stereotypes about boys raised by
lesbian mothers are patriarchal: They imply that every family should have a
father, because only a “man” can raise masculine, heterosexual boys. In
Pleasant v. Pleasant (Illinois 1993),310 the trial court suggested that men who
are not “masculine” do not fit the bill: If boys are exposed to “unmasculine”
men, then they are likely to become “unmasculine” boys, or boys with “gender
identity problems.”311 In the patriarchal framework, boys raised by gay fathers
FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA (Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1998); David
Popenoe, American Family Decline: 1960-1990: A Review and Appraisal, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 527
(1993); Julie Bosman, Obama Calls for More Responsibility from Black Fathers, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2008, at A15; Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at
47.
306. Wardle, supra note 243, at 859-60 (quoting BLANKENHORN, supra note 305, at 25).
307. See, e.g., HEROG & SUDIA, supra note 305.
308. 798 N.E.2d 941, 1000 n.29 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting).
309. Id. (emphasis added).
310. 628 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
311. Id. In the cases involving lesbian mothers and sons, litigants often expressed concerns that
boys would be exposed to gay men, even though they were not being raised by gay fathers. In In re
Marriage of McKay, No. C6-95-1626, 1996 WL 12658, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 1996), for
example, the father sought to restrict the mother’s visitation rights on the grounds that she was a lesbian
living with her same-sex partner. To support his request, the father testified that his son had been sent a
greeting card from a friend of the mother’s named “N.E.,” who was “an adult gay male.” Id. The father
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lack strong male role models, so they are viewed as “fatherless” too, like boys
raised by lesbian mothers.
What about girls raised by gay fathers? We have now analyzed three of the
four groups of cases, so only the last group of cases remains. There were only
two cases in which litigants, experts, or judges expressed stereotypes about gay
fathers raising lesbian daughters, and neither case yields much meaningful
insight. In Gottleib v. Gottleib (New York 1985),312 one judge invoked a
generic need for “proper identification” between the “parents” and the “child,”
rather than a gender-specific need for identification between fathers and
daughters.313 In J.P. v. P.W. (Missouri 1989),314 the court did not directly
express any sexual development stereotypes, but it quoted two such stereotypes
from other opinions.315 In this context, however, the silences seem to signify
more than the stereotypes. In 85% (17 of 20) of the cases involving gay fathers
and daughters, there were no references to the sexual or gender development of
girls.
Even without a text to guide us, we can guess why litigants, experts, and
judges may not have been too concerned about the “gender identity” of girls
raised by gay fathers. If they were anything like the trial judge in Pleasant, then
they would have viewed gay men as effeminate, so they would have assumed
that gay fathers would raise feminine daughters.316
There are, however, other conventional stereotypes about girls who lack
“strong” male role models—yet they did not appear in any of the cases
involving daughters. In the literature on “fatherless” families, commentators
often claim that girls without fathers are likely to be “wayward” or

explained that N.E. had signed the card with “Love,” and he had included the name of “Kelvon,” his
male partner. Id. After the father intercepted the card, he informed N.E. that “he would not allow
correspondence from adult males who were not family members.” Id. at *3.
312. 108 A.D.2d 120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
313. In Gottleib, a divided appellate court upheld an order restricting the father from involving his
daughter in “any homosexual activities or publicity” during her visits. Id. at 121. Writing separately, one
concurring judge reasoned that “a child’s sexual maturation and sense of sexual security must be
safeguarded so that the child will have a proper identification as to what the parents’ role model should
be.” Id. at 123 (Kassal, J., concurring). Note how the judge framed this stereotype in gender-neutral
terms—he referred only to “parents” and child”—rather than referring specifically to the “father” and
his “daughter.” Id.
314. 772 S.W. 2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
315. In J.P. v. P.W, an appellate court required the father’s visits with his daughter to be conducted
without his partner or “any other male,” id. at 786, and to be “supervised” by “a responsible adult,” id. at
794. In justifying this order, the court quoted passages from two other cases in which stereotypes had
been expressed. In one of these cases, a court upheld the state’s authority “to protect minors from being
influenced by those who advocate homosexual lifestyles.” Id. at 792 (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 489
N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio 1985)). In the other—a case involving a lesbian mother and a daughter—a
court found that “damage [was] likely to occur as [the daughter’s] sexual awareness develops with the
approach of young womanhood.” Id. (quoting N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. App.
1980)).
316. See, e.g., Case, supra note 80, at 2 (arguing that when a man displays feminine characteristics,
“his behavior is generally viewed as a marker for homosexual orientation”).

DUKEMINIER_1.24.11.DOC

2009]

1/28/11 11:18 AM

Like Father, Like Son

311

“promiscuous,” bearing children out of wedlock as teenagers.317 In cases
involving gay fathers, the opportunity for an analogy seems clear. The same
commentators who stereotype “fatherless” girls as promiscuous often
stereotype gay men as promiscuous.318 If litigants, experts, and judges had
adopted both of these stereotypes, then we would expect them to express
concerns about gay fathers raising promiscuous daughters.
There is, however, no evidence of these stereotypes in any of the custody
and visitation cases. Litigants, experts, and judges expressed no concerns about
gay fathers raising promiscuous daughters, and they expressed very few
concerns about gay fathers raising lesbian daughters. Apparently, they believed
that gay fathers were “strong” enough models for daughters, even if they were
not “strong” enough models for sons.
I can think of only one principle that would explain this belief, and it is
related to the patriarchal framework itself: If litigants, experts, and judges
considered masculinity to be more valuable than femininity—that is, if they
adopted a male supremacy principle—then they would generally be more
concerned about the role of masculine, heterosexual fathers in the production of
masculine, heterosexual boys.319
IV. IDENTIFYING THE JUDGE’S GENDER: MALE JUDGES AND THE GENDER OF
HOMOPHOBIA
Parts II and III showed that disputes over gay and lesbian parenthood are
influenced by the parent’s gender and the child’s gender. This brief Part shows
that they are influenced by the judge’s gender as well. By analyzing the same
group of custody and visitation cases from yet another angle, this Part
demonstrates that gay and lesbian parents have been subjected to stereotypes
that are influenced by the judge’s gender.320
317. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 243, at 853 (reporting one psychological case study in which a
daughter “experimented with homosexual practices and also indulged in heterosexual promiscuity”).
318. See, e.g., id. at 862 (claiming to observe the “chronic instability of homosexual liaisons,
especially gay liaisons”).
319. The male supremacy principle, which is often referred to simply as “patriarchy,” has been the
primary target of feminist theorists for many years. See, e.g., JUDITH M. BENNETT, HISTORY MATTERS:
PATRIARCHY AND THE CHALLENGE OF FEMINISM 55 (2006) (describing the feminist definition of
“patriarchy” as “male power”); ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN 57 (1995) (defining “patriarchy” as
“a familial-social, ideological, political system in which . . . the female is everywhere subsumed under
the male”); Redstockings Manifesto, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS
FROM THE WOMEN’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT 533, 534 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970) (“Male supremacy is
the oldest, most basic form of domination. All other forms of exploitation and oppression . . . are
extensions of male supremacy.”).
320. To examine whether the judge’s gender had any influence on the acceptance of stereotypes, I
began by finding the first names of the judges who authored each majority opinion in the collection, as
well as any concurring or dissenting opinions analyzed in Parts II and III. Applying conventional
assumptions about which names are “masculine” and “feminine,” I coded each judge as presumptively
“male,” “female,” or “N/A,” for the purposes of this analysis. When a judge’s name was ambiguous, I
reviewed biographical information for clues about the judge’s gender, such as the use of gender-specific
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Initially, when I set out to explore the influence of the judge’s gender, I did
not expect to find any meaningful differences, because the large majority (71%)
of opinions were written by male judges. To my surprise, however, the
differences were not only meaningful but stark: Gender-based stereotypes were
accepted in 39% (47 of 122) of the opinions written by male judges and only
5% (1 of 21) of the opinions written by female judges—that is, eight times
more often in opinions written by male judges.321
In fact, only one female judge authored an opinion in which she accepted a
stereotype that portrayed gay and lesbian parents as HIV agents, child
molesters, recruiters, or role models, and her opinion is the kind of exception
that proves the contrary rule. In In re Marriage of Birdsall (California 1988),322
a gay father had testified at trial that “he had no intention of raising [his son] as
a homosexual.”323 Based on this statement, the male trial judge found that the
father “obviously recognizes some possibility of harm to the child from his
lifestyle,” because “he indicated that he does not want his son to become a
homosexual.”324 Relying on this finding, the trial judge prohibited the father
from exercising overnight visitation “in the presence of any friend,
acquaintance or associate known to be homosexual.”325
The trial judge’s order was vacated on appeal. Writing for the unanimous
panel, a female judge found that the father “only said he would not raise his son
as a homosexual.”326 “A denial of any intention to attempt to indoctrinate [the
child] into a homosexual lifestyle,” she explained, “cannot support an inference
that [the father] believes his lifestyle would be detrimental to his child.”327
While the judge’s analysis seemed to entertain the stereotype that gay and
lesbian parents can “raise” a child “to become a homosexual,” the court’s
judgment did not seem to be influenced by the stereotype itself.

pronouns. I then cross-referenced each judge’s gender with the stereotypes identified in Parts II and III
to determine how often male and female judges authored opinions in which they accepted stereotypes
that portrayed gay and lesbian parents as HIV agents, child molesters, recruiters, and role models.
321. This amounts to a difference of seven cases, which is large enough to be regarded as
meaningful. See supra Part I.D.6 (defining minimum threshold for identifying differences that are
“presumptively meaningful”). This analysis does not include twenty-eight cases in which the judge’s
gender could not be identified—either because the judge’s first name was not clearly “masculine” or
“feminine,” or because the judge’s first name could not be found. For the purposes of this analysis, such
cases are inherently ambiguous.
Using an alternative approach, one could estimate the total number of opinions written by “male”
and “female” judges, based on the distribution of the opinions in which the judge’s first name could be
identified and coded as “masculine” or “feminine.” Under these assumptions, my results would not have
been significantly altered: Gender-based stereotypes would be accepted in 35% (50 of 147) of the
opinions written by “male” judges and only 7% of the opinions written by “female” judges—i.e., five
times more often in opinions written by “male” judges.
322. 197 Cal.App.3d 1024, 1027 (Ct. App. 1988).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1030.
325. Id. at 1027.
326. Id. at 1030.
327. Id.
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This difference—that male judges are more likely to accept gender-based
stereotypes of gay and lesbian parents—is more difficult to interpret than the
other differences, because it is not specifically related to any stereotypes, and it
is not mentioned in the opinions themselves. Moreover, although we can make
assumptions about which judges are male and which judges are female, we
have no basis to assume which judges are gay and which judges are
heterosexual.
If we assume, for the purposes of argument, that most of these judges
would identify as heterosexual, then we can begin to place this difference in
social context. In recent years, surveys have generally found that heterosexual
men are more likely than heterosexual women to accept homophobic and
heterosexist stereotypes—and specifically, that they are more likely to apply
such stereotypes to gay men than to lesbians.328 In this respect, the influence of
the judge’s gender seems to parallel the broader relationship between
homophobia and gender.
V. SCHOLARSHIP, ADVOCACY, AND THE GENDER OF HOMOPHOBIA
Gay and lesbian parents have been subjected to gender-influenced
stereotypes—stereotypes influenced by the parent’s gender, the child’s gender,
and the judge’s gender. This fact has implications for both lawyers and
scholars. On the strategic level, it can inform how we argue on behalf of gay
and lesbian families. On the theoretical level, it can inform how we understand
the relationship between homophobia and gender.
Most legal scholarship on gay and lesbian parenthood focuses on
strategy—namely, how to build better arguments on behalf of gay and lesbian
parents. Law review articles on the subject are generally structured as briefs,
handbooks, and references for activists, lawyers, and judges. By referring to
empirical studies conducted by psychologists and sociologists, they attempt to
refute the most common stereotypes about gay and lesbian parents. With only a
few exceptions, these articles are not “theoretical”—they do not offer new
insights into the intersections of homophobia, parenthood, and childhood. Yet
this body of scholarship is profoundly useful. By gathering and articulating progay responses to anti-gay stereotypes, it provides activists, lawyers, and judges
with valuable tools.
To date, however, this body of scholarship has adopted a gender-blind
framework. It presents stereotypes of gay and lesbian parents in gender-blind
terms, and it responds to these stereotypes in gender-blind terms. This Part
examines what happens when scholars adopt a gender-blind framework for
responding to stereotypes that are influenced by gender. It argues that our

328. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (citing surveys).
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gender-blind framework has weakened and warped and our advocacy on behalf
of gay and lesbian families. By reviewing the scholarship on each of the
stereotypes identified in Parts II and III, Part V offers concrete ways to
strengthen and broaden the case for gay and lesbian parenthood.
A. The Gender of HIV Stereotypes
Between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, legal scholars published a halfdozen articles that specifically considered the impact of concerns about HIV in
custody and visitation cases.329 Although these articles approached the subject
from different angles, they all framed the subject in gender-blind terms. In
every article, the authors wrote of discrimination against “parents” who were at
risk of contracting HIV, or were already infected with HIV, without
acknowledging any potential differences between fathers and mothers or gay
men and lesbians.
This is a curious development. In light of the historical association between
male homosexuality and disease, the specific association between male
homosexuality and HIV, and the fact that all of the relevant cases involved gay
fathers, it is somewhat puzzling to see legal scholars writing as though all
“parents”—male, female, gay, heterosexual—were equally subject to HIV
stereotypes in custody and visitation cases. Reading through these articles, one
would hardly suspect that gay men have been specifically stereotyped as HIV
agents in the United States.
In most of these articles, the authors briefly acknowledged the
demographic link between gay men and HIV before they proceeded to analyze
the legal impact of HIV in custody and visitation cases.330 After they mentioned
this fact, however, they quickly passed over it, without considering whether it
had any specific implications for gay fathers.331 In one article after another,
329. See Nancy Mahon, Public Hysteria, Private Conflict: Child Custody and Visitation Disputes
Involving an HIV Infected Parent, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1092 (1988); Amy Pearce, Visitation Rights of an
AIDS Infected Parent, 27 J. FAM. L. 715 (1989); Pierce Jo Reed & Laura Davis Smith, HIV, Judicial
Logic and Medical Science: Toward a Presumption of Noninfection in Child-Custody and Visitation
Cases, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 471 (1997); Lauren Shapiro, An HIV Advocate’s View of Family Court:
Lessons from a Broken System, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 133 (1998); Aline Cole Barrett &
Michelle A. Flint, Comment, The Effect of AIDS on Child Custody Determinations, 23 GONZ. L. REV.
167 (1987); Robert Zaslow, Comment, Child Custody, Visitation, and the HIV Virus: Revisiting the Best
Interests Doctrine to Ensure Impartial Parental Rights Determinations for HIV-Infected Parents, 3 J.
PHARMACY & L. 61 (1994).
330. See, e.g., Mahon, supra note 329, at 1095 (noting that “bisexual and gay men . . . . are at a
higher risk of becoming HIV infected than the general public”); Reed & Smith, supra note 329, at 478
(noting that “gay men remain disproportionately represented in HIV epidemiologic studies”); Barrett &
Flint, supra note 329, at 170 (noting that “[n]inety percent of [HIV] victims are members of two main
high risk groups: male homosexuals (73%) and intravenous drug users (17%)”); Zaslow, supra note 329,
at 70 (noting that during the early 1980s, “[w]orkers at the Centers for Disease Control mockingly called
AIDS the disease of the “4-H’s”: homosexuals, Haitians, heroin addicts, and hemophiliacs”).
331. See Mahon, supra note 329, at 1095; Reed & Smith, supra note 329, at 478; Barrett & Flint,
supra note 329, at 170; Zaslow, supra note 329, at 70.
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authors emphasized that the virus was spreading rapidly beyond the gay male
demographic, and they expressed concerns about discrimination against all
parents who are “infected” with HIV.332 Even as they acknowledged the
specific link between male homosexuality and HIV, they neglected the special
problems that it raised for gay fathers in custody and visitation cases.
In some articles, the authors pushed this neutrality principle even further.
Writing as HIV advocates, they wrote exclusively in terms of discrimination
against “HIV-positive parents” and “AIDS-infected parents,” without
acknowledging the demographic link between male homosexuality and HIV at
all.333 By focusing on problems of parents who were “infected” with HIV, they
ignored the problems of gay fathers—parents who were often stereotyped as
HIV carriers, even when there was no evidence that they had actually
contracted HIV.
The most striking example of this framework appears in the earliest article,
where two authors introduced the legal academy to “The Effect of AIDS on
Child Custody Determinations” and specifically considered the intersection of
HIV, homosexuality, and parenthood. The authors broached the subject of HIV
by observing that “[n]inety percent of victims are members of two main high
risk groups: male homosexuals (73%) and intravenous drug users (17%).”334 In
the next sentence, however, they emphasized that “the disease . . . can be
transmitted through heterosexual contact, which puts at risk women who
engage in sex with members of the high risk groups.”335 By the time they return
to the subject of “homosexuals,” the “male” modifier has dropped out of the
analysis.336 Under the heading, “The Homosexual Parent,”337 they predicted
that “[i]n a case involving an AIDS-infected parent, the moral stigma attached
to homosexuality will certainly play a large part in the court’s determination” of
that parent’s rights.338 Given that lesbians are at a “very low risk” for

332. See Mahon, supra note 329, at 1095 (noting that “the number of women exposed to the virus
by men, who are intravenous drug users or bisexuals, is growing”); Reed & Smith, supra note 329, at
478 (noting that “throughout the past decade, heterosexual women show the greatest increases in
infection rates,” “HIV is now the fourth leading cause of death among all American women of
childbearing ages,” and “[w]omen of color are particularly at risk for HIV infection in both urban and
rural areas”); Barrett & Flint, supra note 329, at 170 (noting that “[t]he disease . . . can be transmitted
through heterosexual contact, which puts at risk women who engage in sex with members of the high
risk groups”); Zaslow, supra note 329, at 70 (noting that in the late 1980s, Americans learned that “the
epidemic was reaching all peoples”).
333. See Pearce, supra note 329; Shapiro, supra note 329.
334. Barrett & Flint, supra note 329, at 170.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 182.
337. Id. at 178.
338. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
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contracting HIV,339 it is not clear why these authors framed the controversy in
terms of “homosexuality” and “parenthood.”340
This strikes me as a missed opportunity. As Eve Sedgwick explains: “No
one should wish to reinforce the myth that the epidemiology of AIDS is a
matter of discrete ‘risk groups’ rather than of particular acts that can call for
particular forms of prophylaxis.”341 Whether or not Sedgwick’s claim makes
for sound public health policy, it is especially compelling in the context of
custody and visitation cases, where courts are generally required to make
specific, individualized findings about a child’s best interests. If courts were
concerned about parents exposing children to HIV, then they should have
focused on the epidemiology of individual gay fathers rather than the
epidemiology of gay men in general. Instead of reinforcing the discourse of risk
groups, legal scholars should have been challenging it.
In any particular case, there would be nothing contradictory about
admitting that gay men are more likely than (most) other people to contract
HIV, but insisting that a particular gay man is less likely than (most) other
people to contract HIV. After all, all gay men are not equal, even in
epidemiological terms. Some have tested negative; some are monogamous;
some practice safe sex. These are all obvious facts. All of them undermine the
stereotype of gay men as HIV carriers—and thus, the application of “risk
group” analysis in custody and visitation cases. Unfortunately, none of these
statements appear in the legal scholarship in this field.
There are reasons to think that such arguments may have been useful in
custody and visitation cases. Recall that in J.P. v. P.W. (Missouri 1989),342 the
father and his partner tested negative for HIV, but the mother sought to
supervise the father’s visits to protect her child from “exposure . . . to

339. Mahon, supra note 329, at 1095 n.25; see ENGEL, supra note 138, at 113 (“Differences in
sexuality, promiscuity, and simple biology dictated that HIV would spread quickly among sexually
active gay men, but hardly at all among lesbian women.”).
340. In theory, this gender-blind framework might be defended as a subtle way of presenting a
united front against AIDS phobia and homophobia—a way of bringing gay men and lesbians together in
the fight against HIV. The theory would be that by speaking in gender-neutral terms, legal scholars
would emphasize that “the epidemic was reaching all peoples,” undermining the cultural association
between gay men and HIV. Zaslow, supra note 329, at 71.
There is no question that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many lesbians took common cause
with gay men in the fight against AIDS phobia and homophobia. See CASTLE, supra note 139, at 12;
ENGEL, supra note 138, at 113; SEDGWICK, supra note 139, at 38. It is a separate question, however,
whether this phenomenon had anything to do with the legal academy’s gender-blind response to HIV
stereotypes in custody and visitation cases.
As a theoretical matter, such a strategy seems dubious: It is not clear how one could effectively
undermine a stereotype without even naming it, let alone articulating arguments to disprove it. In any
event, as a practical matter, it did not seem to be the project of legal scholars writing on the impact of
HIV in custody and visitation cases. They were interested in the broader fight against HIV, so they
generally ignored the stereotype that portrayed gay men as HIV carriers.
341. SEDGWICK, supra note 139, at 38 n.39.
342. 772 S.W.2d 786, 786-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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AIDS.”343 Based on the father’s testimony, the trial court found that the father
and his partner had engaged in “oral sex” during the marriage, and they had
entered into a “monogamous” and “permanent” relationship shortly after the
divorce.344 In spite of these facts, the court found that “AIDS has a higher
incidence of occurrence among homosexuals than the general public” and that
“[a]fter his homosexual encounter with [his partner], the father continued to
have normal sexual intercourse with the mother.”345 Relying on these findings,
the court prohibited the father’s partner or “any other male” from visiting the
child, and the court’s order was affirmed on appeal.346
During the trial, the mother’s lawyer had questioned the father extensively
about his sexual conduct with his partner and his wife, in order to show that the
father had exposed both his wife and his daughter to the “AIDS virus.”347 To
rebut the alleged risk to the child, the father’s lawyer called an expert witness
who testified that HIV could not be spread through “casual contact.”348 He did
not, however, make any attempt to rebut the alleged risk to the mother, or the
generalization that as a gay man, the father was more likely than the general
public to contract HIV. Throughout the proceedings, no one mentioned that the
father’s risk of contracting HIV was actually lower than the general public’s
risk, insofar as he and his partner had tested negative and were in a
“monogamous” relationship limited to “oral sex.”349 It is not possible to say
whether such an argument would have changed the outcome of J.W. v. P.W., or
whether similar arguments would have influenced the outcomes of similar
cases. It seems clear, however, that scholars and lawyers gained no advantage
by overlooking this argument.
B. The Gender of Sexual Abuse Stereotypes
Most legal scholars have addressed the subject of homosexuality and child
sexual abuse in passing, as part of broader studies on the impact of homophobia
and heterosexism in American family law. Only one author, Susan Becker, has
written a law review article that specifically addresses the impact of child

343. Id. In the opinion, the appellate court implies that the father had tested negative for HIV,
reciting the expert’s testimony that “it is possible that a person infected with the AIDS virus [could] test
negative.” Id. at 789. In the trial transcript, the father testifies that both he and his partner had tested
“negative” for “AIDS.” Statement of Facts, Cross Examination of Paul Robert Waller by Steven E.
Rodgers, In re Marriage of Jolene Marie Waller, No. 410,536 (Travis County District Court, June 22,
1988) at 46 (on file with author).
344. J.P., 772 S.W.2d. at 788.
345. Id. at 787.
346. Id. at 786, 789.
347. See Statement of Facts, Cross Examination, supra note 343, at 41-49.
348. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 789.
349. See id. at 788 (describing father’s relationship with his partner as “monogamous” and finding
that relationship involved “oral sex”); Statement of Facts, Cross Examination, supra note 343, at 46
(recounting father’s testimony that he and his partner had tested “negative” for “AIDS”).
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sexual abuse stereotypes in custody and visitation cases involving gay and
lesbian parents.350 “On one level,” Becker offered her article as “a litigation
primer for attorneys representing gay or lesbian parents accused of sexual
abuse.”351 “More importantly,” she explained, “it is an appeal to judges and . . .
experts in such cases . . . to reconsider their views on sexual orientation and the
undue influence that these views may have on the outcome of their opinions
when child sexual abuse is alleged.”352 In short, Becker aimed to help lawyers
fend off specific accusations of sexual abuse and the generic stereotype of the
gay child molester.
As this introduction suggests, Becker’s approach to the subject was
systematically blind to the influence of gender. In her title, she announced her
battle against the bias that experts and judges display when a lesbian or gay
parent is accused of sexually abusing a child.353 Throughout her article, she
spoke of “heterosexuals,” “homosexuals,” and “gay men and lesbians,” without
recognizing any distinction between stereotypes about gay men and lesbians.354
She claimed, for example, that courts “automatically” condemn “gay” and
“lesbian” parents who are accused of child sexual abuse in custody and
visitation cases,355 even though “empirical data demonstrates on homosexual
parents demonstrates that . . . . children are much more likely to be sexually
abused by heterosexuals than homosexuals.”356 Whenever Becker sought to
describe or rebut the stereotype of the gay child molester, she spoke in these
gender-blind terms.
In this respect, Becker’s article was representative of four trends in the
legal scholarship on homosexuality and child sexual abuse. In responding to the
stereotype of the gay child molester, most legal scholars have: (1) obscured the
significance of the parent’s gender in custody and visitation cases involving
sexual abuse stereotypes; (2) obscured the significance of the perpetrator’s
gender in studies on homosexuality and child sexual abuse; (3) invoked
absolute numbers rather than relative proportions to describe the likelihood of
child sexual abuse in heterosexual and homosexual populations; and (4)
obscured the significance of the victim’s gender in debates over homosexuality
and child sexual abuse. In the following sections, I spell out each of these
criticisms in more detail, citing examples from scholarship in the field.
1. The Significance of the Parent’s Gender in Custody and Visitation
350. Susan Becker, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations Against a Lesbian or Gay Parent in a Custody
or Visitation Dispute: Battling the Overt and Insidious Bias of Experts and Judges, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
75 (1996).
351. Id. at 82.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 75.
354. Id. at 77, 94-95.
355. Id. at 77.
356. Id. at 94-95.
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Cases
The problems begin with the notion that in custody and visitation cases,
when “gay or lesbian” parents are accused of sexually abusing children, they
are “automatically condemned” by “the public and the courts.”357 A number of
similar suggestions have been made in casebooks and law review articles on
gay and lesbian parenthood.358 In one of the leading casebooks on sexual
orientation and the law, William Rubenstein claims that in custody and
visitation cases, “[s]ome courts make explicit allegations that lesbians and gay
men are, generally speaking, child sexual abusers.”359 Charlotte Patterson, one
of the country’s leading authorities on studies of gay and lesbian parenthood,
observes that “[t]here is a history of judicial hostility towards lesbian and gay
families with children, and negative stereotypes are evident in many court
rulings.”360 In her list of negative stereotypes, Patterson writes of courts
expressing the view that the “children of lesbian or gay parents . . . are more
likely to be sexually abused by parents or by parents’ friends.”361
By lumping together gay men and lesbians in these claims, scholars
obscure the role that the parent’s gender has played in sexual abuse cases, and
specifically, in how courts have expressed the stereotype of the gay child
molester. In Part II, we saw that both gay men and lesbians were specifically
accused of sexual abuse, but gay fathers were stereotyped as child molesters
more often and more explicitly than lesbian mothers. In the most notorious of
these cases, the court’s stereotype was specifically concerned with “the
molestation of minor boys by adult males.”362 Although lesbians were also

357. Id. at 77.
358. See, e.g., WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 51, at 825 (suggesting that “common beliefs
about homosexual parents” may play a role in custody and visitation disputes, including the belief that
“a homosexual parent is more likely to molest the child”); Developments in the Law—Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1629, 1639 (1989) (noting “[t]he courts’ fear that gay or
lesbian parents will molest children”); David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial
Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 359 (1994) (“Some courts have
contended that children living with gay or lesbian parents face an increased risk of sexual molestation in
the home environment, either at the hands of the parent, or one of the parent’s friends or associates”);
Erica Gesing, The Fight to Be a Parent: How Courts Have Restricted the Constitutionally-Based
Challenges Available to Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 841, 859 (2004) (“Another concern raised
by opponents of homosexuals as adoptive parents is that parents involved in same-sex relationships are
more likely to molest their children than heterosexual parents”); Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and
the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1027 (1991)
(“Sometimes, the claim is not that same-sex couples will not have children, but rather that they will, and
that the children will be molested”); David M. Rosenblum, Comment, Custody Rights of Gay and
Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1665, 1684 (1991) (“[T]he unfounded fear that homosexual parents
will molest their children plays a large role in custody determinations involving gay and lesbian
parents.”).
359. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 57, at 834.
360. Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social
Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 191, 197-98 (1995).
361. Id. at 199.
362. J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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specifically accused of sexual abuse, they were not explicitly stereotyped as
child molesters.363
2. The Significance of the Perpetrator’s Gender in Child Sexual
Abuse Studies
Because legal scholars have overlooked the influence of gender in the
sexual abuse cases, they have not formulated a rigorous or compelling response
to sexual abuse stereotypes. Like many others, Susan Becker and Charlotte
Patterson answer the stereotype of the gay child molester by citing empirical
studies. According to Becker, “[e]mpirical data demonstrates that gay men and
lesbians are the least likely persons to sexually abuse children” and that
“children are much more likely to be sexually abused by heterosexuals than by
homosexuals.”364 Summarizing the “social science research on children of
lesbian and gay parents,” Patterson writes that “the existing research suggests
that the great majority of child sexual abuse is committed by heterosexual men,
not by lesbians or gay men.”365
The legal scholarship on gay and lesbian parenthood contains many similar
claims. Based on another review of the “social science literature,” David Flaks
claims that “the vast majority of sex crimes committed by adults on children
are heterosexual, not homosexual.”366 “In fact,” he continues, “it has been
reported that most child molesters are heterosexual men, [and] that gay men
and lesbians are not more likely to molest children . . . than are heterosexual
men and women, and that ‘there are virtually no cases of pedophilia committed
by gay parents.’”367 In more popular versions, this argument begins and ends
363. See supra Part II.B (citing cases). Some legal scholars, it should be noted, have accurately
acknowledged this disparity in the expression of sexual abuse stereotypes. See, e.g., ROBSON, supra note
33, at 131 (noting that “the harm of molestation . . . is more likely to be emphasized in a gay father’s
case than a lesbian mother’s”); Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on SameSex Marriage: Two Are Better than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 49 (2001) (“One common concern is
that homosexual people are likely to prey on children as sexual partners. Although this fear is primarily
directed at gay men, it is occasionally directed at lesbians.”).
Susan Becker’s claim that courts “automatically condemn[]” both gay and lesbian parents as child
molesters, Becker, supra note 350, at 77, was apparently based on her experience as co-counsel in
Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995), a case in which a heterosexual father accused a lesbian
mother and her partner of sexually abusing Miriam, the adopted young daughter of the mother and
father, see Becker supra note 350, at 75. Based on the testimony of the father’s expert, the trial court
found that Miriam and her brother had been “eroticized” by the mother and her partner. Hertzler, 908
P.2d at 116. The trial court did not, however, adopt the expert’s view that “Miriam had possibly been
sexually abused.” Id. at 109. In any event, the trial court’s finding of “eroticization” was expressly
overturned by the Wyoming Supreme Court on appeal. Id. at 124. In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court
found that the trial court had “indulged an essentially personal viewpoint in derogation of [the mother’s]
lifestyle,” and the Supreme Court specifically mocked the trial court’s finding of “eroticization” as the
“solipsistic contrivance of [an] erstwhile expert.” Id. Becker does not cite any other opinions in which
lesbian mothers (or gay fathers) were either accused of sexual abuse or stereotyped as child molesters.
364. Becker, supra note 350, at 77, 95.
365. Patterson, supra note 360, at 199.
366. Flaks, supra note 358, at 360.
367. Id.
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with any of the following observations—“heterosexuals are more likely to
molest children than are homosexuals,”368 “[t]he vast majority of child
molesters are heterosexual men,”369 or “[n]inety percent of child abuse is
committed by heterosexual men.”370
Although there are some differences among these arguments, they all
suffer from the same basic flaw: When they characterize the findings of
empirical studies, they overstate the significance of the perpetrator’s sexual
orientation and downplay the significance of the perpetrator’s gender. By
comparing the incidence of sexual abuse among “heterosexuals” and
“homosexuals,” or “heterosexual men” and “gay men and lesbians,” they make
two implications: (1) heterosexual men are more likely to molest children than
gay men, and (2) gay men are no more likely to molest children than
heterosexual women or lesbians.
In truth, the first claim is not supported by the empirical evidence and the
second claim is demonstrably false. As some scholars have acknowledged, the
perpetrator’s gender is a much more powerful predictor of sexual abuse than
the perpetrator’s sexual orientation.371 The data establish that men are far more
likely to molest children than women, regardless whether they are heterosexual,
gay, or bisexual.372 The data do not, by contrast, establish that heterosexual
men are more likely to molest children than gay or bisexual men.373 In light of
these facts, it is neither accurate nor persuasive to compare the incidence of
sexual abuse among heterosexuals and homosexuals, or even among
heterosexual men and gay men and lesbians. At the very least, it is clear that
gay men are more likely to molest children than heterosexual women or
lesbians.
This fact may not be convenient for pro-gay scholars, lawyers, and
activists, but it is not likely to surprise anyone else. By any measure, men

368. Strasser, supra note 358, at 1027.
369. Developments in the Law, supra note 358, at 1639-40; see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 57, at
834 (“[s]ome courts make explicit allegations that lesbians and gay men are, generally speaking, child
sexual abusers”).
370. Gesing, supra note 358, at 860. Similar claims have appeared in a number of more
sophisticated rebuttals, which are considered in more detail below.
371. See ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 57, at 1169-70; Stephan H. Black, A Step Forward:
Lesbian Parentage After Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 237, 264 (2006);
Developments in the Law, supra note 358, at 1640; Mark Strasser, Legislative Presumptions and
Judicial Assumptions: On Parenting, Adoption, and the Best Interest of the Child, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
49, 69 (1996).
372. David Finkelhor & Diana Russell, Women as Perpetrators, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW
THEORY AND RESEARCH 171, 174 (David Finkelhor ed., 1984) (reporting study’s finding that male
offenders were responsible in 94% of offenses against girls and 86% of offenses against boys); Carole
Jenny, Thomas A. Resler & Kimberly L. Poyer, Are Children at Risk of Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?,
94 PEDIATRICS 41, 42 (1994) (finding that in 269 cases of alleged child sexual abuse, 248 (92%)
involved male offenders, 11 (4%) involved female offenders, and 10 (4%) involved both male and
female offenders); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD. DEV. 1025,
1034 (1992).
373. This point is analyzed in more detail in Part V.B.4.
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commit more sexual assaults than women in the United States, and in this
respect, men who molest children are no different.374 To some extent, the
relative prevalence of male child molesters may help explain why gay fathers
were stereotyped as child molesters more often and more explicitly than lesbian
mothers, and why one court’s stereotype was specifically concerned with “the
molestation of minor boys by adult males.”375
Because legal scholars have refused to acknowledge this fact, they have
overlooked an interesting analogy to custody and visitation cases involving
heterosexual couples. Although it is well-known that men are more likely to
sexually abuse children than mothers, this fact is not generally weighed against
fathers in custody and visitation cases involving heterosexual couples. Based
on this analogy, we might argue that the same rule should apply to gay men
who are fathers.376
3. Proportionality: Comparing the Incidence of Child Sexual Abuse in
Heterosexual and Gay Male Populations
This approach, however, was not taken by advocates for gay and lesbian
parenthood. Like other scholars writing in this field, advocates sought to refute
the stereotype of the gay child molester on empirical grounds. Within this
framework, the key question is whether the stereotype has any basis in fact—
whether studies show that the incidence of child sexual abuse is greater in
heterosexual male or gay male populations, or whether it is roughly equivalent.
In responding to sexual abuse stereotypes, scholars have typically
answered this question by claiming that “heterosexual men are overwhelmingly
responsible for child abuse,”377 “the vast majority of sex crimes committed by
374. JENKINS, supra note 203, at 61-62.
375. J.L.P.(H.) v. D.L.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
376. The merit of this argument is not straightforward. It depends on why the evidence is excluded
in cases involving heterosexual couples and whether those reasons would apply to cases involving gay
fathers as well. I can think of three possible reasons for excluding such evidence, and only the first two
reasons would clearly apply to gay fathers. The first reason is statistical: Even if men are more likely to
sexually abuse children than women, an individual man is still not likely to sexually abuse an individual
child, because the overall incidence of sexual abuse is still exceptionally low. The second reason is
evidentiary: Even if men are somewhat more likely to sexually abuse children than women, courts
should still rely on individual evidence in custody and visitation cases, because they have an
independent obligation to determine the best interests of every child. The third reason is constitutional:
Even if men are more likely to sexually abuse children than women, courts may not decide cases based
on “overbroad generalizations about . . . males and females.” See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 517, 533 (1996) (holding that state action may not be justified by “fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females” or “overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females”). Only the last reason would not apply to cases
involving gay fathers, unless the father could persuade the court to apply “heightened scrutiny” to sexual
orientation classifications.
For these purposes, however, I am less concerned with the merits of the argument, and more
concerned with the fact that it has been overlooked by scholars who advocate on behalf of gay and
lesbian parenthood.
377. Becker, supra note 363, at 49.
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adults on children are heterosexual, not homosexual,”378 and “children are
much more likely to be sexually abused by heterosexuals than by
homosexuals.”379
Although these claims are factually correct, they are not responsive to the
key question about homosexuality and child sexual abuse. They do not disprove
the stereotype of the gay child molester on empirical grounds because they are
not based on the relevant comparisons. In mathematical terms, they use the
wrong denominators: They compare how many child molesters are
“heterosexual” and “homosexual,” how many offenses are “different-sex” and
“same-sex,” and how many children are abused by “heterosexual” and
“homosexual” offenders. They do not, however, compare any of these findings
to the number of heterosexual and gay men in the general public, so they do not
compare the incidence of child sexual abuse within those two populations.
This is a problem of straightforward arithmetic, and it marks another
unfortunate oversight in the legal scholarship on this subject. It is a problem so
obvious that even people like Paul Cameron have noticed it.380 Paul Cameron is
the country’s leading proponent of the stereotype of the gay child molester, and
by almost all accounts, he is a quack and a fraud.381 Yet when he claims that
“proportionality” is the “key” to the debate over homosexuality and child
sexual abuse, he is uncharacteristically insightful.382 Given that “there are so
many more heterosexuals than homosexuals,” he writes, the question is “which
kind of child molestation—homosexual or heterosexual—is proportionately
more common?”383

378. Flaks, supra note 358, at 360; see also Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring With
Wardle: Morality, Social Science and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 307 (“The
vast majority of child molestation acts in this country . . . are perpetrated by heterosexual men.”);
Rosenblum, supra note 358, at 1684 (“Studies show that most child molestations are committed by
heterosexual men with female victims.”).
379. Becker, supra note 350, at 95; see also Wishard, supra note 7, at 411 (“[S]exual molestation
of children is much more likely to be performed by heterosexual rather than homosexual men.”).
380. For a more detailed version of Cameron’s argument, see Timothy Dailey, Homosexuality and
Child Sexual Abuse, INSIGHT, No. 247 (May 17, 2002), available at http://www.traditionalvalues.org/
urban/one-a.php. Dailey’s analysis has been methodically refuted by Gregory Herek. See Herek, supra
note 205.
381. Cameron has been expelled from the American Psychological Association, and his views on
homosexuality and child molestation have been specifically disavowed by the American Sociological
Association and renounced by a federal district court judge as “misrepresentations.” See Gregory Herek,
Paul Cameron Bio and Fact Sheet, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/facts_cameron_
sheet.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (citing Neb. Psychol. Ass’n Resolution (Oct. 19, 1984)).
382. Paul Cameron, Child Molestation and Homosexuality, http://familyresearchinst.org/FRI_Edu
Pamphlet2.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
383. Cameron claims that “perhaps 2% of adults regularly indulge in homosexuality,” “[y]et they
account for between 20% to 40% of all molestations of children.” Id. This claim is supported only by
Cameron’s own surveys, and it has been thoroughly debunked by leading experts in the field. See, e.g.,
Herek, supra note 205; Herek, supra note 381. Interestingly, however, Cameron’s claim is not addressed
by any of the customary responses from legal scholars—heterosexual men are “overwhelmingly
responsible for child abuse,” Becker, supra note 363, at 49, the vast majority of abuse is “heterosexual,
not homosexual,” Flaks, supra note 358, at 360, and children are “much more likely to be sexually
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By ignoring the question of proportionality, legal scholars have left
themselves vulnerable to a simple yet powerful counterargument: Most child
molesters are heterosexual because most people are heterosexual. If we mean to
refute the stereotype of the gay child molester with data, rather than answering
a straw version of the stereotype, then we must make our case in proportional
terms. We must prove that the average heterosexual man is more likely to
sexually abuse children than the average gay man—or at least, that the average
gay man is no more likely to sexually abuse children than the average
heterosexual man. In other words, we must show that sexual orientation is not
an accurate predictor of child sexual abuse.
In the legal scholarship responding to sexual abuse stereotypes, this
argument has not been spelled out. For the most part, scholars have relied on
the claim that “most child molesters are heterosexual” to answer the stereotype
of the gay child molester, without comparing the incidence of child sexual
abuse within heterosexual and gay populations at all.384 In a few cases, they
have actually claimed that heterosexual men are “more likely” to molest
children than gay men, or that heterosexual men are responsible for a
“disproportionate” amount of child sexual abuse, although the leading studies
do not support such definitive claims.385
So what is the fact of the matter? Fortunately, gay fathers have little to fear
from the data. None of the evidence supports the stereotype of the gay child
molester. In 1994, a study published in a leading medical journal found that,
based on the study’s 95% confidence interval, the incidence of child sexual
abused by heterosexuals,” Becker, supra note 350, at 345. In light of the small proportion of gay men to
heterosexual men in the general public, these positions are not mutually exclusive.
384. See Becker, supra note 350, at 49; Flaks, supra note 358, at 360; Gesing, supra note 358, at
860; Patterson, supra note 360, at 199.
385. In another leading casebook in the field, William Eskridge and Nan Hunter claim that
“[s]traight males are the group most likely to molest children,” when compared to gay men, heterosexual
women, and lesbians. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 57, at 1169-70. To support this statement, the
authors cite to the most recent study on the subject, which found that “a child’s risk of being molested
by his or her relative’s heterosexual partner is over 100 times greater than [the child’s risk of being
molested] by someone who might be identifiable as being homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual.” Id.
The casebook’s claim about the relative propensity of heterosexual and gay men, however, does
not quite follow from the study’s findings. After all, the study could not have found that the average
heterosexual man is 100 times more likely than the average gay man to be a child molester. As Paul
Cameron suggests, an individual child’s risk of being molested by a heterosexual or gay man is
influenced far more by the distribution of heterosexual and gay men in the general public than by the
relative propensities of heterosexual and gay men toward pedophilia.
For examples of similar claims, see Marc Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use
and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 207, 216 (1995) (“[R]esearch
on the sexual abuse of children shows that offenders are disproportionately heterosexual men.”)
(emphasis added); Strasser, supra note 371, at 69 (“[I]f one examines the information regarding four
groups—lesbian women, straight women, gay men, and straight men, an individual belonging to the last
group is most likely to be a molester and an individual belonging to the first group is least likely to be a
molester.” (emphasis added)); id. at 1027 (“heterosexuals are more likely to molest children than are
homosexuals” (emphasis added)); and Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Children’s Best Interests
When a Parent Is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 880-81
(1985) (“Research on the sexual abuse of children, however, shows that offenders are, in
disproportionate numbers, heterosexual men.” (emphasis added)).
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abuse among gay men was between 0% and 3.1%, which the authors concluded
was “within current estimates of the prevalence of homosexuality in the general
community.”386 In other words, the authors found that given the distribution of
heterosexual and gay men in the general public, gay men were neither more nor
less likely to molest children than heterosexual men. In light of these findings,
the study concluded: “[N]o evidence is available from this data that children are
at a greater risk to be molested by identifiable homosexuals than by other
adults.”387 In 1986, another study reached similar conclusions based on the
finding that 4% of male offenders in the study were “known homosexuals.”388
4. Terminology: Distinguishing the Perpetrator’s Sexual Orientation from
the Victim’s Gender
In order to compare the incidence of child sexual abuse in heterosexual and
homosexual populations, we must be able to distinguish between
“heterosexuals” and “homosexuals.” There are significant definitional problems
here, which are familiar to sexuality scholars: Should sexual orientation be
defined by desire, behavior, or self-identification as “heterosexual” or
“homosexual?”
How we define the concept of sexual orientation may well influence the
prevalence of sexual abuse that we find among heterosexual and gay male
populations. In any case, the most critical question will be whether we
distinguish heterosexuality and homosexuality from pedophilia at all.

386. Jenny, Resler & Poyer, supra note 372, at 44.
387. Id. (emphasis added).
388. Mary J. Spencer & Patricia Dunklee, Sexual Abuse of Boys, 78 PEDIATRICS 133, 135 (1986). A
few legal scholars, it should be noted, have accurately acknowledged this limit in the empirical data.
See, e.g., Becker, supra note 363, at 49 (“Gay men appear to be no more likely than heterosexual men to
abuse children.” (emphasis added)); Flaks, supra note 358, at 359 (“[I]t has been reported that . . . gay
men and lesbians are no more likely to molest children or to commit crimes with children than are
heterosexual men and women” (emphasis added)).
Based on a survey of the available studies, psychologist Gregory Herek summarizes the empirical
data on homosexuality and sexual abuse in modest terms:
The empirical research does not show that gay or bisexual men are any more likely than
heterosexual men to molest children. This is not to argue that homosexual and bisexual men
never molest children. But there is no scientific basis for asserting that they are more likely
than heterosexual men to do so.
Herek, supra note 205.
There is only one study that suggests that heterosexual men may be more likely to molest children
than gay men, but the claim is not actually supported by the study’s own data. In 1978, a study of 175
convicted child molesters did not find any examples of men who had “regressed” from an “adult
homosexual orientation” to pedophilia. A. Nicholas Groth & H. Jean Birnbaum, Adult Sexual
Orientation and Attraction to Underage Persons, 7 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 175, 181 (1978).
Based on this finding, the authors theorized: “It appears, therefore, that the adult heterosexual male
constitutes a greater sexual risk to underage children than does the adult homosexual male.” Id. This
statement ignores the study’s own 95% confidence interval, which forecloses any conclusion that
heterosexual men represent 100% of all convicted child molesters. Because gay men represent such a
small percentage of the general public, even a small deviation in the study’s findings would undermine
the validity of the author’s hypothesis.
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In some instances, legal scholars have sought to sidestep proportionality
questions by observing that most men who sexually abuse children are
“heterosexual,” whether the victims are girls or boys.389 In a debate over gay
and lesbian parenthood, Carlos Ball and Janice Farrell Pea argued that “the vast
majority of child molestation acts in this country, including those perpetrated
on boys, are perpetrated by heterosexual men.”390 In a footnote, they explained
further that (1) “girls are at a greater risk of being molested than boys,” (2)
“[a]lmost all of the adults who molest girls are men,” (3) “[a]lmost all adults
who molest boys are also men,” and (4) “[t]he majority of men who abuse male
children engage in adult heterosexual relationships.”391 To support the last
statement, they cited the two sexual abuse studies already mentioned, which
found that about 75% of male victims were sexually abused by a father, a
stepfather, or a mother’s boyfriend.392
This argument begs the same kind of proportionality questions as the
others—presumably, the “majority” of men who abuse boys have engaged in
heterosexual relationships because the “majority” of men are heterosexual. But
this argument begs a more fundamental question as well: If a man engages in a
relationship with an adult woman and sexually abuses a boy, is he
“heterosexual,” “homosexual,” or something else? To interpret the data on
homosexuality and sexual abuse, we must understand the distinction between
homosexuality and pedophilia, and the related distinction between the
perpetrator’s sexual orientation and the victim’s gender. Otherwise, we cannot
understand how perpetrators have been classified as “heterosexual” or
“homosexual,” and we cannot distinguish between offenses committed by gay
men against boys and offenses committed by men against boys. This question
is especially relevant for gay fathers in custody and visitation cases: By
definition, such men have engaged in heterosexual relationships with adult
women—just like the perpetrators classified as “heterosexual” in recent studies,
who were responsible for abusing 75% of male victims.
This question has generally been ignored by pro-gay scholars, but it has
caught the attention of a few opponents of gay and lesbian parenthood. James
Donovan observes that in the debate over homosexuality and child sexual
abuse, “[e]verything hinges upon how one defines homosexual.”393 In
Donovan’s view, “the definition of homosexual does not require that the object
389. Ball & Pea, supra note 378, at 308; Gesing, supra note 358, at 859.
390. Ball & Pea, supra note 378, at 308 (emphasis added).
391. Id. at 307 n.279.
392. Id.; see also Gesing, supra note 358, at 859 (citing study’s finding that “in seventy-four
percent of the cases where a male sexually abused a boy, the offender had been or was currently
involved in a heterosexual relationship with the child’s mother or relative”).
393. James Donovan, A Philosophical Ground for Gays’ Rights: “We Must Learn What Is True in
Order To Do What Is Right,” 4 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 8 (1993). For less sophisticated
versions of this argument, see Dailey, supra note 380 (defending the stereotype of the gay child molester
on the grounds that “[p]edophiles are invariably male” and “[s]ignificant numbers of victims are male”);
and Herek, supra note 205, at 133 n.2 (citing a similar argument made by Paul Cameron).
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be an adult, but merely of the same sex.”394 He acknowledges that not every
man who molests boys is a “homosexual.”395 He claims, however, that if a man
is “fixated” on molesting boys, then he should be classified as a “homosexual,”
albeit a “homosexual pedophile.” Citing a 1978 study finding that “fixated”
pedophiles “show[ed] a slight preference for boys over girls,”396 Donovan
argues that the stereotype of the gay child molester has empirical support.
Once Donovan concedes the distinction between homosexuality and
pedophilia, however, his concerns about “fixated” pedophiles are no longer
relevant to the debate over gay and lesbian parenthood. Even if male
pedophiles showed a slight preference for molesting boys, this fact would tell
us nothing about openly gay adult males—men who are sexually attracted to
other men. The point holds true for all gay men, but it is no less true for gay
fathers in custody and visitation cases. Although studies have found that a boy
is most likely to be molested by his father, stepfather, or his mother’s
boyfriend, they have not found that such offenders are more likely to be gay
than heterosexual.
5. Implications: The Role of Empirical Studies in Sexual Abuse Cases
There are reasons to think that arguments based on an awareness of the
parent’s gender and the child’s gender may have been useful in some custody
and visitation cases. As previously mentioned, in J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P. (Missouri
1982),397 the father’s psychological experts invoked all of the legal
scholarship’s customary responses to the stereotype of the gay child molester.
Both experts argued that “most child molestation” was committed by “adult
heterosexual males,” without comparing the incidence of child sexual abuse in
heterosexual and gay male populations.398 One expert compared the number of
“heterosexual” and “homosexual” offenses—by which he meant different-sex
and same-sex offenses—and he even claimed that “child molestation was
approximately 95% heterosexual,”399 without acknowledging the significance
of the perpetrator’s gender. Neither expert explained the distinction between

394. Donovan, supra note 393, at 16.
395. Id. at 14.
396. See Groth & Birnbaum, supra note 388, at 175. There are a number of specific methodological
problems with the Groth and Birnbaum study, and there are a number of sampling problems with child
sexual abuse studies in general. See Jenny, Resler & Poyer, supra note 372, at 44. More recent studies
have resolved some of these shortcomings, and they have not shown any support for the finding that
male pedophiles show “a slight preference for boys over girls.” Groth & Birnbaum, supra note 388, at
175; see, e.g., Jenny, Resler & Poyer, supra note 372, at 44; Spencer & Dunklee, supra note 388, at 135.
Yet even if we put aside our reservations about a thirty-year-old study that has not been replicated, we
can still see that Donovan’s conclusion from the Groth and Birnbaum study is not logically sound.
397. 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
398. Id. at 867.
399. Id.
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homosexuality and pedophilia or the related distinction between the
perpetrator’s sexual orientation and the victim’s gender.
The court’s rejection of the expert testimony was a classic statement of the
stereotype of the gay child molester, which exploited each of the oversights
made by the experts:
Every trial judge, or for that matter, every appellate judge, knows that
the molestation of minor boys by adult males is not as uncommon as
the psychological experts’ testimony indicated. A few minutes
research discloses the following appellate decisions involving such
molestation. [The court cites seven cases reported between 1957 and
1978.] It may be that numerically instances of molestation occur with
more frequency between heterosexual males and female children, but
given the statistical incidence of homosexuality in the population,
which the father claims is 5 to 10%, homosexual molestation is
probably, on an absolute basis, more prevalent.400
Needless to say, there were a number of flaws in the court’s logic,
especially the casual citation to seven criminal cases in which men were
convicted of sexually abusing boys. First, none of the cited cases involved the
crime of incest—a father who had sexually abused his own child.401 Second,
none of the cases involved a man who had identified himself as “gay” or
“homosexual,” or even a man who had been described in such terms by the
court. Finally, the court’s list of seven cases over twenty-two years was onesided. Because the court did not include a general survey of sexual abuse cases,
it did not suggest how often men were convicted of sexually abusing girls
during the same period. As a result, the court’s list of cases did little to detract
from the expert’s testimony that as a general matter, “most child molestation
occurs between adult heterosexual males and female children.”402 More
fundamentally, the court’s argument conflates the perpetrator’s sexual
orientation with the victim’s gender. By comparing the incidence of men
sexually abusing boys with the incidence of male homosexuality, the court
presumes that all men who sexually abuse boys are “homosexual.”403
Putting these problems aside, however, the court’s response to the expert
testimony was not groundless. When we look closely, we see that even the
court’s infamous remark about “the molestation of minor boys by adult
males”404 had some statistical merit. By testifying that “child molestation was
approximately 95% heterosexual,”405 one of the experts suggested that

400. Id. at 869 (emphasis added).
401. One of the cases, State v. Counts, 572 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. App. Ct. 1978), involved a stepfather
who had sexually abused his stepson. Id. at 886. In the remaining cases, there was no familial
relationship (or at least, no reference to a familial relationship) between the victim and the offender.
402. J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 867.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 869.
405. Id. at 867.
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“homosexual molestation was rare”406—presumably about 5%. This was
misleading. In the most recent study, for example, 22% of sexual abuse
offenses involved allegations of same-sex contact, the vast majority between
men and boys.407 What the experts failed to observe, however, was that in this
study, less than 1% of the perpetrators were identified as potentially
“homosexual.” 408
The court’s strongest objection, however, was the proportionality claim,
which has not yet been answered by advocates for gay and lesbian parenthood.
As the court correctly observed, the claim that most child molesters are
heterosexual men is not convincing, because most child molesters are men and
most men are heterosexual. Because the experts did not compare the
proportionality of abuse in the two populations,409 they left themselves
vulnerable to the court’s infamous response.
In the legal scholarship on gay and lesbian parenthood, J.L.P.(H) is
notorious. In the twenty-five years since it was published, it has been cited in
over fifty law review articles and several casebooks, typically for the shocking
assertion that “every . . . judge knows” about “the molestation of minor boys by
adult males.”410 Like others, I regard the court’s claim as abhorrent. Like
others, I squarely reject the notion that gay men are more likely than others to
sexually abuse children or that by definition, any man who sexually abuses a
boy is “homosexual.” My concern is that no one has actually refuted the court’s
notorious claim in the twenty-five years since the case was published. We have
had answers at our disposal, but we have been burdened by our gender-blind
framework. Operating within this framework, we have failed to articulate a
compelling response to the stereotype of the gay child molester.
C. The Sexuality of Gender Development Stereotypes
Unlike HIV and sexual abuse stereotypes, recruiting and role modeling
stereotypes are not ghosts from our past. In today’s cases, the battle over gay
and lesbian parenthood is most often fought in the field of sexual
406. Id.
407. Jenny, Resler & Poyer, supra note 372, at 42 tbl.1 (finding that in 269 cases of alleged child
sexual abuse, 60 involved same-sex conduct, including 42 involving male-male contact, 8 involving
female-female contact, and 10 involving offenders of both genders).
408. Id. at 44.
409. The court’s characterization of the expert testimony is accurate. See Transcript of Admin.
Hearing, J.L.P.(H) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (No. DR80-7186). On direct
examination by the father’s lawyer, the first expert testified that “the vast majority [of abusers] are
heterosexual males and the victims are adults and children, female.” Id. at 43. On cross examination by
the mother’s lawyer, the same expert testified that “[m]ost molesting occurs within the nuclear family
and it occurs mostly between heterosexual males and female children.” Id. at 51. Finally, on direct
examination by the father’s lawyer, the second expert testified that “child molestation is almost
exclusively heterosexual, approximately, oh, ninety-five percent heterosexual . . . Homosexual
molestation is very rare.” Id. at 61.
410. J.L.P.(H), 643 S.W.2d at 869.
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development.411 In the last ten years, recruiting and role modeling stereotypes
have appeared in ten reported cases, including one case published only last
year.412
Legal scholars have responded to sexual development stereotypes in two
ways that should both sound familiar: (1) We have claimed that “the vast
majority of lesbians and gay men were raised by heterosexual parents”413 and
(2) we have cited a growing body of empirical studies on the sexual
development of children raised by gay and lesbian parents.414 In this literature,
“[v]irtually all of the published research claims to find no differences in the
sexuality of children reared by lesbigay parents and those raised by nongay
parents,”415 and more generally, no “significant differences” of any kind.416 In a
recent review of the empirical data, the American Academy of Pediatrics
reported that “[n]o differences have been found in the gender identity, social
roles, or sexual orientation of adults who had a divorced homosexual parent (or

411. J. Michael Bailey et al., Sexual Orientation of Adult Sons of Gay Fathers, 31 DEVEL.
PSYCHOL. 124, 124 (1995) (“[A] primary focus of expert testimony in custody cases has been the impact
of being reared by a gay or lesbian parent on children’s sexual orientations.”); Stacey & Biblarz, supra
note 304, at 163 (describing the “sexual behavior and identity” of children as “the most politically
sensitive issue in the debate” over gay and lesbian parenthood).
412. See Cook v. Cook, 965 So. 2d 630, 633-34 (La. Ct. App. 2007); In re Marriage of Collins, 51
P.3d 691, 693 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 36 n.11 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J.
concurring); S.B. v. L.W., 793 So. 2d 656, 660-61 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); Jacoby v. Jacoby, 763 So. 2d
410, 415 (Fl. Ct. App. 2000); Price v. Price, No. E1999-00102-COA-R10-CV, 2000 WL 704596, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2000); Eldridge v. Eldridge, No. 03A01-9904-CH-00146, 1999 WL 994099, at
*1 (Tenn. Ct. App., Oct. 27, 1999); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 591-92 (Miss. 1999) (McRae
J., dissenting); Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1195-96 (Ala. 1998); Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d
733, 736-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
413. Ball & Pea, supra note 378, at 287; see Elovitz, supra note 385, at 213 (“The fact that most
lesbian and gay people were raised by heterosexual parents demonstrates that, as they mature, children
develop sexual orientation independently from their parents.”); Flaks, supra note 358, at 369 (“Clearly,
the vast majority of lesbians and gay men are raised by heterosexual parents . . . .”); Kari E. Hong,
Parens Patri[archy]: Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 57 (2003)
(“[T]he claim that a parent transmits her sexual orientation to her child defies common sense. The fact
that most gay and lesbian individuals were raised by heterosexual parents demonstrates the fallacy
behind the asserted syllogism that heterosexual parents raise children who develop into heterosexual
adults.”); Kathryn Kendall, The Custody Challenge: Debunking Myths About Lesbian and Gay Parents
and Their Children, 20 FAM. ADVOC. 21, 24 (1997) (“Most lesbians and gay men were raised in
heterosexual households and are the product of heterosexual parents.”); Julie Shapiro, Custody and
Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 651 n.158
(1996) (“Most lesbians and gay men are the children of heterosexual parents.”); Philip S. Gutis,
Homosexual Parents Winning Some Custody Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1987, at C1 (“‘People who
worry that a child’s sexual orientation inevitably will follow that of their parents should remember that
most people who are homosexual were raised by heterosexual parents and surrounded by heterosexual
role models as they were growing up.’” (quoting Interview of Gregory M. Herek, Chairman of Am.
Psychol. Ass’n Comm. on Lesbian and Gay Concerns)); see also Jennifer Ellis Lattimore, Life After
Lawrence v. Texas: An Examination of the Decision’s Impact on a Homosexual Parent’s Right to
Custody of His/Her Own Children in Virginia, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 105, 142-43 (2004)
(“Studies regarding offspring of gay and lesbian parents show that the vast majority of these children
were heterosexual.”).
414. Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 160.
415. Id. at 163.
416. Id. at 162.
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parents), compared with those who had divorced heterosexual parents.”417 As
both sides of the debate have observed, the “unanimity” among scholars,
lawyers, and activists on this subject has been truly “remarkable.”418
In this context, my concern is not that the legal academy’s framework has
been blind to the gender of homophobia. This is undoubtedly true: In the
literature on gay and lesbian parenthood, there has been no attempt to
distinguish between sexual development stereotypes about fathers and mothers
or sons and daughters. In this context, however, these oversights are less
problematic because they do not seem to compromise the legal case for gay and
lesbian parenthood.419
For present purposes, my concern is that the legal academy’s framework
has been blind to the homophobia of gender—specifically, to the conflation of
stereotypes about sexual development and gender development, and generally,
to the underlying conflation of sexual orientation and gender. Because we have
ignored the conventional associations among stereotypes about “queers, sissies,
dykes, and tomboys,”420 we have imposed an arbitrary limit on the scope of our
arguments. Even as we defend the possibility that the children of gay and
lesbian parents may grow up to be “different,” we refuse to consider the
possibility that they may grow up to be gay men or lesbians.421
1. Lynn Wardle: The Attack on the “No Differences” Paradigm
Since the late 1990s the “no differences” paradigm has come under attack
from opponents of gay and lesbian parenthood.422 In The Potential Impact of
Homosexual Parenting on Children, Lynn Wardle argued that the legal
scholarship on gay and lesbian parenthood was written in a “propagandistic
style” and based on “very unreliable” body of empirical studies, which he
claimed were tainted by methodological and analytical flaws.423 Most
significantly, Wardle claimed that pro-gay researchers and advocates have
misrepresented the data produced by studies of gay and lesbian parenthood.424
Properly understood, he argued, the data “provide[] a basis for serious concerns
417. Ellen C. Perrin & Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Fam. Health, Technical
Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341, 342 (2002).
418. Wardle, supra note 243, at 837, 844; see also Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 160 (“This
body of research, almost uniformly, reports findings of no notable differences between children reared
by heterosexual parents and those reared by lesbian and gay parents.”).
419. See infra note 517 (explaining why the gender-blindness of Carlos Ball’s argument against
gender development stereotypes, although theoretically inaccurate, does not have any strategic
implications for advocates of gay and lesbian parenthood).
420. Valdes, supra note 80, at 3.
421. See infra Part V.C.5.
422. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 999 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting); Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 37 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring); Wardle, supra note
243, at 838; Maggie Gallagher, The Science of Gay Parenting, N.Y. POST, Mar. 30, 2000, at 3.
423. Wardle, supra note 243, at 838, 844-52.
424. Id. at 850.
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about potential detrimental effects upon children raised by gay or lesbian
parents.”425
Like most of today’s opponents of gay and lesbian parenthood, Wardle was
chiefly concerned with the potential impact of gay and lesbian parents on
children’s sexual development: “The most obvious risk to children from their
parents’ homosexual behavior suggested by the current studies relates to the
sexual development of the child. Both theory and empirical studies indicate the
potential that disproportionate percentages of children raised by homosexual
parents will develop homosexual interests and behaviors.”426
To bolster his argument, Wardle expressed several concerns about the
findings of gay and lesbian parenting studies. To a remarkable extent, he shared
the same concerns expressed by litigants, experts, and judges in custody and
visitation cases. In his view, one study indicated that more than 10% of the
“sons” of “gay men” were “gay,”427 another suggested “a link between a
daughter’s sexual behavior and fantasy and her mother’s homosexual
behavior,”428 and yet another reported that “boys raised by homosexual mothers
may have a lower self-image regarding masculinity.”429 In other words, Wardle
expressed specific concerns about (1) the sexual development of sons raised by
gay fathers; (2) the sexual development of daughters raised by lesbian mothers;
and (3) the gender development of sons raised by lesbian mothers. He did not,
by contrast, express any developmental concerns about daughters raised by gay
fathers. Like other opponents of gay and lesbian parenthood, Wardle invoked
the literature on “fatherless” families, comparing the children of lesbian
mothers with the children of single mothers.430
2. Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz: Acknowledging Differences
In the ten years since it was published, Wardle’s article has received mixed
reviews. While the article has been cited favorably by judges in custody and
adoption cases,431 it has been rejected by most legal scholars, who
overwhelmingly support the case for gay and lesbian parenthood.432 For present
purposes, however, the reaction of two sociologists is most relevant. In 2001,
Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz published an article in the American
425. Id. at 852.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 849.
428. Id. at 853.
429. Id. at 854.
430. Id. at 859-60 (quoting BLANKENHORN, supra note 305, at 25).
431. See, e.g., In re Adoption of M.J.S., 44 S.W.3d 41, 71-72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (Tomlin, Jr.,
J., dissenting) (describing Wardle’s article as “[a] most enlightening and judicially balanced law review
article”); Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 & n.4 (Ala. 1998) (noting Wardle’s “criticism of the
methods by which the results of [gay and lesbian parenting] studies are reached, based upon substantial
methodological and analytical flaws”).
432. See, e.g., Ball & Pea, supra note 378, at 253.
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Sociological Review, in which they asked, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation
of Parents Matter?433 The answer, they argued, is that the sexual orientation of
parents matters “somewhat more” than pro-gay researchers have
acknowledged.434
The article offers profound insight into the ways that ideology and fear
have shaped the popular, academic, and legal debates over gay and lesbian
parenthood, so it is worth describing Stacey’s and Biblarz’s argument in some
detail. From the start, the authors emphasized that they were sympathetic to the
case for gay and lesbian parenthood, and more generally, to the case for the
equal treatment of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals.435 They were sharply
critical of Wardle’s arguments against gay and lesbian parenthood, including
his analogy between lesbian and “fatherless” families.436
Stacey and Biblarz reluctantly agreed, however, with Wardle’s suggestion
that “ideological pressures constrain intellectual development in this field.”437
“In our view,” they explained, “it is the pervasiveness of social prejudice and
institutionalized discrimination against lesbians and gay men that exerts a
powerful policing effect on the basic terms of psychological research and
public discourse on the significance of parental sexual orientation.”438 “Because
anti-gay scholars seek evidence of harm,” they concluded, “sympathetic
researchers defensively stress its absence.”439
After surveying the empirical data on gay and lesbian parenthood, Stacey
and Biblarz reported a controversial result: They claimed that researchers have
“downplayed” evidence that the children of gay and lesbian parents were
actually different than the children of heterosexual parents, out of legitimate
fears about how such evidence would be used by opponents of gay and lesbian
parenthood.440 Moreover, the authors claimed that researchers have been
“hesitant to theorize” about how the “no differences” paradigm could be
squared with any of the prevailing theories of sexual and gender
development.441 Based on these concerns, the authors argued for a paradigm
shift in empirical studies of gay and lesbian parenthood. In place of “a
hierarchical model,” they proposed a “pluralist” model, in which researchers
refrain from passing judgment on the sexual orientation and gender identity of
children and parents.442

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 159.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161-62.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 164.
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To analyze the empirical data, Stacey and Biblarz gathered twenty-one
studies of gay and lesbian parenthood published between 1981 and 1998, which
they considered the “best equipped to address sociological questions about how
parental sexual orientation matters to children.”443 After conducting an
independent review, they found statistically significant differences concerning
the sexual and gender development of the children of gay and lesbian parents—
differences that they claimed had been downplayed and ignored by the
researchers who conducted the studies.
The key findings were related to “children’s gender preferences and
behavior” and “children’s sexual preferences and behavior.”444 With respect to
children’s gender development, Stacey and Biblarz relied on five studies of the
children of lesbian mothers. Analyzing these studies, they found that the
daughters of lesbian mothers “more frequently dress, play, and behave in ways
that do not conform to sex-typed cultural norms” and held “higher aspirations
to nontraditional gender occupations . . . . such as doctor, lawyer, engineer, and
astronaut.”445 With respect to sons of lesbian mothers, the authors found mixed
results. “On some measures, like aggressiveness and play preferences,” they
found that “the sons of lesbian mothers behave in less traditionally masculine
ways than those raised by heterosexual single mothers.”446 “[O]n other
measures, such as occupational goals and sartorial styles,” they did not find any
statistically significant differences between the two groups of sons.447
With respect to children’s sexual development, Stacey and Biblarz relied
upon two “intergenerational” studies—one study of the adult children of
lesbian mothers and one study of the adult sons of gay fathers.448 Of the two
studies, the authors emphasized the first, which they regarded as one of the best
designed of the twenty-one studies that they reviewed.449
Reviewing the first study, Stacey and Biblarz found that the children of
lesbian mothers were more likely to engage in homosexual behavior than the
children of heterosexual mothers, and even when they had not engaged in
homosexual behavior, they were more likely to consider the possibility of doing
so.450 These children were not, however, more likely to identify as gay, lesbian,
443. Id. at 167.
444. Id. at 168-71.
445. Id. at 168.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 171; see also id. at 169 tbl.1.
449. Id. at 170. The second study observed only the sons of gay fathers, it polled them only in
adulthood, and it observed only whether they identified as heterosexual, gay, or bisexual. See Bailey et
al., supra note 411, at 124. By contrast, the first study observed the children of both heterosexual and
lesbian mothers, followed them from childhood into adulthood, and observed a much broader range of
data—whether they had thought about engaging in homosexual behavior, whether they actually engaged
in homosexual behavior, and whether they identified as heterosexual, gay, lesbian, or bisexual. See
FIONA L. TASKER & SUSAN GOLOMBOK, GROWING UP IN A LESBIAN FAMILY: EFFECTS ON CHILD
DEVELOPMENT (1998).
450. Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 170.
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or bisexual adults.451 Reviewing the second study, the authors found that the
adult sons of gay fathers reported “a moderate degree of parent-to-child
transmission of sexual orientation.” These sons, in other words, were more
likely than others to identify as gay or bisexual adults.452
With respect to other aspects of child development, Stacey and Biblarz
generally confirmed the other researchers’ conclusions that “no significant
differences” existed in the “self-esteem,” “psychological well-being,” and
cognitive ability of the children of gay and lesbian parents.453 “The few
significant differences found,” they added, “actually tend to favor children with
lesbian mothers.”454 Based on this review of the empirical data, they argued:
“Most of the differences in the findings . . . cannot be considered deficits from
any legitimate public policy perspective. They either favor the children with
lesbigay parents . . . or represent ‘just a difference’ of the sort democratic
societies should respect and protect.”455 For these reasons, they concluded,
“there is no evidentiary basis for considering parental sexual orientation in
decisions about children’s ‘best interest.’”456
3. Carlos Ball: Defending Gender Development Differences
The Stacey and Biblarz article caused quite a stir in debates over gay and
lesbian parenthood. It was widely reported in the popular press when it was
published,457 and it has been frequently quoted in cases, casebooks, and law
review articles in subsequent years.458
The legal academy’s response to the article has been a case study in the
politics of gay and lesbian parenthood, and a testament to the article’s claim
that “ideological pressures constrain intellectual development in this field.”459
451. Id. at 171. In addition, the authors observed yet another difference between daughters and
sons, which was related to the conventional stereotype that girls raised without fathers are likely to be
“promiscuous.” See supra Part III.D (describing conventional stereotype of “fatherless” girls). They
found that the daughters of lesbian mothers were “more sexually adventurous and less chaste, whereas
the sons of lesbians evince the opposite pattern—somewhat less sexually adventurous and more chaste.”
Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 171. “In other words,” they explained, “once again, children
(especially girls) raised by lesbians appear to depart from traditional gender-based norms.” Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 177.
456. Id. at 176.
457. See, e.g., Bettina Boxall, Sociologists Challenge Data on Gay Parenting Families, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at B1; Erica Goode, A Rainbow of Difference in Gays’ Children, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2001, at F1; Bill Hoffman, Study on Kids of Gay Parents Stirs a Flap, N.Y. POST, June 9, 2001,
at 18.
458. A Westlaw search indicates that the Stacey and Biblarz article has been cited in two same-sex
marriage cases, one adoption case, one custody case, and over ninety law review articles. In addition, it
has been cited and excerpted in several leading casebooks on sexual orientation and family law. See,
e.g., ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 57, at 1186-88; RUBENSTEIN, BALL, & SCHACTER, supra note 42,
at 731-36; WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 51, at 826.
459. Stacey and Biblarz, supra note 304, at 160.
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Opponents like Wardle have welcomed the article, which they cite as
conclusive proof that gay men and lesbians should not be granted custody,
visitation, adoption, or marriage rights.460 Among advocates, the reaction has
been guarded. In law review articles, legal scholars have generally downplayed
the article’s finding that there were “differences” between the children of gay
and lesbian parents and the children of heterosexual parents. When they refer to
the article, they cite only the conclusion that there were “no differences” that
could be considered “deficits.”461 They do not acknowledge that the authors
found significant differences in children’s gender and sexual development at
all.
To date, only one scholar has squarely confronted the legal implications of
the article’s controversial findings. This exceptional scholar is Carlos Ball, the
legal academy’s chief critic of Lynn Wardle’s arguments against gay and
lesbian parenthood. In Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and
the Implications of Difference, Ball considered whether the findings presented
by Stacey and Biblarz could justify laws prohibiting adoptions by gay and
lesbian couples.462
Rather than insisting that the differences observed by Stacey and Biblarz
were not significant, Ball acknowledged that they marked a “turning point” in
the debate over gay and lesbian parenthood.463 “As a practical matter,” he
conceded, “it is not likely that . . . state policy makers, judges, or the opponents
of lesbian and gay families will soon view differences associated with gender
and sexual preferences and behavior as irrelevant” to determinations of
children’s best interests.464 “It is therefore necessary,” he resolved, “to explore
460. In one form or another, Lynn Wardle has invoked the Stacey and Biblarz article in seven
articles in the past four years. See Lynn D. Wardle, Children and the Future of Marriage, 17 REGENT U.
L. REV. 279, 293 (2005); Lynn D. Wardle, Considering the Impacts on Children and Society of
“Lesbigay” Parenting, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 541, 550 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of
Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561, 561 n.1 (2005); Lynn D.
Wardle, Form and Substance in Parentage Law, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 203, 250 (2006); Lynn
D. Wardle, The “Inner Lives” of Children in Lesbigay Adoption: Narratives and Other Concerns, 18
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 511, 512 n.1 (2006); Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption Problems,
Paradigms, Policies, and Parameters, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 323, 364 (2004); Lynn D.
Wardle, Preference for Marital Couple Adoption—Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 345, 378 (2003). Wardle’s argument has been picked up by judges in two highly publicized cases.
See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 1000 n.29 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J. dissenting);
Ex parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 37 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring).
461. See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 80, at 1083 n.425 (quoting the claim of Stacey and Biblarz that
“most differences . . . ‘cannot be considered deficits from any legitimate public policy perspective’”);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2186 n.625 (2002) (suggesting that Stacey and Biblarz
found no “malignant impact”); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional
Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2246 (2005) (suggesting that Stacey and Biblarz found
“no difference in adverse outcomes”); see also RUBENSTEIN, BALL & SCHACTER, supra note 42, at 731
(“Most of the responses to Wardle continued to insist that children raised by gay parents were no
different than those raised by heterosexuals.”).
462. Ball, supra note 269, at 692.
463. Id. at 692, 697-705.
464. Id. at 702.
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some of the policy and legal implications of the differences noted by Stacey
and Biblarz.”465
For the sake of argument, Ball assumed that the article’s findings about
children’s “gender related differences” were not only “plausibl[e]” but would
be “confirm[ed]” by future studies.466 In other words, he assumed that when
children are raised by gay and lesbian parents, they are less likely to conform to
traditional gender roles.467 “Daughters of lesbians and gay men,” he conceded,
“may be more interested in ‘masculine’ clothing or in careers that have
traditionally been the prerogative of men,” and “the sons of lesbians and gay
men may be less interested in sports or more interested in nurturing.”468
Ball argued, however, that even if these findings were confirmed, they
could not provide a legitimate basis for laws prohibiting adoptions by gay and
lesbian couples, because laws based on gender stereotypes violate the Equal
Protection Clause.469 Quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Virginia (U.S. 1996),470 Ball reasoned that laws cannot be justified by “fixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females” or “overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females.”471
In light of the “no differences” paradigm of debates over gay and lesbian
parenthood, this is a refreshing and pathbreaking argument. Although Ball’s
claims were specifically tailored to adoption laws, they could be extended to
custody and visitation cases with one minor adjustment: In custody and
visitation cases, it is not a statute that is based on gender stereotypes but a
court’s determination of a child’s best interests.472 This kind of argument could

465. Id.
466. Id. at 704.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 723.
469. Id. at 742. Ball articulates this argument on two alternative grounds. First, he argues that laws
prohibiting adoptions by gay and lesbian couples discriminate on the basis of sex, and as a result, they
should be subject to “heightened scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 730-40. Second, he
argues that even if such laws are not subject to heightened scrutiny, they should not pass “rational basis
review,” because the enforcement of gender stereotypes is “a per se illegitimate objective.” Id. at 74047. In both cases, Ball’s conclusions are based on the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v.
Virginia. See id. at 733, 742 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 541 (1996)).
470. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
471. Ball, supra note 269, at 733, 742 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533, 541).
472. In the adoption context, Ball argues that statutes prohibiting adoptions by gay and lesbian
couples discriminate on the basis of sex, insofar as they permit a man to adopt with a woman but
prohibit a man from adopting with another man, and vice-versa. Id. at 731. This argument is known as
the “facial” sex discrimination argument, and it is frequently advanced in same-sex marriage cases. See
Widiss, Rosenblatt & NeJaime, supra note 10, at 462.
In custody and visitation cases, courts apply the best interests standard. Because the best interests
standard does not explicitly discriminate on the basis of sex, it is not vulnerable to facial sex
discrimination claims. In some cases, however, gay and lesbian parents could argue that the standard
was applied in a discriminatory manner. When judges rely on explicit stereotypes about the “gender
identity” and “masculinity” of boys, it should not be too difficult to prove that decisions are based on
gender stereotypes.
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be especially useful for lesbian mothers raising sons, who so often confront
stereotypes about the formation of “gender identity” and the adoption of
“masculine” roles.473 Rather than conceding that boys should be “masculine”—
“no different” than boys raised by “masculine” fathers—mothers could insist
that the state has no legitimate interest in the production of “masculine”
boys.474
4. Carlos Ball: Ignoring Sexual Development Differences
In one respect, however, Ball’s argument is surprisingly limited: It is
expressly confined to stereotypes about children’s gender development; it does
not address stereotypes about children’s sexual development at all.
In reviewing the Stacey and Biblarz article, Ball drew a sharp distinction
between the article’s findings on “gender behavior and preferences” and
“sexual behavior and preferences.”475 For the sake of argument, he was willing
to concede the empirical controversy over children’s gender development, so
that he could “focus fully on the implications of difference in this area, and in
particular on the effects of such difference on the equality claims [of] lesbian
and gay parents.”476 He was not, however, willing to concede the empirical
controversy over children’s sexual development—not even for the sake of
argument.
Ball argued that the evidence on gender development had reached “a
minimum threshold of plausibility,” but he claimed that the evidence on sexual
development was not “anywhere near” such a “minimum threshold.”477 On this

Although the facial sex discrimination has long been a darling of legal scholars, it has experienced
a string of defeats in recent same-sex marriage cases. Id. at 468, 474-45. Recently, some scholars have
proposed that in same-sex marriage cases, “the sex discrimination argument may be strengthened by
grounding the facial sex discrimination argument in a discussion of sex stereotypes.” Id. at 464.
473. See supra Part III.C.3 (citing Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Pleasant
v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 n.2 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992); Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1990); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640
P.2d 966, 968-69 (Okla. 1982); Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)).
474. In Ball’s article, he makes both moral and legal arguments against laws based on gender
stereotypes. In moral terms, Ball argues that such laws violate the principles of “equality” and “parental
autonomy,” which he claims are “reflected in American law.” Ball, supra note 269, at 705-24. In one
respect, Ball’s moral argument would be even stronger in custody and visitation cases than in traditional
adoption cases. In custody and visitation cases, the child already has a relationship with the gay or
lesbian parent. In such circumstances, parents have a right to direct children’s “upbringing,” so Ball’s
principle of “parental autonomy” would be supported by the Due Process Clause. See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (plurality) (recognizing a parent’s “fundamental right to make
decisions regarding the care, custody, and control” of his or her child); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (recognizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control”).
475. Ball, supra note 269, at 699-700, 702 (quoting Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 168).
476. Id. at 704-05.
477. Id. at 702.
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ground, he refused to entertain the notion that the children of gay and lesbian
parents might be more likely to grow up to be gay and lesbian adults.478
Ball provided two reasons for distinguishing so sharply between the
evidence on gender development and sexual development. Above all, he
emphasized that the evidence on sexual development was based on “only one
study” and contradicted by “many studies,” whereas the evidence on gender
development was “found in multiple studies.”479 He warned that “[w]e should
be careful before we reach any conclusions, even tentative ones, regarding the
transmissibility of sexual orientation from parents to children based on only
one study of roughly twenty-five children of lesbian mothers.”480 “[W]hatever
conclusions are reached from only one study,” he continued, “are likely to be
so speculative so as to be both useless and dangerous.”481 In addition, he noted
that “the vast majority of lesbians and gay men were raised by heterosexual
parents.”482 In his view, “anyone who wants to argue plausibly that parents
influence the sexual orientation of their children must in some way address
[that] obvious and seemingly relevant fact.”483
5. Like Parent, Like Child: A New Front in the Fight for Gay and Lesbian
Parenthood
I respectfully disagree. While I applaud Ball for taking up the subject of
children’s gender development, I do not believe that he has identified
compelling reasons to withhold argument on the subject of children’s sexual
development. I believe that the underlying theory is too plausible, the
underlying stereotypes are too often conflated, and the stakes for gay and
lesbian parents are too significant to be ignored.
This is not the place, and I am not the person, to resolve a long-standing
dispute over the empirical data on gay and lesbian parenthood. While I have a
few qualms about Ball’s view of the data,484 I will not dwell on the empirical
478. Id. at 703.
479. Id. at 702, 703.
480. Id. at 703.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. I am most concerned with Ball’s treatment of the second study relied upon by Stacey and
Biblarz, which observed “evidence of parent-to-child transmission of sexual orientation” between gay
fathers and adult sons. Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 171 (citing Bailey et al., supra note 411). As
we saw in Part III, the number one fear expressed by litigants, experts, and judges in custody and
visitation cases is that gay fathers will raise gay sons. See supra Part III.A tbl.1. Because the second
study provides specific support for this common stereotype, it seems too significant to be ignored.
In the text of his article, Ball repeatedly claims that the evidence on sexual development was based
on “only one study” and contradicted by “many studies,” whereas the evidence on gender development
was “found in multiple studies.” Ball, supra note 269, at 702-03. As he acknowledges in his footnotes,
however, the evidence on sexual development cited by Stacey and Biblarz was actually based on two
studies—one study of the children of lesbian mothers and one study of the sons of gay fathers. See id. at
703 n.71; see also Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 171.
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controversy in this Article. I will, however, note a few theoretical problems
with Ball’s refusal to confront the underlying premise of recruiting and role
modeling stereotypes—the notion that the children of gay and lesbian parents
are more likely to become gay and lesbian adults.
The first problem concerns Ball’s claim that this premise is not plausible
because “the vast majority of lesbians and gay men were raised by heterosexual
parents.”485 This type of argument gets a lot of play in the legal scholarship on
gay and lesbian parenthood. For most advocates of gay and lesbian parenthood,
this fact is enough to end the debate over sexual development stereotypes by

The lead author of this study, J. Michael Bailey, is admittedly a controversial figure whose work
has been questioned by colleagues and LGBT advocates. See, e.g., Robin Wilson, Northwestern U.
Concludes Investigation of Sex Researcher but Keeps Results Secret, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 1,
2004, available at http://chronicle.com/daily/2004/12/2004120103n.htm. Yet Ball’s criticisms of the
study’s findings are not based on the controversy surrounding the lead author; they are based on the
merits of the study itself.
In his footnotes, Ball claims that the second study was “at best inconclusive” because “the vast
majority . . . of the . . . sons of gay fathers who participated in the study . . . were heterosexual.” Ball,
supra note 269, at 703 n.71. I am not persuaded by Ball’s “vast majority” argument. It is similar to the
“vast majority” argument addressed in the text, and it falls victim to a similar rejoinder: Most of the sons
of gay fathers were heterosexual because most people are heterosexual. The study concluded that nine
percent of the sons were gay or bisexual. Bailey et al., supra note 411, at 125. Based on this finding, the
authors suggested that “the rate of homosexuality in the sons (nine percent) is several times higher than
that suggested by the population-based surveys and is consistent with a degree of father-to-son
transmission.” Id. at 126.
More broadly, it is not clear why Ball suggests that the evidence produced by these studies has
been contradicted by “many studies.” Ball, supra note 269, at 702. As Stacey and Biblarz explained, the
two studies on which they relied are the only two “intergenerational” studies of the children of gay
parents, so they are the only studies that compare the adult sexual orientation of children and parents. In
both studies, the authors found some evidence that children’s sexual development was influenced by gay
or lesbian parents. Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 171.
Ball cites six other studies, see Ball supra note 269, at 702 n.70, which he claims have reached
different results, but the studies do not seem to support Ball’s claims. Most of these studies do not
include “control” groups of the children of heterosexual parents, so they cannot support meaningful
comparisons between the children of heterosexual and homosexual parents—which is why they were not
included in the meta-analysis conducted by Stacey and Biblarz. See Frederick W. Bozett, Children of
Gay Fathers, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS 39 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1987); Richard Green, Sexual
Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692
(1978); Brian Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544 (1979); Ann
O’Connell, Voices from the Heart: The Developmental Impact of a Mother’s Lesbianism on Her
Adolescent Children, 63 SMITH COLLEGE STUD. IN SOC. WORK 281 (1993). Moreover, some of these
studies are vulnerable to the same objections articulated by Stacey and Biblarz: The authors claim to
find “no differences,” but this conclusion is belied by the data produced by the studies themselves. See,
e.g., Bozett, supra (finding that 16% of the children of gay fathers self-identified as “gay or bisexual”);
Green, supra (finding that between 8% and 14% of the children of gay fathers were identified as
“homosexual”); Ghazala Afzal Javaid, The Children of Homosexual and Heterosexual Single Mothers,
23 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 235 (1993) (finding that 27% of the daughters of lesbian mothers
self-identified as “asexual” and reported that they “did not want to have children,” compared with none
of the daughters of heterosexual mothers). In one of these studies, the author explicitly warned that “the
sexual orientation of the children was not specifically investigated.” Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative
Study of Self-Esteem of Adolescent Children of Divorced Lesbian Mothers and Divorced Heterosexual
Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 123 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1992).
I want to emphasize that I remain agnostic on the question of whether a parent’s sexual orientation
influences a child’s sexual development. Although I am concerned with Ball’s view of the data, I do not
mean to advance the contrary view. I do not believe that the empirical controversy can be resolved or
avoided. I mean to raise the question of how to proceed in the absence of conclusive data.
485. Ball, supra note 269, at 703.
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itself.486 If most gay men and lesbians were raised by heterosexual parents, the
logic goes, then there is no reason to think that a parent’s sexual orientation
would influence a child’s sexual development.
This reasoning should sound familiar. It is much like the claim that “most
child molesters are heterosexual,” and it falls victim to a similar
counterargument: Most lesbians and gay men are raised by heterosexual parents
because most parents are heterosexual. Opponents of gay and lesbian
parenthood do not claim that all of the children of gay and lesbian parents will
be homosexual or that all of the children of heterosexual parents will be
heterosexual. They suggest that all other things being equal, more of the
children of gay and lesbian parents will be homosexual and more of the
children of heterosexual parents will be heterosexual. Stereotypes are based on
generalizations, not absolute claims. As Lynn Wardle writes, “Both theory and
empirical studies indicate the potential that disproportionate percentages of
children raised by homosexual parents will develop homosexual interests and
behaviors.”487 Unless we compare the incidence of homosexuality in children
raised by gay and lesbian parents to the incidence of homosexuality in children
raised by heterosexual parents—or at least, to the incidence of homosexuality
in the general public—then we will not be able to reject sexual development
stereotypes on empirical grounds.
What about theoretical grounds? As you may have noticed, Wardle claims
that his position is supported by “theory” as well as “empirical studies.”488 This
leads us to the second problem with Ball’s rejection of the evidence on sexual
development: He has not offered any theory of sexual development that
supports it. In this respect, too, Ball’s argument is typical of the legal
scholarship on this subject. As Stacey and Biblarz have explained, dozens of
scholars have claimed to find “no differences” between the sexuality of the
children of gay and heterosexual parents, but they have been “hesitant to
theorize” how such a lack of differences could be explained.489 In all of the
arguments made on behalf of gay and lesbian parenthood, no one has attempted
to square the “no differences” paradigm with the prevailing wisdom on
childhood sexual development.
To make matters worse, Stacey and Biblarz do not believe that such a
theory exists:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of a credible theory of sexual development
that would not expect the adult children of lesbigay parents to display a
somewhat higher incidence of homoerotic desire, behavior, and
identity than children of heterosexual parents. . . . In fact, the only
“theory” of child development we can imagine in which a child’s
486.
487.
488.
489.

See supra note 413.
Wardle, supra note 243, at 852 (emphasis added).
Id.
Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 162.
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sexual development would bear no relationship to parental genes,
practices, environment, or beliefs would be an arbitrary one.490
While advocates for gay and lesbian parenthood have been ignoring these
objections, opponents of gay and lesbian parenthood have been getting a great
deal of mileage out of them. In the last five years, Wardle has quoted the above
passage five times to support some version of the following statement: “[T]he
social science that purports to show ‘no difference’ defies all theories of child
development.”491
Again, this is not the place, and I am not the person, to resolve a longstanding dispute over the etiology of homosexuality. I will, however, take a
moment to illustrate some of the theoretical challenges posed by Stacey and
Biblarz. To oversimplify for a moment, let us imagine that there are only two
theories of homosexual development—“nature” and “nurture.” On the one
hand, if homosexuality were influenced by “nature,” then one might reasonably
expect some measure of genetic transmission from parent-to-child—perhaps
just a predisposition, if not a “gay gene.” On the other hand, if homosexuality
were influenced by “nurture,” one might reasonably expect some measure of
cultural transmission from parent-to-child—perhaps just a greater willingness
to experiment with same-sex behavior, among children who were naturally
predisposed.
This “nature”/“nurture” model is too simplistic in many ways. In this
context, the most significant problem with this model is that the influence of
“nature” is not necessarily genetic.492 In spite of the skepticism expressed by
Stacey and Biblarz, there may well be some causes of homosexual development
that do not depend on a parent’s “genes, practices, environment, or beliefs”
after all. It has often been suggested, for example, that male homosexuality
may be influenced by elevated fetal androgen levels, which increase as women
give birth to multiple sons.493 On this theory, a boy with older brothers would
be more likely to become gay than a boy with no older brothers, but the son of

490. Id. at 163.
491. Wardle, Children and the Future of Marriage, supra note 460, at 295; Wardle, Considering
the Impacts on Children and Society of “Lesbigay” Parenting, supra note 460, at 544; Wardle, Form
and Substance in Parentage Law, supra note 460, at 253; Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption Problems,
Paradigms, Policies, and Parameters, supra note 460, at 364; Wardle, Preference for Marital Couple
Adoption—Constitutional and Policy Reflections, supra note 460, at 378.
492. In addition, even if the influence of nature were genetic, the legal consequences of the
“nature” model would not be straightforward. On the one hand, if homosexuality were wholly
determined by genetic transmission from parent to child, then a parent’s homosexuality might actually
be less relevant in traditional adoption, custody, and visitation cases: Because the child already exists in
such cases, any genetic transmission from parent to child has already occurred. On the other hand, it
homosexuality were partially determined by genetic transmission from parent to child, then a parent’s
homosexuality might be more relevant: If the state has an interest in raising children to become
heterosexual, then courts might be especially unwilling to let gay and lesbian parents raise children who
are genetically predisposed to become homosexual.
493. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, Gay at Birth?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at A19.
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a gay father would not be more likely to become gay than the son of a
heterosexual father.
Even if such a theory were proved, however, it would not establish that a
parent’s sexual orientation plays no role in the process of sexual development
whatsoever. At the end of the day, even Ball concedes that based on our present
state of knowledge, “it is not unreasonable to believe that the children of
lesbian and gay men would feel freer to explore and affirm same-gender sexual
desires.”494
I agree. Because I am agnostic on the empirical and theoretical questions, I
am not willing to insist—as many scholars do—that a parent’s homosexuality
does not have any influence on a child’s sexual development at all. Following
in Ball’s own footsteps, I would like to explore some of the legal implications
of this thought.
Apart from the empirical and theoretical questions, one might wonder
whether Ball’s reluctance to entertain sexual development stereotypes could be
defended on strategic grounds. “[W]hatever conclusions are reached from only
one study,” Ball warns, “are likely to be so speculative so as to be both useless
and dangerous.”495 Yet in custody and visitation cases, gay and lesbian parents
do not have the luxury of avoiding such dangers—at least not by invoking a
sharp distinction between stereotypes about gender development and sexual
development, as Ball does. As Francisco Valdes has observed, our legal system
often conflates sex, gender, and sexual orientation in order to facilitate
discrimination against “queers, sissies, dykes, and tomboys.”496 Because
litigants, experts, and judges conflate sexual orientation with gender identity
and gender roles,497 they conflate sexual development stereotypes with gender
development stereotypes, particularly in cases involving boys raised by lesbian
mothers. As a result, even as a strategic matter, we cannot pick our battles here.
In order to fight gender development stereotypes effectively, we must fight
sexual development stereotypes as well.
In custody and visitation cases, the overlap between gender development
stereotypes and sexual development stereotypes was nearly perfect. In all but
one (7 of 8) of the cases in which parents were subjected to stereotypes about
gender development, they were also subjected to stereotypes about sexual
development.498 In several of these cases, the two concerns were so thoroughly
conflated that they were difficult to distinguish from each other.
494. Ball, supra note 269, at 703 n.73.
495. Id. at 703.
496. Valdes, supra note 80.
497. Cf. Ball, supra note 269, at 705 (“Concerns about gender roles among the children of lesbians
and gay men often bleed into issues of gender identity.”).
498. See Cook v. Cook, 965 So. 2d 630, 633-34 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628
N.E.2d 633, 637, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 36 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992);
Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988
WL 30173, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Okla. 1982);
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Recall that in Dailey v. Dailey (Tennessee 1981),499 a psychologist testified
that it would be “preferable” to raise Rusty, a four-year-old boy, in “a normal
relationship wherein males and females adhere to their roles,” because
“homosexuality is a learned trait and it would be very difficult for Rusty to
learn and approximate sex role identification from a homosexual
environment.”500 In M.J.P. v. J.G.P (Oklahoma 1982),501 a psychiatrist
described the “sexual identity” of the mother’s six-year-old boy as
“masculine.”502 In Lundin v. Lundin (Louisiana 1990),503 the court cited a
psychologist’s concerns that if a two-year-old boy were raised by his lesbian
mother, he may not learn “masculine and female” roles, which the psychologist
described as “sex appropriate roles.”504 In response to the court’s question
about the boy seeing his mother and her partner sharing a bed, the psychologist
testified: “I would be concerned if the role models were confused so that a child
would not understand or know that this”—that is, the mother’s
homosexuality—“was not typical or usual or to be expected.”505 Finally, in
Pleasant v. Pleasant (Illinois 1993),506 the trial court expressed concerns about
a ten-year-old boy’s “sexual orientation” and “gender identity problem,” and
the court repeatedly described gay men as “unmasculine.”507
The phenomenon is not unique to custody and visitation cases. In Lofton v.
Kearney (11th Cir. 2004),508 the plaintiffs argued that Florida’s law prohibiting
adoptions by gay men and lesbians was unconstitutional. In defense of the law,
the state claimed that “dual-gender parenting” plays “a vital role . . . in shaping
sexual and gender identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling.”509 In
upholding the law, the district court relied upon the state’s interest in providing
“proper gender role modeling”510 and promoting “proper gender
identification,”511 while the Eleventh Circuit relied upon the state’s interest in
providing “heterosexual role models.”512
In fact, the phenomenon is not even limited to court cases—it comes up
often in the scholarship on gay and lesbian parenthood. Lynn Wardle’s work,

Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). But see Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760,
766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (expressing gender development stereotypes but not mentioning sexual
development stereotypes).
499. 635 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
500. Id. at 394.
501. 640 P.2d 966.
502. Id. at 968-69.
503. 563 So. 2d 1273.
504. Id. at 1275.
505. Id. (emphasis added).
506. 628 N.E.2d 633 at 637.
507. Id. at 639.
508. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dept. Children & Fam. Servs, 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (Lofton II).
509. Id. at 818.
510. Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1383 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
511. Id.
512. Lofton II, 358 F.3d at 822.
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for example, leaves little question that his concerns about gender development
are both linked to and derived from his concerns about sexual development. For
Wardle, “the most obvious risk to children from their parents’ homosexual
behavior suggested by the current studies relates to the sexual development of
the child.”513 He has argued at length, in several places, that “children raised by
homosexual parents will develop homosexual interests and behaviors.”514 By
contrast, he has spared only two sentences in one article to express concerns
about the “masculinity” of boys and the “cross-dressing” of girls, in the midst
of a paragraph listing several concerns about the sexual development of
children raised by gay and lesbian parents.515
In light of the ubiquitous conflation of gender development stereotypes
with sexual development stereotypes, Ball’s limited response to gender
development stereotypes seems likely to fall on deaf ears—especially in cases
involving gay fathers raising sons, where sexual development stereotypes are
most prevalent.516 For opponents of gay and lesbian parenthood, concerns about
gender development are rarely expressed by themselves, and they are often
expressed as synonyms or euphemisms for concerns about sexual development.
Because Ball did not notice the link between stereotypes about gender
development and sexual development, he imposed an arbitrary limit on the
scope of his argument.517
513. Wardle, supra note 243, at 852.
514. See, e.g., id. at 850-54.
515. Id. at 854-55.
516. See supra Part III.A tbl.1.
517. In addition to the problem explained in the text, Ball portrays gender development stereotypes
in gender-blind terms, like so many other scholars in this field. In Ball’s view, opponents of gay and
lesbian parenthood have expressed the following objections about children’s gender development: (1)
“the fear that the sons of lesbians and gay men will be less masculine and more feminine than the sons
of heterosexual parents and that the daughters of lesbian and gay men will be less feminine and more
masculine than the daughters of heterosexual parents,” Ball, supra note 269, at 717; (2) the “argument
that male children can best learn from their male parents what it means to be a complete man and a good
father and that female children can best learn from their mothers what it means to be a complete woman
and a good mother,” id. at 716; and (3) “the idea that men as fathers and women as mothers have unique
and complementary skills and attributes that are absent whenever a woman tries to father a child and a
man tries to mother a child,” id. at 710.
When I survey the debates over gay and lesbian parenthood, I do not see this kind of balance
between concerns about boys and girls. In arguments against gay and lesbian parenthood—as in the
custody and visitation cases—there seem to be much broader, much deeper concerns expressed about
the gender development of boys than the gender development of girls. In this respect, anti-gay scholars
like Lynn Wardle are similar to experts and judges in custody and visitation cases. On the one hand,
Wardle has expressed the sweeping concern that “boys raised by homosexual mothers may have a lower
self-image regarding masculinity”; on the other hand, he has expressed the narrower concern that
“lesbians . . . disclosed increased cross-dressing among daughters.” Wardle, supra note 243, at 854.
The distinction is a subtle one, but it would be familiar to psychologists, because it closely tracks
the DSM’s diagnosis of gender identity disorder in childhood. By invoking the image of “unmasculine”
boys, Wardle calls to mind a wide range of ways in which boys might deviate from conventional styles
of play, dress, behavior, and demeanor. By invoking the image of “cross-dressing” girls, by contrast,
Wardle calls to mind a much narrower set of behaviors. In today’s society, girls are not generally
regarded as “cross-dressing” unless they insist on wearing neckties or emphatically refuse to wear
dresses or skirts. See, e.g., DSM-IV, supra note 260, at 576-77 (observing that boys with Gender
Identity Disorder “may have a preference for dressing in girls’ or women’s clothes,” while “[g]irls with
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To some extent, Ball may have been concerned about asking too much of
judges by advancing an argument that depends on an extension of existing law.
There is no question that under today’s equal protection jurisprudence, it is
significantly easier to challenge sexist stereotypes than homophobic or
heterosexist stereotypes.518 Although recent decisions from the California and
Connecticut Supreme Courts are promising, federal courts have widely rejected
the claim that discrimination against gay men and lesbians is “inherently
suspect.”519
In some cases, this tradeoff may not be required. Even when judges do not
articulate stereotypes about gender development, they sometimes articulate
gender-specific stereotypes about sexual development—especially in cases
involving gay and lesbian parents and children of the same gender. In Bennett
v. O’Rourke (Tennessee 1985),520 for example, the court’s ruling was based
explicitly on the “increased chance of role-modeling” because “the homosexual
parent and the minor child [we]re both female.”521 In such cases, the parent
might challenge these stereotypes by invoking the Supreme Court’s holding in
United States v. Virginia (U.S. 1996) that state action may not be based “on
fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.”522
Such cases are already rare, however—and if gay and lesbian parents begin
challenging judges who articulate gender-based stereotypes, then these cases
are likely to become even rarer. Sooner or later, a gay or lesbian parent will be

Gender Identity Disorder display intense negative reactions to parental expectations or attempts to have
them wear dresses or other feminine attire [and] may refuse to attend school or social events where such
clothes may be required”).
In this context, however, Ball’s gender-blind analysis does not have any strategic implications,
because it does not cut off any valuable legal arguments. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits all laws
based on gender stereotypes, whether or not the stereotypes apply to one sex or both sexes. In
constitutional terms, there is no difference between a ruling based on the notion that “boys should be
masculine and girls should be feminine,” and a ruling based on the notion that “boys should be
masculine but girls may be masculine or feminine.” One might say that only the second ruling is based
on a kind of “male supremacy principle,” but both rulings are based on gender stereotypes, so both
would be unconstitutional. See Widiss, Rosenblatt & NeJaime, supra note 10, at 474-75.
518. See Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 534 (2001) (“The sex discrimination argument
relies on settled law . . . Each of the other principal arguments for gay equality—the privacy and suspect
classification arguments—depend on an innovative extension of existing law to cover gays.”).
519. Compare Kerrigan v. Comm’r Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008) (holding that
under Connecticut’s equal protection provisions, classifications based on sexual orientation are “quasisuspect” and subject to “heightened . . . scrutiny”), and In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal.
2008) (holding that under California’s equal protection clause, classifications based on sexual
orientation are “suspect” and subject to “strict scrutiny”), with Lofton v. Sec’y of Dept. Children & Fam.
Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that under the Federal Constitution, classifications
based on sexual orientation are subject to rational basis review), Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 293 (6th Cir. 1997) (same), Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard,
124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997) (same), Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996)
(same), Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (same), and Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677,
685 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).
520. 1985 WL 3464 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985).
521. Id. at *3.
522. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996).
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stereotyped as a recruiter or a role model, and the judge’s assumptions about
the parent’s gender and the child’s gender will not be expressed in the opinion
itself. This consequence is one of the costs of focusing legal argument on the
use of explicit stereotypes, which is familiar to civil rights scholars and lawyers
in other contexts.523 In these cases, gay and lesbian parents will have to make
difficult choices, and the argument for gay and lesbian parenthood will have to
stand or fall by itself.
These choices are not easy to make, but the options are fairly
straightforward. On the one hand, we could insist that the children of gay and
lesbian parents are “no different”—no more likely to be homosexual, no less
likely to be heterosexual—than the children of heterosexual parents. On the
other hand, we could acknowledge that they may well be different, but we can
insist that a child’s homosexuality is “just a difference”—the kind of difference
that a democracy should “respect and protect.”524 By confronting the fear of
parent-to-child transmission, we stand not only to win greater protections for
gay and lesbian parents but to challenge the homophobic, heterosexist, and
ubiquitous “fantasy that gay and lesbian youth do not exist.” 525
Without the support of sex discrimination claims, this route to progress
may well be slower, but the argument would not be wholly without precedent.
In Romer v. Evans (U.S. 1996),526 the Supreme Court held that under the Equal
Protection Clause, a state’s actions may not be based solely on “animus”
toward gay men and lesbians.527 When gay and lesbian parents are subjected to
sexual development stereotypes, they might invoke Romer for support, arguing
that the court’s ruling was based on no more than “animus” toward gay men
and lesbians. After all, the state’s interest in preventing the development of gay
and lesbian children amounts to little more than a desire to minimize the
number of gay and lesbian adults in the world—the pursuit of a fantasy that gay
and lesbian people will cease to exist.528
523. See supra Part I.D.2 and note 71 (describing limitations of focusing on explicit stereotypes).
524. Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 304, at 177.
525. Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the Fantasy that Gay and
Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269 (1996).
526. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
527. Id.
528. Sedgwick writes:
The renaturalization and enforcement of gender assignment is not the worst news about the
new psychiatry of gay acceptance, however. The worst is that it not only fails to offer, but
seems conceptually incapable of offering, even the slightest resistance to the wish endemic in
the culture surrounding and supporting it: the wish that gay people not exist. There are many
people in the words we inhabit, and these psychiatrists are unmistakably among them, who
have a strong interest in the dignified treatment of any gay people who may happen to
already exist. But the number of persons or institutions by whom the existence of gay people
is treated as a precious desideratum, a needed condition of life, is small. The presiding
asymmetry of value assignment between hetero and homo goes unchallenged everywhere:
advice on how to help your kids turn out gay . . . is less ubiquitous than you might think. On
the other hand, the scope of institutions whose programmatic undertaking is to prevent the
development of gay people is unimaginably large. There is no major discourse that offers a
firm resistance to that undertaking.
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I do not mean to predict that by relying on Romer, gay and lesbian parents
would win more custody and visitation cases involving recruiting and role
modeling stereotypes. In light of the constitutional protections historically
afforded to gay men and lesbians, such a prediction would be hopelessly naïve.
In the short term, it does not seem likely that many judges will be persuaded by
this argument—especially those judges who are already inclined to rule against
gay and lesbian parents based on homophobic or heterosexist stereotypes.529
Nor do I mean to suggest that gay and lesbian parents should advance a
long-shot claim for the long-term good, without regard to the profound interests
at stake in custody and visitation cases. When gay and lesbian parents confront
homophobic and heterosexist litigants, experts, and judges, they are often asked
to balance the fight for a parent-child relationship against the broader fight for
gay and lesbian parenthood. In such circumstances, strategic decisions are often
painful and difficult. I have no magic recipes for making such tradeoffs; I leave
them to individual parents and lawyers to make for themselves.
But law professors are another matter. As scholars, we have an obligation
to make claims that are not only useful but truthful, and we have the freedom to
develop arguments that may not be advanced or accepted for years. My hope is
that sooner or later—the sooner, the better—parents, lawyers, and judges will
be ready to stand up not only for parents who are gay men and lesbians, but for
children who may grow up to be gay men and lesbians, too.
CONCLUSION
In the past several years, the Family Pride Coalition of Washington, D.C.,
has launched “OUTSpoken Families,” a national training campaign for gay and
lesbian parents.530 The campaign’s goal is “to create a speakers bureau of
people available to appear in the media and before lawmakers,” so that the
speakers can present “the most convincing case” for gay and lesbian
parenthood to the public.531 During day-long seminars, gay and lesbian parents
are given a 162-page handbook, and they are taught about research on gay and
lesbian people who raise children and on the terminology that most appeals to

Sedgwick, supra note 244, at 161.
529. Federal courts have generally declined to read Romer as a broad prohibition against state
action targeting gay men and lesbians. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 868
(8th Cir. 2006) (upholding sexual orientation classification under rational basis review and
distinguishing Romer); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dept. Children & Fam. Servs, 358 F.3d 804, 826 (11th Cir.
2004) (same). There have, however, been some encouraging decisions from state courts in recent years.
See, e.g., State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 30 (Kan. 2005) (invalidating sexual orientation classification
under rational basis review and citing Romer); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962
(Mass. 2003) (same).
530. Wyatt Buchanan, Training Helps Gay Families Win Hearts, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 29, 2007, at
A1.
531. Id.
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heterosexual Americans.532 Early this year, Family Pride reported that “815
people in 45 states and three countries have volunteered to be trained and speak
on behalf of gay and lesbian families.”533
The OUTSpoken project is funded in part by the Gill Foundation, one of
the nation’s largest philanthropy organizations devoted to lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender rights.534 In a recent interview about the OUTSpoken
project, Robert MacFarlane, the Foundation’s Executive Director, reported that
the Foundation’s marketing research shows that “women—and mothers in
particular—are most effective in speaking for the movement.”535 He explained:
“‘When we’re looking for common ground and looking for Americans to
understand us, they have to see us and know us, and right now women and
moms are more persuasive.’ . . . People still tend to react negatively to images
of gay fathers with children.”536
There you have it—the gender of homophobia in a nutshell, from a leading
advocate for gay and lesbian parenthood, a leading opponent of homophobia
itself. MacFarlane may well be correct: In this moment, lesbian mothers may
make better “poster parents” than gay fathers. It is my belief, however, that we
will not defeat homophobia until we confront the gender of homophobia in a
more straightforward manner. I look forward to a day when we no longer feel
compelled to ignore, hide, or apologize for our differences—a day when we can
insist that regardless of our differences, we should all be respected.
APPENDIX
This Appendix lists 191 opinions from custody and visitation cases
involving a gay, lesbian, or bisexual parent and a heterosexual parent reported
in the United States since the 1950s. I would like to thank Kimberly D.
Richman of the University of San Francisco for generously sharing her
collection of family law opinions involving LGBT parents.537 I supplemented
Richman’s list with my own research by conducting additional Westlaw and
Lexis searches and checking citations in cases, casebooks, law review articles,
and internet sources. To the best of my knowledge and effort, this collection
includes every custody and visitation case involving a gay, lesbian, or bisexual
parent and a heterosexual parent reported in the United States since the 1950s.

532. Id.
533. Id.
534. See GILL FOUNDATION, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://www.gillfoundation.org/
gillresources.
535. Buchanan, supra note 530, at A1 (reporting Interview of Robert MacFarlane, Executive
Director of Gill Foundation).
536. Id.
537. See KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING CHANGE: QUEER PARENTS, JUDGES, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 179-87 (2009).
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A. Reported Custody and Visitation Opinions Involving Gay Fathers and
Heterosexual Mothers, 1950-2007
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Luley v. Luley, 48 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1951)
Commonwealth ex rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1952)
Evans v. Evans, 8 Cal. Rptr. 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)
A. v. A., 514 P.2d 358 (Or. Ct. App. 1973)
In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974)
In re J.S. & C., 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
In re Marriage of Teepe, 271 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1978)
Neal v. White, 362 So. 2d 1148 (La. Ct. App.1978)
Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)
Jilek v. Chatman, 613 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App. 1981)
J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
Sweet v. White, 432 N.E.2d 1098 (Ill. App. Ct.1982)
In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1983)
Wolff v. Wolff, 349 N.W.2d 656 (S.D. 1984)
Gottleib v. Gottleib, 108 A.D.2d 120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985)
In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App.1987)
Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988)
Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
Glover v. Glover, 586 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990)
Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
H.J.B. v. P.W., 628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ. App.1993)
In re Marriage of Salmon, 519 N.W.2d 94 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)
North v. North, 648 A.2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)
In re R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
In re R.E.W., 472 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1996)
In re Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
Pulliam v. Smith, 476 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)
Boswell v. Boswell, 701 A.2d 1153 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)
Inscoe v. Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662 (Md. 1998)
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K.T.W.P. v. D.R.W., 721 So. 2d 699 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)
Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d 898 (N.C. 1998)
T.K.T. v F.P.T., 716 So.2d 1235 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)
Santiago J. v. Pamela J., No. CN98-06021, 1999 WL 1456949 (Del. Fam.
Ct. Aug. 12, 1999)
Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1999)
In re Marriage of Kraft, No. 99-1719, 2000 WL 1289135 (Iowa Ct. App.
Sept. 13, 2000)
Pamela J. v. Santiago J., No. CN98-06021, 2000 WL 1279443 (Del. Fam.
Ct. May 4, 2000)
Price v. Price, No. E1999-00102, 2000 WL 704596 (Tenn. Ct. App. May
31, 2000)
In re Marriage of Dorworth, 33 P.3d 1260 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)
Jenkins v. Jenkins, No. 05-98-01849, 2001 WL 507221 (Tex. Ct. App.
May 15, 2001)
Santiago J. v. Pamela J., No. CN98-06021, 2002 WL 31453319 (Del.
Fam. Ct. July 10, 2002)
Strome v. Strome, 60 P.3d 1158 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)
McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111 (Idaho 2004)
Soteriou v. Soteriou, No. FA0307332435, 2005 WL 3471472 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 23, 2005)
Isch v. Isch, No. FA0540020635, 2006 WL 1230270 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Apr.
20, 2006)
T.D. v. T.A.J., No. CN01-09889, 2006 WL 4041946 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar.
3, 2006)
A.O.V. v. J.R.V., Nos. 0219-06-4, 0220-06-4, 2007 WL 581871 (Va. Ct.
App. Feb. 27, 2007)

B. Reported Custody and Visitation Opinions Involving Lesbian Mothers and
Heterosexual Fathers, 1950-2007
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Immerman v. Immerman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298 (Ct. App. 1959)
Nadler v. Super. Ct., 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Ct. App. 1967)
Anagnostpoulous v. Anagnostpoulous, 317 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct.
1974)
DiStefano v. DiStefano, 51 A.D.2d 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
Lewis v. Lewis, No. 626, 1976 Ohio App. LEXIS 6024 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 1, 1976)
Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 881 (La. Ct. App. 1978)
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